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Abstract 
This thesis presents an ethnographic account of a grassroots social movement in 
Thailand, the Assembly of the Poor, drawing on theoretical perspectives from political 
ecology and social movements literature. The Assembly is the first national association 
representing the interests of the rural poor to emerge in the country since the activities 
of the Peasants' Federation of Thailand in the 1970s. Established in 1995, the Assembly 
of the Poor is a coalition of villagers' groups, including some urban slum dwellers, and 
non-government organisations (NGOs) campaigning on environmental and local 
livelihood issues such as the impacts of large dams and community land rights in 
reserved forest lands and national parks. After its formation the Assembly quickly 
became famous in Thailand for staging mass protests in Bangkok to force the 
government into negotiations. 
An ongoing debate in the political ecology and social movements literature concerns the 
potential of grassroots environmental movements to effectively transform social 
structures of inequality and exploitation in Third World societies. Taking the Assembly 
of the Poor as a case study, this thesis explores the social processes of organisation and 
mobilisation through which collective action and protest is constituted, and investigates 
the extent to which the Assembly is able to challenge dominant discourses of 
development, effect social change and broaden grassroots democracy in Thailand. 
Although the Assembly has made only limited material gains relative to its goals (but in 
themselves unprecedented in Thailand), I argue that the movement demonstrates 
significant changes in grassroots political consciousness, and innovative forms of 
activism, organisation and political struggle. Through its campaigns and protests the 
Assembly endeavours to create new social and political spaces for the assertion of 
collective identity and political agency, express its grievances and social critique, and 
put forms of grassroots democracy into practice. 
Chapter 2 examines the historical background and origins of the Assembly of the Poor. 
Rapid economic development, industrialisation and social change induced a rising 
lV 
demand for land, forests, water and other rural resources by rural people, the state and 
industry. Local communities increasingly got caught up in "resource wars" which 
erupted throughout the country as they actively resisted the growing threats to their 
livelihoods and land rights. This resurgence of rural politics is also related to the history 
of the NGO movement as a domain for middle class activism and rural development 
work. In Chapter 3, I present a broad overview of the Assembly and discuss how it has 
been able to overcome a fragmenting impetus, and combine a large number of diverse, 
locally-grounded conflicts into a country-wide movement able to campaign and 
negotiate at a national level. 
We cannot fully understand the Assembly as a social movement without appreciating its 
structure based on local groups linked by thriving social networks. In chapter 4 I give an 
ethnographic account of the emergence of the Mun River Villagers' Committee and its 
campaign against the Pak Mun Dam. I focus on explaining how concerted collective 
action emerged in the context of environmental degradation. In Chapter 5 I examine the 
educated, middle class activists who play a key role in building and sustaining the 
networks which constitute the Assembly. Considering the anti-hierarchical and 
democratic ideology espoused within the Assembly, this handful of activists hold a 
position of power and influence which contradicts their expressed democratic ideals. 
In chapter 6 I present a detailed ethnographic account of the Assembly's 1997 protest, 
demonstrating should it not be seen as simply an instrumental political strategy. Its 
demonstrations dramatise conflict and make it visible while also forcing open spaces 
and opportunities to express the language of human and democratic rights to support 
their demands. Demonstrations express a social critique about the usually unseen 
impacts of 'development' on poor and marginalised people. 
I address issues of participation, democracy and civil society in Chapter 7. The 
movement has attempted to enact collective leadership, participation and grassroots 
democracy through meetings, forums and networks. Villagers and NGO activists are 
constructing and extending the social domain of civil society in an effort to build 
autonomous countervailing forces to challenge the political and economic power of the 
state and economic elite. 
V 
Languages, Transcription and Thai References 
Two main languages were used by the subjects of this study, Thai and Lao. Thai is the 
'national' language of Thailand, originating among the people of the central region of 
the country. People from other areas often refer to it as the 'central language' (phasa 
klang) to differentiate it from a number of colloquial languages and dialects of regional 
Thailand. Thus, in the text I often refer to Thai as Central Thai to underscore this 
distinction. Lao is the domestic (ie first-learned) language of the great majority of 
people in the Northeast region and hence of many of the groups in the Assembly of the 
Poor. Within Thailand Lao is frequently referred to as 'Isan language' (phasa isan), as 
'Isan' is a Thai-Pali word meaning 'northeast' (see Diller, 1991; Keyes, 1989). 
Moreover, Lao exists as a spoken language but its written form has virtually 
disappeared. Therefore, during fieldwork in Thailand all interviews, including the 
majority which were conducted in Lao, were transcribed by research assistants into Thai 
script. Throughout the text I have indicated when interviewees and speakers use Lao. If 
not otherwise indicated the original was spoken in Thai. Documents extracted have all 
been translated from written Thai. All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated. 
The following transcription system, adapted from one devised by Peter Jackson 
(personal communication), is used throughout the thesis for Thai and Lao terms. I make 
a few exceptions for well-known conventions, such as baht for the Thai currency. For 
well-known place names and public figures I follow the spelling conventions used in 
Thailand's English-language newspapers, the Bangkok Post and the Nation. 
It is important to note that the Assembly of the Poor, the subject of this study, and the 
Forum of the Poor are the same association, called in Thai the samatcha khan jon. Soon 
after it was formed the samatcha khan jon officially titled itself in English the 
"Assembly of the Poor" on all relevant documentation. Since then the Nation newspaper 
has followed that official translation. The Bangkok Post, on the other hand, continues to 
call the association the Forum of the Poor, following an alternative translation of the 
word samatcha. 
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Following Thai academic convention, the names of Thai scholars are listed 
alphabetically according to first name in citations and the References section. 
Following the Australian Commonwealth Style Guide, newspaper articles are cited in 
the text with details of source, date and page number if no author is named in the 
source. Where authors of newspaper articles have been given, the name and date system 
has been used for the citation and a full reference appears in the reference list. 
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1 Introduction 
Respected fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters, 
Please listen to a verse from me, Panya Tongyu 
I'm going to sing the story of fishing and the Pak Mun Dam 
The history of the Assembly and the Mun River ... 
Oh, mothers and fathers, 
The floodwaters have destroyed our livelihood ... 
But before the dam many Thai people 
Came to make their living on the Mun River ... 
Many villagers hunted there for fish, which never dwindled 
Helping each other to catch fish to eat and to sell 
Why did such an abundance of itu fish 
Rise up the Mun River? ... 
When they came to build the government's dam 
We joined together against the project 
Bringing our ideas together to find a solution 
Many advisors joined in to help us 
It was like that, fathers and mothers 
Big people, little people all joined in ... 
We marched for twelve days down the Khong Jiam Road 
Many of us marching together in a powerful procession 
Brothers and sisters, you saw us on television 
Which broadcast our voices and publicised our story 
Thai brothers and sisters in trouble 
Who marched together and occupied the Pak Mun Dam wall 
Until the government paid us compensation 
We saw the fruits of coming together to depend on each other ... 
Now, why have poor people joined together once again to fight 
In the Assembly of the Poor? ... 
(Written and performed by Panya Tongyu, 1 Bangkok, 13-3-1997) 
On 25 January 1997 the Assembly of the Poor (samatcha khan Jon) commenced a mass 
demonstration on the streets facing Government House in Bangkok. The Assembly, a 
coalition of rural villagers and urban slum dwellers, encompassed groups from every 
region of Thailand. Over twenty thousand people joined the rally, refusing to move until 
1 This is a pseudonym, not his real name. All participants in this research gave information and 
interviews on the condition of anomymity. See methods section below, Following the People. 
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the government responded to their petition. The protesters transformed the usually quiet 
streets into a bustling, makeshift village in the heart of the city. On many nights during 
the rally Panya Tongyu, a villager from Northeast Thailand, took to the stage and 
performed songs he had written to entertain his fellow villagers. In his younger days 
Panya had worked as a mo lam, a performer of Lao folk songs, and had spent fourteen 
years travelling throughout the Northeast and Laos, before returning to his home on the 
banks of the Mun River in Ubon Ratchathani Province. One sultry day in March, while 
we sat together among the crowd of protesters on the dusty pavement, Panya scribbled 
down the words to a new song in a battered notebook. That night, accompanied by 
another villager on a khaen, a traditional Northeastern musical instrument (see 
Photograph 2), Panya performed his mo lam song to the heat-exhausted demonstrators. 
He sang about his fellow villagers living along the Mun River and the coming of the 
Pak Mun Dam. In his song he travelled along the river, describing communities and 
fishing sites from his own home to the confluence with the Mekong fifty kilometres 
away. Pan ya sang about the villagers' demonstrations against the dam, their long protest 
march from the provincial capital to the dam wall in 1994, and their first small victory 
in their fight for compensation from the state. This song was a story about one 
successful protest, told to inspire another. I present extracts above to begin this thesis. 
Almost every night, after announcements about the day to day organisation of the rally 
and the progress of negotiations with the government, protesters told their own 
particular stories from the stage, their local community's battles with the state and their 
group's reasons for joining the Assembly of the Poor. Some of those from the 
Northeast, like Fanya, transformed their histories into mo lam songs. Many, like the 
Mun River villagers, were fighting over the impacts of dams. Others came to demand 
fair compensation for dislocation by large-scale development projects, or defend their 
claims to land or forest threatened by state forestry policy. Through these stories and 
performances the members of the Assembly continually talked to themselves, 
consolidating the common ground of shared problems, building the solidarity needed to 
sustain their protest, and seeking the language and symbolism to express their struggle 
in the public sphere and negotiate with the government. 
The protest was an extraordinary event in the history of political action by rural and 
urban poor in Thailand. The Assembly of the Poor had been formed in December 1995 
2 
with the goal of increasing its members' political influence and bargaining power with 
the state through a larger, nationwide umbrella organisation. This was the first national 
organisation representing rural villagers' interests to emerge since the rise and fall of the 
Peasants Federation of Thailand amidst the political turmoil of the 1970s. Following its 
inception, the Assembly staged a number of high-profile, mass protests aiming to 
compel the government to resolve the grievances of its members. Early in 1996 they 
forced their way onto the national stage with a mass demonstration by 12,000 people at 
Government House that lasted for five weeks and won extensive coverage in the media. 
By the beginning of 1997 their network had grown, so that when they returned to rally 
in Bangkok they were able to mobilise over 20,000 people to protest. While in Bangkok 
they attracted almost daily coverage in the media, much of it positive and supportive. 
Ordinary villagers from marginalised communities spoke on national TV, were quoted 
in the daily newspapers, and negotiated face to face with senior government 
bureaucrats, cabinet ministers and Prime Minister Chavalit Y ongchaiyudh. The protest 
rally continued for over three months (ninety-nine days), making it the longest lasting 
popular demonstration ever mounted in Bangkok. At the time, it appeared to achieve 
considerable success. When the protesters finally dispersed and returned to their homes 
on 2 May 1997, they had won a government commitment to address all of their 
gnevances. 
Contesting Development: Environmental Movements and Social Change 
There has been growing interest, particularly among researchers in the fields of political 
ecology and social movement studies, in the widespread emergence and impact of 
"grassroots" environmental movements throughout the Third World during the last three 
decades.2 Growing numbers of local people, mostly in rural areas, have mobilised 
collectively to defend their livelihoods or rights over local resources. The environmental 
and social impacts of dams, and conflicts over land, forests and other natural resources 
arising from economic development, have created new motives for mobilisation and 
political action, and new sources of solidarity and organisation (Ghai, 1994 ). At the 
same time, increasingly globalised discourses of environmentalism (Milton, 1996) and 
2 Examples include (Adams, 1990; Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Cummings, 1990; Escobar, 1995a; Esteva & 
Prakash, 1992; Friedmann & Rangan, 1993; Gadgil & Guba, 1994; Guha, 1989, 1997; Hirsch & Warren, 
1998; Parnwell & Bryant, 1996; Peet & Watts, 1996a; Peluso, 1992; Redclift, 1987; Redclift & Sage, 
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sustainable development (Bryant & Parnwell, 1996; Redclift, 1987) have provided new 
ways of expressing and legitimising their claims, and of finding common cause with 
urban-based organisations and sections of the middle class (Hirsch, 1997c). In many 
cases they have been supported by non-government organisations (NGOs), sometimes 
linking them into national, and even international, organisational networks (Julie Fisher, 
1993, 1998). Through these growing NGO networks and globalising discourses, many 
grassroots movements have been linked into a global debate - indeed, some say a global 
movement - over development and its alternatives (Rahnema, 1997). The Chipko 
movement (Guha, 1989) and opposition to the Narmada Dam scheme (Esteva & 
Prakash, 1992; Fisher, 1995) in India are probably the most well-known examples. 
The proliferation of new organisations and movements around resource and 
environmental conflicts in the Third World has sparked a heated debate in the academic 
literature about their political and social implications (see, for example, Escobar, 1995a, 
1995b; Linkenbach, 1994; Peet & Watts, 1996a; Yearly, 1994). Bryant and Bailey 
(1997: 158), in their book on Third World Political Ecology, note that a 
potentially revolutionary ... development in terms of the topography of a 
politicised environment since the 1980s has thus been the emergence of 
grassroots organisations as a political force to be reckoned with in many 
parts of the Third World. 
Many commentators see grassroots collective action as representing a new type of social 
actor: 'new' social movements bringing about progressive social and political change in 
the societies in which they emerge (for example, Wignaraja, 1993b). As Peet and Watts 
(1996b:33) sum up the argument, these new "Third World people's movements rather 
than First World workers' movements are seen as potentially transformative of the 
existing social structures". Hence, they even suggest a specific field of study -
"liberation ecology" - to explore the contribution of grassroots environmental 
movements to social transformation and challenging conventional notions of 
development. 
This debate about the potential of grassroots environmental movements for social and 
political transformation constitutes the central issue of this thesis. Taking the Assembly 
1994; Sethi, 1993; Taylor, 1995) 
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of the Poor as a case study, I explore the social processes through which collective 
action and protest are constituted, and study the extent to which the Assembly has been 
able to effect social change, transform power relations and broaden grassroots 
democracy in Thailand. Indeed, claims about the importance of the Assembly as an 
agent of social transformation in Thai society have already been made by some Thai 
political scientists, notably Suthy Prasartset and Praphat Pintoptaeng. Suthy (1997) 
asserts that the Assembly of the Poor is a "new social movement" (khabuankan 
khleuanwai thang sangkhom mai) and "is one leader in the struggle to strengthen civil 
society" in Thailand. Praphat (1997a:54) notes that the central aim of the Assembly is to 
"transform social relations of power to enable local communities freedom to manage 
local resources and compel the state to guarantee local community rights, and recognise 
local know ledge". 
Although I argue that we need to avoid an overly romantic faith in the progressive 
nature or potential of grassroots movements such as the Assembly of the Poor to 
generate far-reaching structural change in society, I do argue that significant changes 
are taking place in grassroots political culture and, hence, the horizons of activism and 
political contestation. An aspect of this is the demonstration of creative and innovative 
forms of activism, organisation and political struggle. Material grievances stemming 
from the economic interests and class positions of Assembly members are important, 
but what is relatively new about the Assembly derives from the organisational and 
networking capacities developed in partnership with NGOs, and strategies open to them 
to articulate their claims with influential symbolic and discursive representations, such 
as environmental protection, sustainable development, community rights, participation 
and democracy. Through its campaigns and protests, as I explore throughout the thesis, 
the Assembly struggles to create new social and political spaces for the assertion of 
collective identity and political agency, expression of its grievances, as well as the 
practice of participation and grassroots democracy as a challenge to the dominant 
political culture. 
My approach to these issues has been primarily through ethnographic research, and I 
believe that ethnography lends itself well to studying collective action in all its 
complexity. Throughout the thesis I present ethnographic material as appropriate to 
demonstrate this. Ethnography has been particularly useful in revealing the creative and 
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socially constructed nature of identity, collective action and protest, and the deployment 
of culture in political struggle. In focusing on the experiences, knowledge and practices 
of different actors in the Assembly of the Poor I explore the ways in which participants 
give meaning to their actions and the movement as a whole. This approach reveals the 
range and diversity of motivations and understandings, and internal tensions and 
contradictions that open up the complex and manifold nature of the movement. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will introduce the main theoretical concepts and issues 
that I have drawn on in my account and analysis of the Assembly of the Poor, before 
outlining my ethnographic methods in greater detail. My approach, as I suggested 
above, has been informed by two broad fields of study which have both focused on 
environmental conflict and collective action in Third World contexts, namely, political 
ecology and social movements theory. 
Political Ecology 
Political ecology does not constitute a cohesive body of theory as such, but is generally 
concerned with applying Marxist political economy to an analysis of the causes and 
consequences of environmental change and resource conflicts in the Third World 
(Bryant, 1992; Bryant & Bailey, 1997). The field encompasses a variety of perspectives 
and approaches to the sociology and political economy of the environment. A broad 
body of work that has emerged out of this approach provides a wide ranging critique of 
development policy and practice in terms of their effects on the environment and rural 
peoples' livelihoods, and their contribution to the intensification of resource conflicts. 
In this study I draw on political ecology's focus on the political, economic, and 
ideological dimensions of environmental conflict to provide theoretical tools for 
contextualising and analysing the Assembly of the Poor. Clearly, the concern with 
delineating the social actors involved, their class bases and material interests, the 
relations of power between them and the broader political and social context will 
contribute to understanding and interpreting the social processes involved. 
The political ecology approach first emerged during the 1980s, stimulated by the need 
to understand Third World "peasant and agrarian societies in the throes of complex 
forms of capitalist transition" and the environmental consequences of those 
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transformations (Peet & Watts, 1996b:5). Research focused on the political and 
economic causes of environmental change, social conflict over access and control of 
resources, and the political and social consequences (Bryant, 1992). Several authors 
pointed to the contradiction between the roles of the state as promoter and regulator of 
economic development, and as manager and protector of the natural environment 
(Bryant, 1992: 15). Development policies which accelerate natural resource exploitation 
and promote the construction of irrigation works, dams and other kinds of infrastructure 
have transformed and often degraded the environment. Studies of conflicts over access 
brought into focus the power relations between different social groups, especially in 
conflicts between local people and the state, or capitalist business interests. Other 
studies explored the impact of environmental change on different socio-economic 
groups. Rural people in the Third World mostly depend on land and local natural 
resources for their livelihood. Collective environmental action by the poor, therefore, 
largely stems from struggles in defence of livelihood (Friedmann & Rangan, 1993; 
Guha, 1997; Redclift, 1987). Thus, as Bryant (1992:26) notes, environmental 
degradation "not only exacerbates socio-economic inequalities, but also serves as a 
catalyst for political protest, notably as manifested in environmental movements". 
The proliferation of new resource and ecological conflicts in the Third World has 
stimulated some writers to try to expand the analytical power of political ecology by 
drawing on social movements theory and poststructural perspectives on discourse and 
power, notably in the recent volume Liberation Ecologies, edited by Peet and Watts 
(1996a; see also Redclift, 1992). These authors highlight the cultural and discursive 
terrain on which environmental movements must engage and oppose power. They 
review recent work which demonstrates the socially constructed and contested meanings 
of "development", "environment", and "sustainability." The ideas and discourses of 
economic development that have dominated the modem development project in the 
Third World since World War II have been a major cause of environmental and 
ecological change affecting populations and communities. Social conflicts may be 
contests over the meanings of environment or sustainable development, as much as 
struggles over material conditions such as access and control over resources (Escobar, 
1995a). 
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Political Ecology in Thailand 
Political ecology and a concern with the political, economic and social dimensions of 
environmental change have informed a great deal of research in Thailand, and there is 
now an extensive corpus of academic and scholarly work available on development and 
environmental change in that context. As a matter of fact, these studies have made 
important contributions to Third World political ecology in general and received a great 
deal of interest beyond the boundaries of 'Thai studies'. This body of work reflects an 
empirical concern with the environmental impact of Thailand's rapid economic 
development and the growing influence of environmental politics during the last two 
decades. Until recently researchers focused on the causes and consequences of 
perceived environmental problems and the growing social conflicts over resources. For 
example, much has been written about the causes of deforestation and conflicts over 
forest use, agriculture and land degradation, and the environmental consequences of 
industrialisation and pollution (including Hafner, 1990; Hirsch, 1993; 1997c; 1997d; 
Lohmann, 1996; Murray, 1992a; Pinkaew & Rajesh, 1992; Rigg, 1995; Santhat, 1989; 
Suthawan, Pinkaew, Sutharin, & Chusak, 1996; Taylor, 1994). 
Some recent studies highlight the central role of poor, marginalised people, and NGOs, 
in environmentalism in Thailand (Hirsch, 1997a; 1997c; Pfirmann & Kron, 1992; 
Pinkaew & Rajesh, 1992; Prudhisan & Maneerat, 1997; Tegbaru, 1997; Tjelland, 1998). 
Hirsch (1993, 1997c) argues that struggles by poor rural villagers over local resources 
constitute the main social basis of environmentalism. "Environmentalism in Thailand is 
largely a response to the depredations made on resources, livelihoods and quality of life 
by the country's rapid economic development in recent decades ... " (Hirsch, 1997b: 10). 
He argues that 
grassroots environmentalism has emerged as a combination of two 
related trends. The first is the impact of Thailand's development path on 
rural livelihoods, in particular as it has affected peripheral and 
marginalised people and areas .... The second trend is the incorporation 
of people living in more marginal areas into mainstream political and 
economic arenas, and the role of environment as a legitimising discourse 
for their claims over resources (Hirsch, 1997a:25-26). 
As Hirsch points out, environmental discourse - multiple and contested as it is -
provides ideological means for poor, less powerful villagers to seek to legitimate their 
claims over land and other resources, and also to find common ground and make 
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alliances with other social forces such as environmental NGOs. But he sees such 
alliances between rural groups, other institutions and middle-class NGOs as contingent 
and transient, involving "a coalescence of diverse social actors that has ultimately 
proven short-lived" (Hirsch, 1997c: 192). In the final analysis, Hirsch sees grassroots 
environmental action as diverse, fragmented and unorganised, grounded in widespread 
local conflicts. This is also the impression that his edited volume on environmentalism 
in Thailand gives us (Hirsch, 1997d). This seems to be because political ecology 
approaches have focused methodologically on particular perceived environmental 
problems, such as pollution, deforestation, or have used case studies focusing on 
specific localities and communities. In this study I will show how the Assembly of the 
Poor has endeavoured to forge a diverse and scattered array of local struggles into a 
cohesive and more sustained, long-lasting movement. 
From another perspective political ecology has not been very good at explaining the 
process that takes us from a situation of environmental degradation and/or threats to 
local livelihoods to concerted collective action and organised protest by affected people. 
Researchers have focused on how the environment has become a rallying point for 
grassroots movements and collective action in opposition to domination, exploitation 
and displacement. By and large, however, they have failed to account for how it is that 
local people or grassroots groups have been able to overcome the disorganising and 
atomising effects of industrial development and environmental degradation on the 
ability of local communities to mobilise together effectively and sustain collective 
campaigns. In other words, how do we get from the structural causes of ecological 
grievances to collective agency? Political ecology has largely taken over an old 
assumption from peasant studies that 'misery breeds revolt' (Goodwin & Skocpol, 
1994) and translated it into a language of environmental politics: 'environmental crisis 
and threats to livelihood breed organised opposition.' 
Some recent studies of resistance and collective action by the poor, however, suggest 
that "there is never a straight line from misery to protest nor a straight historical line 
from dissent to mobilization" (Fox & Starn, 1997:11). For example, in his study of 
"everyday forms of peasant resistance", Scott (1985:246) emphasises the range of 
obstacles to collective action by poor, rural villagers in Malaysia, including complex 
local social stratification, fear, repression and "the day-to-day imperative of earning a 
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living - of household survival". Scott believes that it is the "level of repression that 
structures the available options" (1985:299). In his work on labour unions in Thailand, 
Brown (1997: 171) argues that industrialisation and rapid economic growth in urban 
areas have placed economic pressures on workers that undermine their ability to get 
organised in the first place: " ... as rural communities are uprooted and people seek 
waged work across a range of industries, often employed in small enterprises, the task 
of establishing and maintaining existing organisations has proven difficult". The other 
side of this is, as Brown alludes to, social disintegration of rural villages throughout 
Thailand and their growing dependence on short and long term migration to work 
outside the local area. The point is, of course, that while environmental degradation or 
threats to local livelihood arising from large-scale development projects provide rallying 
points for local opposition, at the same time they further undermine local communities' 
abilities to mobilise people and resources for organised and sustained opposition. 
For such reasons, I believe that it is important to explain how local people move from 
ecological crisis to organised and collective political action. How, in the face of 
growing economic insecurity, social disruption and attacks on local resources, 1n 
addition to coercive or repressive action by the state, do local people get organised 
effectively in the first place? How do they move beyond a grounding in local, concrete 
grievances to building a cohesive national movement, as the Assembly of the Poor has 
done? How do they mobilise people and resources, and choose the strategies and tactics 
of their struggle? How do they articulate their struggle and demands in opposition to 
powerful discourses of "national development" and the claims of the state or business 
corporations? 
Social Movements Theory 
In this thesis I draw on a number of theoretical insights and perspectives from the social 
movements literature to address these questions. Social movements theory has always 
been concerned with analysing human agency, collective action and social change, and 
these are also key issues here. In particular, recent theoretical elaborations of the roles 
of culture and identity, social networks, and the notion of "civil society" as the terrain 
and target of social movement activity, provide fruitful approaches to understanding and 
analysing the Assembly of the Poor. 
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The term "social movement" usually refers to organised, collective action by people 
sharing common interests or a common identity, and which has the goal of changing the 
social order (Scott, 1990:6). Beginning in the 1960s, the emergence of what appeared to 
be radically new forms of collective action and political mobilisation in industrialised 
nations challenged and transformed the previously dominant modes of analysis (Della 
Porta & Diani, 1999; Johnston, Larana, & Gusfield, 1994). Until that time, social 
science perspectives on social movements were dominated by functionalism and 
Marxist theories of class struggle and ideology (Melucci, 1996; Scott, 1990). The rise of 
student and women's movements during the 1960s, followed by peace and anti-nuclear 
movements, environmentalism, gay rights and ethnic autonomy struggles, seemed to 
explode conventional ways of understanding collective behaviour and social change 
(Johnston et al., 1994). These "new social movements" appeared to represent radically 
new political "subjects", distinct, for instance, from the labour movement, which was 
the legitimate political subject of social transformation in Marxist theory. They did not 
seem to be analysable in terms of the class or socio-economic positions of participants 
and defied neat ideological categorisation in terms of right or left. Moreover, their 
"grievances and mobilizing factors tend to focus on cultural and symbolic issues that are 
linked with issues of identity rather than on economic grievances that characterized the 
working-class movement" (Johnston et al., 1994:7; see also Melucci, 1985). Many of 
the new movements acted on a deep scepticism and mistrust of conventional channels of 
political participation and representation, and used strategies of mass mobilisation, 
nonviolent protest and civil disobedience (Johnston et al., 1994:8). 
Research and theoretical engagement with the "new social movements" provoked new 
theoretical perspectives and fresh conceptions of contemporary movements, their 
relationships to industrial society and their roles in social change. By the mid- l 980s 
Cohen was able to delineate two main competing theoretical paradigms: strategy 
perspectives and identity perspectives (Cohen, 1985; see also Cohen & Arato, 1992). 
Strategy perspectives view social movements as manifestations of social conflict, which 
emerge as a result of changing social and political opportunities, and access to 
resources. Analysts drawing on strategy perspectives see collective action as rational 
and instrumental, and investigate the ways in which movements organise, mobilise 
people and resources, and deploy political strategies towards social or political change 
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(Cohen & Arato, 1992). Praphat's (1997a; 1997b; 1998) work on the Assembly of the 
Poor exemplifies this approach. 
The identity paradigm, on the other hand, studies social movements as collective 
struggles over meanings, culture and identity. This struggle over culture and identity is 
rarely unconnected with the participants' material conditions, nor do they usually totally 
reject dominant ideologies. Rather, every group involved in social conflict faces the 
problem of articulating a collective identity and of struggling to give meanings to their 
actions. In other words, social and political conflict is often deeply expressive and 
symbolic. Issues of culture, identity and knowledge as they are expressed and contested 
within social movements are important, as they reveal new ways in which power is 
contested by social actors. Material and class bases of social movements remain 
important, but analysts such as Melucci (1988; 1996) have also focused on questions of 
identity and collective identity in addressing questions of why people get involved in 
social movements and how they mobilise as a collective social actor. The reformulation 
and articulation of a collective identity may be as much a political strategy of resistance 
and opposition to the state as a means of mobilising people to protest (Castells, 1997). 
Cohen (1985) argues that the two distinct paradigms can be regarded as complementary; 
that both perspectives can usefully inform theoretical analysis of social movements (see 
also Cohen & Arato, 1992). This marks a recognition among many social movement 
theorists that, as Scott (1990:5) puts it, "holistic theories of the social world [such as 
Marxism or functionalism] are untenable in the light of the complexity of the 
phenomena under consideration". At the same time, the actual novelty and 
distinctiveness of the so-called "new social movements" has been called into question 
(Melucci, 1994). As (Scott, 1990) points out, many "new" movements were actually 
revivals of earlier movements or could be shown to have direct historical links with 
"old" labour movements. Thus, much recent work draws on a range of theoretical 
perspectives in order to explore issues of culture and identity, as well as political 
opportunities and strategies (Della Porta & Diani, 1999; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 
1996; Melucci, 1996). 
The explosion of writing and theoretical engagement with social movements in the West 
has also stimulated and influenced work in Third World contexts (for example Escobar 
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& Alvarez, 1992b; Slater, 1985; Wignaraja, 1993a). Many of the new theoretical 
questions and issues were taken up and applied, albeit with a recognition of political, 
social and cultural contexts different from Western countries. Much of the literature 
dealing with social movements in the Third World explores organised struggles to 
transform power relations in order to overcome poverty and inequality, and to 
democratise society. For example, writing from a position of activism and solidarity, 
Wignaraja (1993b:18-19) argues that social movements are engaged in building 
"countervailing power to the dominant state power". Like much political ecology, he 
views contemporary social movements in the Third World as responding to a deep-
seated crisis of dominant approaches to modernisation and development. The resulting 
social contradictions weaken or undermine the legitimacy of the state and its exercise of 
power. In response, according to Wignaraja (1993b:4), two themes dominate the 
struggles of the new movements: "human development and participatory democracy"; 
that is, demands for socially just and equitable forms of development, and practices of 
participatory democracy that go beyond the limitations of institutional forms of 
representative democracy, enabling poor people to become the subjects and agents of 
their own development. 
Similarly, Escobar and Alvarez (1992a) focus particularly on identities and cultural 
innovation, new forms or strategies of "doing politics", and new ways of 
conceptualising and enacting democracy and development. These issues are taken up 
with renewed emphasis in a recent follow-up volume that stresses cultural politics and 
political culture (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998b ). Similarly, another recent 
volume, edited by Fox and Stam (1997:3), takes as its specific task a focus on the 
"ideas, identities, symbols, and strategies" which inform "the cultural politics of social 
protest" by social movements in both Third World and Western contexts. 
Assembling Identity, Mobilising Culture 
I begin this chapter with a folk song performed in the midst of a street protest to signal 
an approach to the Assembly of the Poor that pays close attention to identity, culture 
and the symbolic dimensions of protest, power and political struggle. Indeed, questions 
of how the movement socially constructs collective identity and establishes solidarity as 
a basis for struggle and protest, and deploys culture strategically, run through many of 
the chapters of this thesis. As Castells (1997:8) points out, the formation of collective 
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identity is always involved when subordinated people attempt to redefine their position 
in society and change the social order. Similar! y, Jordan and Weedon argue that 
collective identities are formed in the process of struggle, and represent "sites of 
resistance": 
Just as group domination has its cultural dimensions, so resistance to 
domination must also be rooted in culture and experience, at least, if it is 
be successful.... [F]or marginalized and oppressed groups, the 
construction of new and resistant identities is a key dimension of a wider 
political struggle to transform society (1995:5-6, emphasis in original). 
Hence, the formation and articulation of identity constitutes a foundation for collective 
action. 
Gupta and Ferguson (1997) explore the relations between place, identity and resistance, 
and this would seem to be a useful theme to investigate in environmental movements . 
'Place', as Barfield (1997:360) notes, is "a space made meaningful by human 
occupation or appropriation and is a cultural concept fundamental to describing human 
beings' relations with their environment". Political ecology, however, has largely 
ignored the role of place or environment in the social construction of identity. For many 
of the groups making up the Assembly of the Poor, claims about their relations to their 
dwelling place and local environment constitute both a rallying point for collective 
opposition and a political claim of authenticity and legitimacy for their grievances and 
political struggle. 
As I explore throughout this thesis, most of the groups in the Assembly articulate a 
locally-grounded identity that is linked with their particular claims about a way of life 
faced with destruction by 'development'. As I will argue, a faithfulness to the material 
local grievances of its diverse membership constitutes one of the strengths of the 
Assembly and helps explain its ability to mobilise large numbers of people to protest. 
But this brings us to the problem of how localisation is transcended in building a 
national movement (Esteva & Prakash, 1992). How does the Assembly construct a 
unifying identity and culture of solidarity (Fantasia, 1988), which at the same time 
integrates and gives validity to a large number of locally-based identities? A concern 
with identity questions how it is constituted, negotiated and transformed, problematises 
labels and categories such as "the Poor", "the people" and "the grassroots" that the 
Assembly uses in representing itself and seeking legitimacy for political actions. At one 
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very basic level the Assembly fights to gain recognition of its own autonomous agency 
with the "right to have rights" and to make claims on the state (Dagnino, 1998:50). 
Furthermore, as I show below, the position and identity of NGO activists in the 
Assembly reveals tensions and contradictions that have not been resolved. 
The articulation of identity illuminates an aspect of the discursive and symbolic 
elaboration of the Assembly's political struggles. Social movements and post-Marxist 
theorists have recognised that for every material conflict there may be many possible 
ways of making it meaningful and articulating it with available discourses and 
ideologies in the process of struggle (Della Porta & Diani, 1999; Laclau & Mouffe, 
1985). Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 168) argue that the "forms of articulation of an 
antagonism, therefore, far from being predetermined, are the result of a hegemonic 
struggle". In this case the Assembly of the Poor draws on environmental discourse to 
help make its conflicts and grievances meaningful in a way that can oppose 
development practice but also attack the hegemony of industrial development. As 
Hirsch argues, environmentalism offers a legitimising discourse for local people's 
claims over resources (1997a; 1997c). But, as I demonstrate in this study, the Assembly 
cannot be understood solely as an expression of environmental conflict. It links its 
struggles with discourses of sustainable development, community rights, participation 
and democratic reform. Thus, the movement challenges not just development policy and 
practice but also the dominant political culture. 
Direct Action and Protest 
As Scott (1990:6) writes, social movements are often distinguished from other 
collective actors, such as political parties, "in that they have mass mobilization, or the 
threat of mobilization, as their prime source of social sanction, and hence of power" ( 
see also Marx & McAdam, 1994). In this study I pay particular attention to protest, the 
social processes underlying it and the meanings it expresses. I show that the Assembly's 
mass demonstrations should not be seen simply as an instrumental political strategy; 
they do not simply mean 'power in numbers'. The Assembly's demonstrations 
dramatise conflict and make it visible while also forcing open discursive spaces and 
political opportunities to express the language of community and democracy to support 
their demands and stake their claims to be seen as a legitimate political actor with 
justifiable grievances (see Alvarez et al., 1998b:20). In other words, as Melucci 
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(1998:425) argues, protests seek to express demands to the state but also involve a 
struggle over the very meanings of collective action. Demonstrations express a social 
critique about the usually unseen impacts of 'development' on poor and marginalised 
people and the responsibilities of the state to see that social justice is done. 
Furthermore, the cultural and symbolic dimensions of the Assembly can be illustrated 
most forcefully in the movement's protest rallies. The Assembly's protests carry 
expressive and symbolic meanings that cannot be separated from their political power. 
They are sites for the social construction of identity and solidarity, the deployment of 
culture and cultural practices for political purposes, and the assertion of the "voice of 
the poor". From the perspective of the villagers and NGO activists, participation in 
rallies and protests provides experience through which their sense of solidarity and 
collective political agency and potential - their political culture - is transformed. 
Civil Society, Participation and Hegemony 
Studies of social movements throughout the world have challenged our ideas about the 
domains and targets of political struggle, about how power relations are contested and 
transformed. The state is no longer the sole, or in some cases even the major, antagonist 
and target of action. Instead, the concept of "civil society" is increasingly being brought 
to bear to analyse the social domains and impacts of social movements, grassroots 
organisations and NGOs (in, for example, Cohen & Arato, 1992; Dagnino, 1998; Scott, 
1990). 
"Civil society" is an ambiguous and contested concept. In its simplest formulation it 
refers to everyday social life which is independent from the direct control of the state 
(Hindess, 1996). More incisively, the civil society concept is used to analyse the social 
and political contexts in which people are able to act collectively to challenge or 
influence state power. Thus, in much of the literature, civil society means a domain in 
which people are free to form independent and autonomous associations to mediate with 
the state and pursue their political goals (for example Fisher, 1998: 11-12). A spatial 
metaphor for conceptualising and defining civil society prevails throughout much of the 
political science literature. For example, Hewison (1997: 10) defines civil society as an 
"autonomous sphere of political space in which 'political forces representing 
constellations of interests in society have contested state power' " (see also Rodan, 
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1996:28). 
Fisher (1998) maintains that NGOs (including professional development agencies and 
grassroots organisations) represent the foremost agents strengthening and democratising 
civil society in most of the Third World. She argues that when previously marginalised 
people organise together into associations they increase their power to influence the 
state and their collective capacity to address their own problems. Associations that 
promote internal participatory democracy further "empower" themselves and enhance 
their organisational autonomy. Moreover, Fisher argues that through their growing 
tendency towards building NGO networks and relationships with other sectors of civil 
society, such as churches and business corporations, they are increasing their ability to 
mobilise resources and influence powerful civil institutions. Therefore, considering the 
rapid proliferation in the sheer numbers of NGOs during the previous two decades, 
especially those pursuing advocacy for the political rights and livelihood security of the 
poor, Fisher concludes that they represent the "vanguard of civil society" in developing 
countries (1998: 12). Thus, this approach to civil society celebrates it as the "political 
space" in which people organise autonomously and develop their collective capacities 
and power to influence the state. It suggests a social domain in which to develop 
participatory and democratic institutions and push back the power and domination of 
authoritarian states. 
A rather different conception of civil society, that draws on the work of Antonio 
Gramsci, has also become influential in the approaches of many activists and 
academics. Gramsci' s contribution to modem conceptions of civil society is his analysis 
of how dominant groups controlling the state gained the consent of the majority of the 
population without the use of force or coercion (1971: 12). Gramsci conceives of civil 
society as the domain of the contestation of hegemony. He does write about civil society 
as consisting of a multiplicity of private associations and organisations, but sees the 
dominant forms of these as serving the state, not opposing it: "one or more [association] 
predominates relatively or absolutely - constituting the hegemonic apparatus of one 
social group over the rest of the population (or civil society)" (Gramsci, 1971:264-5). 
"Hegemony" means the ideological and cultural process through which society is 
organised and the consent of the majority attained: 
The "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population 
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to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant 
fundamental group; this consent is "historically" caused by the prestige 
(and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because 
of its position and function in the world of production (Gramsci, 
1971: 12). 
Through his concept of hegemony, Gramsci highlights the ideological and cultural 
dimensions of domination and the exercise of power in civil society. Ideologies, he 
writes, "'organise' human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle, etc" (Gramsci, 1971 :377). Hegemony, in 
Gramci's formulation, is not a totalising process. As Raymond Williams (1977) writes, 
hegemony is a lived process which, because embedded in unequal social relations, is 
also constantly resisted and challenged. Hegemony, in Williams' interpretation, 
sees the relations of domination and subordination, in their forms as 
practical consciousness, as in effect a saturation of the whole process of 
living - not only of political and economic activity, nor only of manifest 
social activity, but of the whole substance of lived identities and 
relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can 
ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural system 
seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and 
common sense (1977: 110). 
Thus, such theoretical formulations propose that the political consciousness and 
identities of subordinated groups are shaped by hegemonic processes. 'Political 
consciousness' here refers to the subjective experiences and knowledge of actors, the 
meanings they give to their social position, and the ways in which they understand their 
political interests and the purposes of collective action. Hegemony, in other words, 
shapes 'political subjects', as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Dagnino (1998) have 
argued. Some commentators have pointed to the similarities between these 
reformulations of Gramscian theory and Foucault's analysis of the operation of power 
and discourse in constitution of human subjectivity (see Smart, 1983; Torfing, 1999). 
For example, in an often-quoted passage Foucault wrote 
There are two meanings of the word subject ... subject to someone else 
by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience 
or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to (Foucault 1982, quoted in Rabinow, 
1984:21). 
Thus, Gramsci and his successors see civil society as a terrain of struggle over 
hegemony and his work suggests a new approach to social transformation in which the 
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power of the state could be overturned by a cultural and ideological struggle for 
institutions in civil society, rather than a direct assault on the state (Dagnino, 1998; 
Strinati, 1995; Williams, 1977). Oppositional or 'counter-hegemonic' forces must be 
based in emergent forms of political consciousness and identities able to bring people 
together for collective action. As hegemony operates in the practical, day to day lives of 
people, then the transformation of political consciousness must also begin from there. 
These ideas have had a profound impact on activists and academics of the Left in many 
parts of the Third World, especially since the early 1980s, as Dagnino (1998) shows in 
Latin America. The Marxist idea of revolution has been largely replaced by struggles to 
democratise civil society as a means of opposition to authoritarian states (Dagnino, 
1998). 
As we will see in this study, both of these conceptions of civil society have proved 
influential in the Thai NGO sector and among activists and academics working with the 
Assembly of the Poor. That is, activists see civil society as the political space in which 
people get organised and build networks to increase their collective capacities to 
influence the state, but also in terms of a constant cultural and ideological struggle over 
the political consciousness of the poor. 
Social Networks in Everyday Life 
In social movements theory there has been a growing recognition of the importance of 
social networks submerged in everyday life as the basis of social movements (for 
instance, Alvarez, 1997; 1985; Melucci, 1988). That is, social movement events such as 
protests, assemblies or meetings are occasional; at other times people go about their 
daily lives and movements are sustained by informal, interpersonal networks and 
cultural practices. For example, in 1997 after the Assembly's protest in Bangkok had 
dispersed, I spent several months visiting Assembly members in their home villages in 
regional areas. Of course I usually found them working their rice fields, tending their 
cash crops or with their families; there was little to distinguish them from their 
neighbours who had not joined the movement. But what gradually appeared to me was a 
thriving social network of communication and organisation which hinged on village 
level organisers and NGO activists. Religious events such as merit-making festivals and 
funerals provided opportunities for the activists to reinforce informal ties and their 
solidarity with local cultural traditions. But this is not to argue that the daily lives of 
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participants were not transformed in certain ways through their participation in these 
networks ( see especially Chapters 5 and 7). 
The structural position of NGO activists in movement networks, and their cultural 
capital of education and literacy skills, means that they have a great deal of influence 
and power in the movement, which they nevertheless tend to down-play considerably in 
public forums. As Jelin (1998) and Alvarez (1998) discuss, this has become a 
controversial issue in some recent Third World social movement literature. Indeed, 
some commentators on the Thai context, such as Rigg (1994) and Tjelland (1995) argue 
that NGOs do little more than incorporate villagers into unequal patron-client relations 
with little real opportunities for grassroots democracy or empowerment. In this study I 
explore and analyse the relationships between the NGO activists and villagers in the 
Assembly (particularly in Chapters 5 and 7). There have been very few ethnographic 
explorations of villager-NGO relations in the literature, and the detailed ethnographic 
accounts provide important insights. 
The Assembly of the Poor as a Social Movement 
As Melucci stresses, the large range of empirical phenomena encompassed by the label 
social movement "are made up of multiple motivations, relations, and orientations" 
(1998:424). Therefore, the definitions and the analytic perspectives used will shape 
interpretations and understandings of movements (Melucci, 1996; 1998). In the previous 
sections I have briefly outlined the theoretical contexts of political ecology and social 
movements theory and some of the theoretical questions which they raise that underlie 
my approach in this thesis. 
Thai political scientists Praphat Pintoptaeng (1997a; 1997b; 1998) and Suthy Prasartset 
( 1997) have applied the analytical lens of social movements theory in their approaches 
to the Assembly of the Poor. Suthy (1997:3-4), in a short article, argues that the 
Assembly enacts new forms of political contention that he contrasts with "old social 
movements" such as peasant or workers' organisations that campaign on the narrow 
economic interests of their members. What distinguishes the Assembly from such "old" 
movements, in his analysis, is its rejection of party politics as an arena of political 
contestation, and its articulation of broad social issues such as human rights, democracy 
and environmentalism. In Suthy's (1997:5) view, the Assembly represents a "counter-
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hegemonic movement" contesting "hegemonic ideas of development" (kanphatthana 
krasae Zak). 
Praphat' s work, however, presents the most detailed, in-depth analysis of the Assembly 
of the Poor so far (1997a; 1997b; 1998). He mainly draws on the political strategy 
perspective. In his recent book about the Assembly he describes the material grievances 
which motivated people to join, the organisational structure of the movement, the 
context of political and social opportunities in which it emerged, political strategies and 
methods of mobilising people and resources for protest, and state responses (Praphat, 
1998). 
This thesis complements Praphat's work. Certainly, the scope of my study is broader, as 
he focuses mainly on the Assembly during its 1997 protest rally, whereas I follow the 
structure of the movement back to locally-based villagers' organisations and track 
Assembly activities outside of times of mass mobilisation in protest. Furthermore, my 
ethnographic approach has led me to pay greater attention to identity and culture, and 
investigate the experiences and understandings of ordinary villagers, · as well as 
villagers' leaders and NGO activists in the movement. 
One final point about social movement theory needs to be made. 'Social movement' 
encompasses not just an analytical category for academic analysis, but also a complex 
discourse disseminated, interpreted and applied reflexively in real situations by activists. 
Political activists in the Assembly describe it as a social movement precisely because · 
that is what they aspire to: organised, broad-based collective action for social change 
and democratisation of Thai society. For example, a publicity leaflet released during the 
1997 protest in Bangkok declares that, "Protest rallies ... have taught the people that we 
should not struggle alone. We must create a democratic social movement" (Assembly of 
the Poor, 1997h). As Cohen and Arato (1992:499) point out, political strategy 
approaches may have particular appeal and practical application for political activists, as 
they most closely coincide with issues facing a movement organiser aiming to mobilise 
people and resources in a campaign. What becomes relevant and interesting then is how 
different participants understand and put the idea of social movement into the practice. 
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Following the People: Anthropological Perspectives and Ethnographic Methods 
Anthropology's emphasis on the experiences and culture of local people and 
subordinated groups potentially has an enormous contribution to make to the study of 
social movements. One anthropologist who has consistently argued for an ethnographic 
engagement with social movements is Arturo Escobar. In Encountering Development, 
he argues for an "anthropology of modernity [which] would rely on ethnographic 
approaches that look at social farms as produced by historical practices combining 
knowledge and power; it would seek to examine how truth claims are related to 
practices and symbols that produce and regulate social life" (Escobar, 1995a: 12). In 
other words, he advocates engagement in the deconstruction and critique of 
development discourse. This project is now under way within anthropology (Cheater, 
1999; Escobar, 1995a; Gardner & Lewis, 1996; Grillo, 1997). Furthermore, Escobar 
argues for an anthropological engagement with contemporary social movements in the 
Third World, many of which arise out of economic and environmental crises and 
challenge dominant ideas of modernity and development. He argues that, because 
contemporary social movements can be seen as cultural struggles over the very 
definitions of development, nature and society, anthropology can make important 
contributions (Escobar, 1992; 1995a). Indeed, this is illustrated in the contributions by 
several anthropologists to a recent edited volume exploring cultural politics and political 
culture in Latin American social movements (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998a). 
Gledhill also advocates a political anthropology of social movements. Like Escobar he 
emphasises issues of culture and power for anthropological investigation: 
A focus on social movements encourages us to look at the politics of 
culture as a process by which groups in 'society' construct or reconstruct 
identities for themselves in their struggles and negotiations with both 
dominant groups and the state (Gledhill, 1994: 194 ). 
He points out that ethnographic fieldwork "enables anthropologists to exarrnne 
processes which are often ignored by political scientists and sociologists working with 
survey techniques and secondary sources" (8). These processes include the way power 
relations are enacted and experienced at the local level by villagers and other social 
actors as part of daily life. Moreover, ethnographic approaches to specific social 
contexts need to be combined with other kinds of data. As Gledhill writes, "It does not 
detract from the importance of fieldwork in any way to argue that it must be 
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complimented by other types of methodologies and data and that anthropologists should 
analyse structures, organisations and systems of relationships beyond the local level" 
(1994:8). 
The ethnographic approach which I have taken, and which grew out of my interest in 
the political activity of rural villagers, has led me to focus on the experience and 
perspectives of villagers and NGO activists in the Assembly of the Poor, and their roles 
in the social construction of collective action and protest. But doing ethnographic 
fieldwork with participants of a protest movement like the Assembly of the Poor 
presented particular practical and methodological problems. 
The fieldwork and research on which this thesis is based were to a large extent 
fortuitous, as I initially began with a research proposal to investigate local 
environmental conflicts along the Chi-Mun River system in Northeast Thailand (see 
Map 1). I had previously spent eighteen months living in Northeast Thailand, including 
ten months in rural villages conducting ethnographic fieldwork for my Masters Degree 
on "Village Schools and Rural Development" (Missingham, 1994; 1997) and 
accompanying my partner during her doctoral research on women's health (Whittaker, 
1995). When I arrived in Thailand in September 1996 I did not expect to be spending 
long periods of time sitting among a crowd of protesters on a hot, dusty street in 
Bangkok. I had planned to stay for an extended time in two local communities on the 
Chi-Mun River, much like many previous village-based studies in Thailand (Chayan, 
1993). 
During a total of thirteen months fieldwork in Thailand from September 1996 to March 
1997, and again from May to November 1997, I was affiliated with the Research and 
Development Institute (RDI) of Khon Kaen University in the Northeast. Consequently, 
my home base was located in Khon Kaen but, as I explain below, I spent long periods of 
time in two other fieldsites, the Mun River in Ubon Ratchathani Province, and in 
Bangkok. In November 1996 I visited the Mun River Villagers' Centre in Ubon 
Ratchathani Province to introduce myself to the NGO workers and villagers based there, 
and to explain my desire to do fieldwork in a local village. I proposed to study the social 
effects of the Pak Mun Dam, which had been completed in mid-1994, and the activities 
of the Mun River villagers' organisation and their local NGO supporters. They readily 
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agreed to cooperate, but events quickly overtook my original plans. I knew a little about 
the Assembly of the Poor protests earlier that year, and so asked about Mun River 
villagers' involvement. Noting my interest, the NGO activists invited me to an 
upcoming regional meeting of the Assembly a few weeks later. At that meeting, 
hundreds of villagers' representatives from throughout the Northeast voted to protest 
again in Bangkok if the government failed to respond to their petition (Fieldnotes, 15-
12-1997, Khong Jiam). 
So it happened that I found myself in the fortunate position of observing members of the 
Assembly of the Poor preparing for a major campaign and protest, while at the same 
time beginning to establish relationships and friendships with some Mun River villagers 
and NGO activists who were to play important roles in that protest. If I wanted to study 
the Mun River villagers' political action I had to take the Assembly into account, and if 
I wanted to research the Assembly ethnographically, then within the Mun River 
villagers' organisation was an excellent place to start. The Assembly is too large and 
diverse to study ethnographically as a whole. It encompasses groups from over one 
hundred different localities from every region of the country (see Chapter 3). Therefore, 
I had to be strategic. I believe that the ethnographic case studies presented here give a 
depth to our understanding of the Assembly that a broader account would lack. 
While I spent a lot of time with Mun River villagers and their leaders, this is not simply 
a study of one group within the movement, and I tried to systematically employ 
strategies to extend the boundaries of the ethnography. The research quickly became 
what Marcus (1995) calls "multi-sited ethnography". I chose to "follow the people" and 
to "follow the conflict" (Marcus, 1995: 106-110). In doing so, I worked outwards, so to 
speak, from the villagers and NGO activists I already knew. The protest rally is a good 
example. When I first arrived there two days after the demonstration began, I first 
joined Fanya Tongyu, whom I already knew, and his family and friends. They 
introduced me to dozens of others from the Mun River group who were keen to talk 
with me and grant me interviews. Pan ya' s support and assistance proved to be crucial. 
He was an organiser for his own community and a delegate for the Mun River Villagers' 
Organisation. Through Fanya I gained access to 'internal' meetings of the Assembly's 
collective leadership, and negotiation meetings with government representatives. Mun 
River villagers' leaders introduced me to delegates from other local groups, and I 
24 
gradually developed a network of people throughout the protest site. Some individuals 
and groups were very suspicious of me at first, but I found that most protesters were 
keen to tell their stories, even to foreign researchers, which they saw as another channel 
to disseminate their struggle. 
This networking continued later, after the protest concluded and the villagers returned to 
their homes. On the invitation of the NGO workers who lived and worked there, I lived 
for a total of four months at the Mun River Villagers' Centre in Pha Pratu Thong village 
on the edge of Pak Mun Dam. This provided a convenient base for visits to dozens of 
villages along the river. But I soon discovered that the Villagers' Centre acted as a 
coordinating centre for a whole network of local groups in the province who had joined 
the Assembly of the Poor. Travelling with the NGO activists I visited many of these 
groups, including communities on the nearby Sirinthorn Dam, Chong Mek on the border 
with Laos, and villages on the Dorm Yai River several hours drive away (see Maps 1 
and 2). I also spent several months in Bangkok, particularly during the extended protest 
rally early in 1997, but also including regular visits during the rest of 1997 for meetings 
and seminars involving _ Assembly representatives, visits to the Assembly secretarial 
office and interviews. Thus, the "field" became an interlocking network of politically 
and socially-constructed locations where certain kinds of knowledge about the 
Assembly were accessible. 
The rest of the time I was mainly based in Khon Kaen, where I undertook ethnographic 
research with two groups of villagers on the Nam Pong River who did not join the 
Assembly of the Poor. This ethnographic data is not presented in detail in this thesis 
because of space constraints, but it provided important background material on local 
organisation, campaign and protest strategies, and insights into why some groups 
participated in the movement and others did not. The town of Khon Kaen is also a 
coordinating centre for NGO activity and I made regular visits to NGO offices for 
seminars, interviews and NGO publications and documents. 
Within these various sites I employed the tools of an ethnographer - participant 
observation, conversations and informal interviews with informants, formal recorded 
interviews. I participated in and observed literally dozens of meetings, from the local 
level to the national level, and negotiation meetings with government representatives. 
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Altogether I interviewed sixty-nine individual villagers, including community leaders 
and ordinary 'rank and file' members of the Assembly. I also formally interviewed 
twenty-one NGO activists involved at various levels in the Assembly, who also engaged 
in ongoing and informative discussions with me during the course of fieldwork. From 
December 1996 to May 1997 I employed an assistant, Mr. Suwit Wongpom, who 
helped in all aspects of the research, especially in the conduct and transcription of 
interviews in Lao. All interviews began with an offer of confidentiality and anonymity, 
and subsequently most participants indicated a preference that their real names not be 
used in the final written thesis. Therefore, I have used pseudonyms for all participants in 
the research, except where indicated or when well-known public figures are mentioned. 
Representing the Assembly 
One month after the Assembly's protest rally dispersed, early in June 1997, I visited 
Fanya Tongyu, in his home beside the Mun River. When I arrived he was busy cooking 
bamboo shoots that he had collected with his wife the night before in a big square tin 
over a charcoal stove. We sat upstairs in his wooden house which was shaded by the 
green and fertile papaya, custard apple and kapok trees surrounding it. I could see the 
swollen, muddy river only thirty metres away through the trees. We talked about the 
protest and Fanya dug out up the battered school exercise book in which he had 
recorded information and scribbled out the songs he composed during the rally. Now he 
sang several of his mo lam songs again, unaccompanied this time, while I recorded 
them. 
I asked Fanya what the Assembly of the Poor had been doing for the past month or so. 
As he was a delegate in the Mun River villagers' negotiating team, I hoped that he 
would give me details of recent meetings with the government. But he interpreted my 
question at a different, more literal level. "The Assembly of the Poor have returned to 
their homes and their families. They have been preparing their fields and planting their 
rice. Working their uplands cash crops," he replied. This summed up what he and his 
wife, and most of the members of the Mun River villagers' organisation were doing, and 
it reminded me forcibly that even though they had returned to their ordinary, day to day 
lives they remained the Assembly of the Poor. This study gives an account of the 
Assembly of the Poor that sheds light on these different dimensions of the movement -
the intense experience of high-profile public demonstrations, the day to day life of 
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people back in their home villages and the networks which connect them. In focusing on 
the experiences, knowledge and understandings of the social actors whose words and 
practice actually constitute the Assembly, I often present villagers' and activists' own 
words (in translation) in order to better explore their understandings of the Assembly, 
their role and part in it, and the meanings they ascribe to their political struggles. 
During ethnographic fieldwork it is difficult not to form personal commitments and 
feelings of obligation with informants and subjects of one's research (Gledhill, 1994). In 
this thesis I do not pretend to be a "objective" observer without feelings of personal 
commitment and support for members of the Assembly and their campaign goals. 
Indeed, I would not have been able to gain access and entry to the groups that I worked 
with in the Assembly without holding sympathy and expressing support for their 
struggle. Nevertheless, I hope that I have been able to step back from an overly-
romantic representation of the Assembly of the Poor in this study and give an account 
that includes the tensions, contradictions and conflicts within the movement. 
To sum up, this study presents an ethnographic account of the Assembly of the Poor, 
informed by theoretical perspectives from political ecology and social movements 
literature. In the next chapter I briefly describe the historical background of the 
Assembly in order to explain the origins of the movement. 
In chapter 3 I present a broad overview of the Assembly and discuss how it has been 
able to overcome a fragmenting and localising impetus to combine a large number of 
diverse, locally-grounded conflicts into a country-wide movement able to campaign and 
negotiate at a national level. 
From a 'big picture' overview of the movement I then turn to a detailed ethnographic 
account of the origins and activities of one particular organisation that has taken a 
leading role in the Assembly of the Poor. Chapter 4 analyses the relationships between 
development, environmental change and grassroots collective action through a case 
study of the emergence of the Mun River Villagers' Committee and its campaign against 
the Pak Mun Dam in Northeast Thailand. This is the story that Pan ya Tongyu introduces 
so eloquently at the beginning of this chapter. 
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In Chapter 5 I tum my attention to the NGO activists within the Assembly. While there 
has been a large amount written about development and environmental NGOs in 
Thailand, there is, as yet, very little written about the actual people who work within 
these organisations. These activists play a key role in building and sustaining the 
networks which constitute the Assembly. 
It is well-managed villagers' organisations, grounded in local problems, on the one 
hand, together with well-coordinated networks linking and supporting them, on the 
other, that enable the Assembly to mobilise large numbers of people to mount sustained, 
mass protest. Chapter 6 presents an ethnographic account of the Assembly's ninety-nine 
day protest rally in 1997. I explore the processes underlying mass mobilisation and the 
social construction of protest, the complex political meanings expressed by the 
demonstration and ways in which the experience transforms the political consciousness 
of participants. 
I address issues of participation, democracy and civil society in Chapter 7. I describe 
how these concepts are put into practice within the organisations and networks which 
constitute the Assembly. It endeavours to enact a "culture of equality" which sustains 
collective leadership and promotes grassroots democracy within the movement. 
Nevertheless, a handful of NGO activists exert power and influence within these 
processes which contradict the Assembly's democratic ideology. 
Finally, in the concluding chapter I consider the multiple outcomes of the Assembly ' s 
activities in the light of the social and political processes described in the previous 
chapters. I return to the key issues posed in the introduction and address the extent to 
which the Assembly of the Poor has been able to transform unequal relations of power 
to the benefit of its grassroots members. 
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Photograph 1. The main stage in the Assembly of the Poor's protest rally. The 
stage backdrop says "Assembly of the Poor demands what was promised [rally no.] 
2". 
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Photograph 2. One night during the Assembly of the Poor protest. A group of 
Northeastern villagers perform an impromptu mor lam to entertain themselves. 
The bamboo wind instrument is a khaen (mentioned on page 2). 
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2 Origins 
The Assembly of the Poor was born when the "Mun River Declaration" 
was made on 10-15 December 1995 at Thammasat University and 
Khong Jiam, Ubon Ratchathani Province by representatives of different 
local communities who have suffered the consequences of 
development... that have arisen in the middle of the war over natural 
resources, soil, water, forest, mineral sources, fisheries etc, between the 
state, business and villagers living in local communities in both the 
countryside and the city (Assembly of the Poor, 1997h, my translation). 
This chapter traces the historical origins of the Assembly of the Poor. As the quote 
above states, the Assembly was founded during a conference of villagers' and NGO 
delegates in December 1995. It announced its birth with the "Mun River Declaration" 
and a protest at the ASEAN Summit then convening in Bangkok. In this chapter I 
present a context for understanding the Assembly and the ethnographic accounts 
presented later. Here I argue that there are three main strands to the historical 
background of the Assembly. 
First, since the early 1960s, economic development and industrialisation have 
transformed Thailand's economy and social structure, undermining the importance and 
security of the agricultural sector, exacerbating economic inequality and bringing about 
new forms of exploitation. Development engendered a social and environmental crisis 
in the countryside as the state and capital increasingly moved to acquire and exploit 
rural environmental resources such as land, forests and rivers, especially since the early 
1980s. 
Second, Thailand has a long history of rural resistance and collective struggle against 
subordination and exploitation. It is difficult to present a cohesive account of rural 
opposition as it has largely been a suppressed history, based in sporadic and 
geographically dispersed events. Nevertheless, I believe that the Assembly needs to be 
seen against that historical context in order to remind us of the agency of the rural poor 
in a long history of struggles to improve their position in Thai society. 
Third, by the early 1970s economic growth and development had produced a growing 
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and diverse middle class, which sustained a movement of political activism opposing 
elite power, and struggling for social and political reform. Much of the energy of this 
middle class political activism has been channelled through the NGO movement since 
the early 1980s. These three trends converged in the rural development work of NGOs 
as activists promoted organisation and "alternative development" by rural villagers in 
response to poverty and environmental threats to livelihood. The result has been a 
decade of rural organising, political activism and protest such as has never before been 
seen in Thailand. 
Economic Development and its Consequences 
Rapid economic growth and industrialisation since the 1960s have changed the structure 
of the Thai economy in terms of the importance of agriculture in GDP and the relative 
wealth and income of the city and village. Up until 1960, Thai society was primarily 
based on an agricultural economy, with about 90 per cent of the workforce engaged in 
agriculture and contributing about half of the national income (Medhi, 1995b:3; Warr, 
1993). Rice production dominated, with over 80 per cent of cultivated land used to 
cultivate rice (Falkus, 1995). Under the military dictatorship of Sarit Thanarat (Prime 
Minister from 1958 to 1963) the government set the country on a path of 
industrialisation and economic growth. 
Sarit began promoting development (kanphatthana) as "both an economic goal to be 
pursued and an ideology on which the legitimacy of the government was based" (Keyes, 
1989:76). The shift towards a greater development effort in regional Thailand was 
largely motivated by concerns of the political leaders that the relative underdevelopment 
and poverty in rural areas, particularly the Northeast, would become a source of 
rebellion and a threat to the security of the state (Demaine, 1986; Keyes, 1967). 
"Development" became a key strategy of ideological, political and economic 
incorporation of marginal communities into the nation-state. Following the advice of the 
World Bank, his government began investing large amounts in public infrastructure and 
promoting private sector investment in manufacturing (Warr, 1993). The extension of 
economic infrastructure and the provision of schools , health centres and administrative 
structures served to incorporate regional populations into the nation-state and capitalist 
economy (Hirsch, 1990), but also enabled the exploitation by the centre of the profits of 
rural production and "the transfer of wealth from the countryside to the city" (Demaine, 
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1986:97). 
From 1961 development policy was officially guided by a series of National Economic 
and Social Development Plans drawn up by the National Economic and Social 
Development Board in the Office of the Prime Minister. Industrialisation was 
encouraged with import substitution policies during the 1960s, followed by a tum 
towards promotion of export-oriented manufacturing from the early 1970s (Falkus, 
1995). These policies led to a period of rapid economic growth and industrialisation 
from the mid-1980s (Falkus, 1995) that continued until the economic downturn and 
crisis that struck in 1997. 
During the 1960s economic growth, albeit highly inequitable, rapidly changed the 
structure of Thai society, while political power remained concentrated in the hands of 
the top echelons of the military and civil bureaucracy, in collusion with a small 
economic elite (Girling, 1981). The economy and social structure became increasingly 
diverse and economically differentiated. Cities and urban centres grew dramatically. A 
sizeable industrial working class appeared, but was kept disciplined under a suppressive 
regime of labour laws and state force (Girling, 1981). 
Development policies, however, favoured Bangkok at the expense of the rural sector, 
and large-scale agricultural industry at the expense of small-scale farmers and peasants 
(Bello, Cunningham, & Poh, 1998: 133-146). While economic and industrial 
development brought about a declining poverty incidence overall, inequality in income 
distribution grew (Pranee, 1995). Pranee reports that while there was a decline in 
poverty during the period of economic development, by 1988 21.2 per cent of the 
population still lived in poverty, and 89 per cent of those lived in rural villages and were 
mainly farmers or farm labourers (1995:224). By 1990, whereas agriculture's share of 
GDP had dropped to about 11 %, it still engaged over 60% of the work force (Warr, 
1993). While rice and agricultural production continued to grow in absolute terms, the 
agricultural sector declined relative to manufacturing, and rural production actually 
helped finance industrial investment and economic growth in Bangkok (Dixon, 1995; 
Medhi, 1995a). Although agriculture remained the foundation of economic growth until 
about 1980, the rice premium, a form of taxation, kept the domestic price artificially 
low and hence "depressed the income of rice farmers, kept the cost of living down for 
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urban dwellers (and thereby the cost of labour)" (Dixon, 1995:50). Rice was finally 
freed from government intervention with the lifting of the rice export tax in 1990 
(Medhi, 1995a). 
The result has been increasing economic inequalities between urban and rural Thailand. 
Large scale commercial rice production for the international market expanded in the 
Central Plains (Keyes, 1989: 156-157). There, and in the North, peasant landlessness and 
tenancy has increased (Turton, 1978). Isan (as the Northeast region is called) has 
suffered the greatest relative deprivation, remaining the poorest region with the greatest 
incidence of poverty (Keyes, 1989; Medhi, 1995a). Production in Isan remains largely 
in the hands of family production units cultivating relatively small plots, primarily for 
subsistence. Rice production has grown steadily in the region but mainly because rapid 
population growth resulted in the expansion of settlement for the clearing and 
cultivation of new land, usually forest areas. This uneven development has led to a 
growing dependence on short and long term migration from rural villages to Bangkok 
and other areas to make up for economic hardship at home and meet the demand for 
low-paid unskilled labour in the city (Lightfoot, Fuller, & Peerasit, 1983). For example, 
Sanitsuda (1990:21) estimated that "an average of two million [Isan] people leave their 
homes each year to look for work elsewhere", mainly in Bangkok's growing 
manufacturing and service industries. 
Coupled with these structural changes in the economy, industrial development has 
resulted in a growing demand for natural resources. While the economic profits of 
agricultural expansion and concomitant deforestation mainly went to fund economic 
growth and industrialisation in Bangkok, rural Thailand has been left with the 
ecological costs of deforestation, soil degradation and industrial pollution. 
Thailand's forests have disappeared rapidly during the last few decades. Feeny (1988) 
estimates that at the tum of the century about 70% of Thailand was covered by mature 
forest. By 1961 this had been reduced to 53%, and by the late 1980s less than 29% of 
the country was forested (Anat, Dhira, Elkinton, & Phaitoon, 1988; Potter, 1993). 
Official figures from the Forestry Department are considerably higher than the estimates 
of NGOs and environmentalists, who place the present forest coverage as low as 15%, 
and the figure is still declining (Hirsch, 1993:24; Lohmann, 1993). The causes are many 
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and complex, including population growth and the expansion of settlement and 
cultivation, the postwar extension of regional infrastructure which facilitated economic 
incorporation, postwar economic growth and spread of cash crops, logging and national 
security pro grams (Hafner, 1990; Hirsch, 1993). 
Changing state land and forest management policies have also contributed to 
deforestation and rural conflicts over land and resource rights (Hirsch, 1993). From the 
mid-1950s through to the mid- l 970s state forest policies reflected a growing concern 
about deforestation, but in practice the state mostly supported continued agricultural 
expansion and forest exploitation because of the huge economic returns these brought. 
During the period of forest-based communist insurgency from 1960 to the early 1980s, 
the military encouraged settlement and clearing of marginal forest land in order to 
counter communist occupation of the forest (Lohmann, 1993). When the insurgency 
effectively ended in the early 1980s it was estimated that 7.2 million people occupied 
land classified as forest reserve throughout Thailand (Pasuk, 1994:35). 
From the late 1970s the state's policies turned towards a much more active and 
aggressive assertion of control of classified forest, resettlement of forest settlers and 
restriction of access, and enforcement of "reforestation" policies and programs that have 
continued to the present day (Taylor, 1994). This change in policy seems to have been 
motivated by several factors, including rising concern both nationally and 
internationally about the environmental effects of deforestation, and the decline of the 
forest-based communist insurgency in the early 1980s. But perhaps most importantly, 
state agencies and powerful business interests have increasingly moved to appropriate 
land, forests and other natural resources to support industrialisation. 
Apart from the impacts of state forest management policies, dam construction has also 
transformed riverine environments in rural Thailand, displaced hundreds of thousands 
of villagers and affected the livelihoods of many times that number. Large dams have 
faced controversy and public opposition throughout the country virtually since the dam 
building program began, but during the 1980s and '90s conflicts and confrontations 
over the use and development of water resources and riverine environments have 
acquired a high profile. Large dams have been justified as 'dual purpose' to supply both 
irrigation water and hydroelectric power. Completed dams, however, have often failed 
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to live up to projected outputs of either electricity or irrigation water (Nart & Poonsab, 
1984). Most electric power generated by these dams services urban and industrial 
centres. In many cases, upon completion of hydroelectric dams, construction of 
irrigation infrastructure has been given low priority and lags far behind. By 1994 in the 
Northeast alone ten major dams had been constructed, extensive farmland and forests 
destroyed and fisheries degraded, and over 100,000 people had been displaced, many 
with little or no compensation (Thai Development Newsletter 25, 1994:51-55). 
It is in this context of economic development, structural change and enviro_nmental 
degradation that the recent history of rural resistance and organised opposition needs to 
be seen. The brief review of the economic and environmental impacts of the 
development era on rural villagers is not meant to imply that village life and livelihood 
were any easier before that time. Rural society and economy in Thailand have always 
been based on inequality and exploitation of the labour and agricultural production of 
poor peasants (Turton, 1978; 1984). The era of economic development and 
industrialisation, however, has brought new forms of inequality and exploitation, and 
hence new forms of grievances to motivate collective resistance. 
Rural Resistance and Organised Opposition 
Until fairly recently the ruling elite has ruthlessly suppressed any form of autonomous 
peasants' political organisation. As Pasuk and Baker (1995:72) note, rural villagers' 
main strategy of resistance to domination and exploitation has been evasion. 
Nevertheless, Thailand has a long history of peasant protest and organised rebellion, but 
until the 1960s peasant mobilisation had been largely sporadic and short-lived. Turton 
(1987:36) argues that 
Prior to 1974 there had been many instances of peasant protest and 
mobilization on issues of agricultural production and livelihood. By 
comparison with the PFf these protests had limited and localized aims, a 
less organized structure, and were likely to be couched in less 
challenging, more deferential terms. Often such protests involved the 
mass petition of bureaucratic authorities... Since the farmers had no 
organizational support, governments were often able to divert and coopt 
such movements ... 
Morell and Chai-anan present a similar picture: "Unorganized and scattered, 
traditionally most [peasants] have been politically apathetic, tending to accept their 
misfortune and poverty as their inescapable karma ... " (1981:212-3). 
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Nevertheless, as Turton mentions, there have many recorded instances of collective 
protest and open rebellion by peasants, going back several centuries (Chatthip, 1984; 
Praphat, 1998; Tanabe, 1984). They were relatively disorganised and localised, and 
usually quickly repressed by the military or police. Many stemmed from peasant 
resistance to the extension of political and economic control by the Central Thai state, 
such as the administrative and tax reforms enforced during the reign of King 
Chulalongkom (1868-1910). Several incidents have been recorded in the North where 
peasants revolted against the burdens of new tax regimes in 1889 and 1902 (Chayan, 
1984). 
Chatthip (1984) describes a number of small, localised peasant revolts in Northeast 
Thailand from the seventeenth century to 1959 which he calls Holy Men Revolts. 
Peasants mobilised behind leaders who were believed to be "people with merit" who 
had acquired great Buddhist power. He argues that these revolts were fundamentally 
different from peasant revolts in other parts of Thailand, such as the Chiang Mai revolt 
of 1889 mentioned above, which he suggests were struggles against economic 
exploitation. But, in fact Chatthip himself shows that many of them involved collective 
resistance to Central Thai state power and economic exploitation through taxation. 
Environmental crises such as drought and crop failures throughout the Northeast almost 
certainly worsened economic pressures and contributed to villagers' grievances and 
motivations to rebel in some instances (Breazeale, 1975). Tanabe (1984) argues that 
Buddhist ideas about millenarianism, consciousness of ethnic difference, and 
experiences of oppression and exploitation also provided ideological motivations for 
these organised rebellions. 
While such peasant rebellions were limited and quickly suppressed, the first opposition 
movement which carried the organisational and ideological force to gain widespread 
support among villagers and sustain itself for a relatively long period of time was the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). 
The Communist Rural Insurgency 
Writers such as Turton (1987), and Morell and Chai-anan (1981), do not include the 
CPT insurgency in their accounts of peasant opposition movements, seeming to regard 
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it as a different sort of phenomenon. Nevertheless, I argue here that the CPT represented 
an important avenue for organised peasant opposition from the 1960s to the extent that 
it gained widespread support among disaffected rural villagers in many peripheral areas 
of Thailand. 
The Communist Party of Thailand was founded in 1930 but remained a small urban-
based, Chinese-dominated organisation until increasing suppression after Field Marshall 
Sarit took power in a coup in 1958 spurred the party to change its strategy to rural 
insurgency among the peasantry (Bowie, 1997; Turton, Fast, & Caldwell, 1978: 164). 
When it turned to rural insurgency in 1961 it only commanded a force of a few hundred 
active insurgents (see Bowie, 1997). The Party was lead by urban, educated, mainly 
Sino-Thais, but after it began its organised armed struggle against the state, it steadily 
attracted growing numbers of peasants into its ranks as active fighters. Evidence 
suggests that it also gained a much larger number of non-combatant supporters. For 
analysts like Morell and Chai-anan (1981) the social changes brought about by 
econorruc and industrial development, rapid population growth and econorruc 
inequality, and exploitation of poor farmers and landless peasants, provided the 
grievances and motivations for rural villagers to join the insurgency. They also show 
that state repression, and military and police actions to suppress insurgency and 
maintain domination, helped drive disaffected villagers into the arms of the communists 
(see also Bowie, 1997:67-68). Pasuk and Baker (1995:293) give examples of conflicts 
with state officials over land rights in peripheral communities of the North and 
Northeast which drove villagers into the insurgency. 
The CPT's relatively greater success in recruiting support in Northeast Thailand seems 
to have been based in the widespread poverty and disaffection with the national 
government in the region. During the 1960s the CPT concentrated its efforts in the 
Phuphan mountains traversing the Northeastern provinces of N akhon Phan om, Kalasin 
and Sakhon Nakhon and built a strong base of support there (Morell & Chai-anan, 
1981:83; Prizzia, 1985:12). From 1965 the insurgency spread to other regions as small-
scale conflicts broke out. The CPT developed a recruitment strategy that encouraged 
their cadres to "assist villagers in building their houses, harvesting their crops, and 
plowing the land" and to start from local contradictions and grievances in building a 
revolutionary peasantry (Prizzia, 1985: 18-19). 
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Evaluations of the CPT' s influence in rural areas, and estimates of numbers, vary 
widely across different sources in the literature. Morell and Chai-anan (1981:83) note 
that in 1969 "the government formally declared selected districts in thirty-five provinces 
to be 'communist-infested sensitive areas"'. Prizzia (1985:20) writes that during the 
democratic period from 1973 to 1976 the CPT grew in numbers and insurgency stepped 
up dramatically: "Communist insurgents under arms increased from an estimated 3,500 
in 1973 to 5,000 in 1974 and to 8,000 in 1975. The CPT was particularly successful in 
increasing its strength in northern and northeastern Thailand". Pasuk and Baker 
(1995:294) report that, "In 1975, the military reckoned that 412 villages were totally 
under insurgent control, and another 6,000 housing almost 4 million people were subject 
to some degree of insurgent influence". After the violent coup of October 1976, about 
4,000 people fled into the forests to join the CPT in their opposition, including left-wing 
MPs, labour and student leaders. By 1979 there were an estimated 13,000 insurgents 
bearing arms (Prizzia 1985). 
From 1978 respective _Thai governments moved away from a policy of military 
suppression of the CPT and towards winning the hearts and minds of rural people, and 
reincorporating alienated students and activists back into the nation-state. On the one 
hand this involved a series of moratoriums for forest-based insurgents to encourage 
them to return without fear of arrest or reprisal to their homes and their lives. On the 
other hand, the state began a concerted effort at rural development, especially in 
marginal areas of the Northeast, to incorporate marginal communities into mainstream 
society, both through programs of ideological dissemination and provision of 
infrastructure such as roads, schools and health stations to alleviate material problems of 
villagers (Demaine, 1986). Ideological divisions between pro-China and pro-Vietnam 
factions, loss of outside support, and amnesty offers from Kriangsak's and Prem's 
government all contributed to a decline and eventual collapse of the CPT's insurgency 
(Gawin, 1990; Prizzia, 1985). By early 1980s most insurgents had returned from the 
forests to rejoin the mainstream of Thai society. 
The Peasants' Federation of Thailand 
The formation of the Peasants' Federation of Thailand (sahaphan chao-na chao-rai 
haeng prathet thai, hereafter referred to as the PFf) in 1974 is held by many 
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commentators to be a turning point for rural activism and peasant politics (Morell & 
Chai-anan, 1981; Turton, 1987). Indeed, prior to the formation of the Assembly of the 
Poor in 1995, the PFT had been the most broad-based, well-organised association of 
poor, rural villagers in Thailand (Kanoksak, 1997). The Peasants' Federation of 
Thailand emerged during the democratic period that opened up in the 1973 to 197 6 
period. This context of liberal parliamentary democracy, greater freedom of association 
and political confidence of students and political activists is therefore very important in 
understanding how and why the PFT emerged and grew in prominence when it did. 
Rising levels of tenancy and landlessness, indebtedness, and exploitation of farmers by 
landlords, middle men and money-lenders charging high rents and high interest rates led 
to widespread and growing dissatisfaction and grievances of small farmers by the early 
1970s, and in that context the PFT emerged (Morell & Chai-anan, 1981). 
The PFT was formed in November 197 4 after a series of organised protests and 
meetings in the North, Centre and Northeast. The protests culminated in a 17-day 
demonstration by over 10,000 farmers in Bangkok in November 1974 which resulted in 
the formal declaration of the PFT. According to Turton (1987) student activists played 
important roles in helping farmers get organised and form the Federation, and had a 
strong influence on its leadership and political strategies. Farmers also built alliances 
with workers and supported their campaigns. For instance, Turton (1978: 129) reports 
that in 1974 "some 20,000 farmers ... marched on Bangkok in sympathy with the strike 
of textile workers". 
The PFT quickly expanded in terms of geographical reach and membership. Its main 
social base of support lay in the northern provinces of Chiang Mai, Lamphun and 
Lampang, but it established offices and organised in 41 of Thailand's 71 provinces 
(Turton, 1987:38). The PFT sets its goals as investigating farmers' problems and 
protecting their interests and legal rights. In 1974 the Federation petitioned and 
mobilised protests calling for land reform and legal controls on land rents. In response 
to the protests the government passed new laws controlling land rents and promising 
land reform. The PFT then launched a concerted campaign to inform farmers about their 
rights under these new laws and to push for their implementation by local level state 
officials. 
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The PFf set out to follow peaceful, legal methods of campaigning, petitioning and 
protest. As Turton (1978: 124) points out, 
the PFf organized largely in the centrally located valleys and basins of 
North and Central Thailand where there had not been a history of armed 
opposition to the government and where armed revolt would have been 
extremely dangerous and could have been met with overwhelming 
military suppression. 
After a new conservative government was formed in 1975, the PFf began to face 
systematic opposition from the state, and severe and violent repression by right wing 
forces and police acting outside the law (Morell & Chai-anan, 1981; Turton, 1987:39). 
PFf members and supporters were harassed, threatened with arrest and accused of 
being communists, despite the fact that, unlike the CPT insurgency, it aimed to 
undertake only peaceful campaigns within the law. At least twenty-one of its leaders 
were assassinated, both before and after the conservative repression and military coup 
of 6 October 1976. After the coup, as many of its leaders were jailed, others fled into the 
forests to join the insurgency. Although some PFf leaders and organisers tried to 
continue their activities after the October 1976 coup, in the context of renewed 
authoritarian rule and continued violent repression PFf actions and influence declined 
and ceased by 1979 (Kanoksak, 1997). 
In the sections that follow I will show that the resurgence of political organisation and 
activism of villagers is directly related to the development and support of the NGO 
movement in Thailand. The student movement of the 1970s was an important 
antecedent to the proliferation of NGO activities from the early 1980s. 
Middle Class Activism: From the Student Movement to NGOs 
Economic growth and industrialisation produced a rapidly expanding and diversifying 
middle class. By the late 1960s university and tertiary education was expanding rapidly 
and a growing number of these new tertiary students came from rural village 
backgrounds. "In the 1960s, universities were set up in each regional centre. The 
number of university students increased from 18,000 in 1961 to 100,000 in 1972" 
(Girling, 1981: 177). Ramkhamhaeng, an open university, opened in 1971. 
From the late 1960s university students began to represent a social force for political 
change and democratisation (Prizzia & Narong, 1974; Wedel & Wedel , 1987). In 1968, 
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after the promulgation of a new constitution, "students from fifteen universities and 
colleges set up the Student Volunteer Group to Observe the National Election" (Morell 
& Chai-anan, 1981:141). The National Student Centre of Thailand (NSCT), initially 
established in 1965, became an influential organising centre for student political power 
and activism after 1969. Morell and Chai-anan (1981:144-5) argue that "With their 
youthful idealism, optimism, unity, and increasingly efficient organisation, the students 
had become the most powerful extrabureaucratic force in the country by 1971 ". Some of 
their earliest campaigns were based on strong nationalist ideology, such as student 
criticism of US imperialism and campaigns against Japanese imports, but as students 
gained confidence in their political potential they attacked military dictatorship and 
advocated democratic reform. 
In October 1973, police arrested thirteen student and academic activists for handing out 
leaflets in Bangkok calling for a new constitution, branded them communists and 
charged them with treason. Students and other supporters began rallying near 
Thammasat University. By 13 October, when they marched to the Democracy 
Monument, they numbered about 400,000 people. The student-led mass protests toppled 
the military dictatorship on 14 October 1973 and brought a short-lived democratic 
period until 1976, during which progressive and left-wing elements flourished (Bowie, 
1997; Girling, 1981; Prizzia & Narong, 1974). 
Most students did not hold radical left-wing ideas and, according to Girling (1981), after 
the success of the mass rallies in October 1973 most withdrew from political activism 
and returned to their studies. An important radical minority, however, were stimulated 
by the student movement's success and the greater freedom and opportunities for 
organised activism during the mid-1970s. Students participated in the Democracy 
Dissemination Campaign in 1974, travelling to rural areas to spread ideas about 
representative democracy and encourage rural villagers to vote (Morell & Chai-anan, 
1981; Quinn, 1997). During the 1973-1976 period "student activists were in the 
vanguard of those seeking to help the workers unite and, above all, to politicise the 
peasants, making them aware of their rights, the possibilities of action, and the political 
power of organization" (Girling 1981:199). Students advocated building a progressive 
democratic movement in alliance with villagers and workers (which they referred to as 
sam prasan, meaning coordinating the three sectors). Consequently, some chose to work 
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in rural areas and with the Peasants' Federation, while others stayed in the city to work 
with labour organisations and gained experience of advocacy and campaign work that 
way (Various interviews with NGO activists, 1997). Furthermore, radical and Marxist 
literature was published and became widely available. According to Girling (1981 :200), 
"In 1974 Marxist activists gained control of the NSCT, and by 1975 every student union 
in Bangkok was under radical control". 
When right-wing and military forces violently suppressed the student movement on 6 
October 1976, many students and political activists were arrested and sentenced to 
several years jail. Others joined the CPT insurgency in the fore st. The precise numbers 
are not known but cornrnentators estimate that some three to four thousand students and 
political activists who had been active during the open democratic period, fled into the 
forests of regional Thailand to join the CPT-led insurgency (Wedel & Wedel, 1987). 
The student movement and various student organisations provided a very important 
recruiting ground for NGOs from the late 1960s. Programs like the Tharnrnasat 
Graduate Volunteer Program and student clubs which organised 'development camps' 
to selected poor villages were replicated in most universities throughout Thailand 
during the 1980s. They put into practice the philosophy of having young middle class 
students experience the way of life of rural villagers and do local practical development 
work. Many of the influential figures and activists in the NGO movement during the 
1980s and 1990s participated in the student movement activities in the 1970s and 
politically 'came of age' at that time. Even for a younger generation, the events of 1973 
and 1976 in which students played a central role provide a historical reference point and 
landmark for social activists. The mass demonstrations lead by students in October 
1973, and the pro-democracy activism by students during the 1973-76 period fuelled 
rising confidence and expectations in the movements' capacity for progressive social 
change and political reform. From that time on tertiary student organisations would 
provide the main recruiting ground for NGOs. 
The NGO li1ovement and Alternative Development 
The category "non-government organisation" is difficult to define. Indeed, in Thailand 
its meaning has changed during the last three decades as NGOs emerged and exerted a 
growing impact in society. There has been an ongoing debate within NGO circles, 
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academic commentators, and in the media about the meaning, role and activities of 
"NGOs" in Thai society, not least because of their links with foreign and international 
funding agencies (for example, see Thai Development Support Committee, 1993). In 
Thai, NGOs are usually referred to as ongkon phatthana ekkachon ("private 
development organisation") thus explicitly linking NGOs with development work. The 
English term "NGO" (en Ji oo) is also frequently used in both spoken and written Thai, 
making its meaning even more ambiguous. The label now encompasses a huge diversity 
of voluntary and non-profit organisations (Amara & Nitaya, 1994; Callahan, 1995). 
Nevertheless, since the early 1980s a cohesive NGO sector, primarily involved in 
community development and environmental activism, has emerged which challenges 
state development policies and promotes social justice and democratisation (Pasuk & 
Baker, 1995; Prudhisan & Maneerat, 1997; Suthy, 1995). With the rejection of the 
communist ideology of revolutionary struggle by many Thai radicals, the NGO 
movement has reflected a growing recognition of diverse sources of social 
transformation and ways of addressing poverty and social inequality. Most 
contemporary NGO activists in Thailand may not advocate revolutionary political 
change, but as Suthy Prasartset writes, many seek "social transformation" through a 
process of struggling for "popular democracy" and to "enlarge the people's political 
space" (1995:121-122). They are overt critics of the concentration of political power, 
economic inequality, and the "maldevelopment" of Thai society (Suthy, 1995:98). 
International and domestic support for NGOs have helped create a sector of professional 
social activists who are largely autonomous from the Thai state system, have 
independent sources of funding, and are linked with international NGO networks that 
propagate ideologies of grassroots development, civil society, democratisation, human 
rights and environmentalism. 
The development of NGO activities in Thailand over the last three decades parallels a 
rapid expansion of NGOs throughout the Third World (Julie Fisher, 1993; 1998; Korten, 
1990). Foreign and multilateral development agencies have contributed in important 
ways to the emergence and growth of the Thai NGO sector, enabling the transfer of 
funding, development discourses and people. For example, many writers ascribe the 
beginnings of the modem Thai NGO movement to the founding of the Thailand Rural 
Reconstruction Movement (TRRM) in 1967 (Gohlert, 1991; Prudhisan & Maneerat, 
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1997; Suthy, 1995). An initiative of the Director of the Bank of Thailand, Puey 
Ungphakorn, TRRM was established following the model of the International Institute 
for Rural Reconstruction in the Philippines and maintained close ties with this institute 
(see Clarke, 1998: 138). It followed a philosophy of alleviating poverty by working 
closely with rural villagers, based on 14 principles that are still influential among the 
NGO community today: 
approach the people, stay with them, learn from them, plan with them, 
work with them, begin from what they know, create from what they 
have, teach by making them learn from practices, not to show off but to 
be a model, not trivial but be systematic, not isolated but integrated, not 
to please but to help them change, and not to patronize but to empower 
(Rueng, 1995:56). 
This incipient NGO activity was closely related to the growing student movement. 
When Puey Ungphakorn became rector of Thammasat University a few years later he 
also established the Thammasat Graduate Volunteer Program which gave graduates 
opportunities to undertake social work and development work in rural areas for a one 
year period (Rueng, 1995). Students at Thammasat and other universities were 
encouraged to participate in development "camps" in poor rural villages. 
The military coup of October 1976 ushered in a temporary hiatus in domestic NGO 
activity as rural development work was regarded by the right as left-wing and 
subversive. TRRM was persecuted as a "left-wing organisation" until , in the throes of 
internal factional conflict, it closed down in February 1978 (Rueng, 1995:53). 
Nevertheless, during the late 1970s international aid organisations such as UNHCR, 
REDDBANA and Save the Children became active in aid programs with Indochinese 
refuges who flooded into Thailand after 1976 (Suthy, 1995). Many of these 
organisations subsequently expanded their work to community development projects 
targeting rural poverty in the Northeast and other economically marginal areas. 
Examples are the NET Project (Northeast Thailand Project) and Grassroots Rural 
Integrated Development (GRID) Project both in Northeast Thailand (Amporn & Kosol , 
1989; Durno, 1989). These development projects provided training and experience for 
many up and coming Thai development workers and NGO activists. 
Closely related to the expanding activities of international aid agencies in Thailand, was 
the growing influence of development discourses that promoted popular participation 
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and saw NGOs as more effective and efficient at achieving such participatory 
development than government agencies. From the early 1970s discourses of rural 
development which hinge upon strategies of 'bottom-up planning', 'grass-roots' 
development or community participation grew in influence among the international 
development community (Hall, 1988; Thomas, 1992). Advocates argued that the 
participation of the rural poor must be facilitated through local organisations providing 
democratic opportunities for rural people to collectively plan and implement 
development activities, and distribute the benefits. They also argued that small-scale 
NGOs, which could operate locally and independently, are more efficient and effective 
at initiating and supporting participatory development than centralised, state 
bureaucracies. 
As theories of participation and the comparative advantage of NGOs in implementing 
grassroots development gained influence, funding agencies such as foreign governments 
and multilateral organisations began donating large amounts of money to NGOs in 
Thailand and elsewhere in the Third World. From the early 1980s the NGO sector 
expanded rapidly as international funding boomed. For instance, in 1985 the Canadian 
government granted 186 million baht to support over 60 NGO rural development 
projects. Indeed, Rueng estimates that foreign donors contributed over 300 million baht 
annually to Thai development NGOs in the early 1990s (1995:66). This international 
funding boom fostered a rapid expansion of NGO activity in the 1980s, especially local, 
small-scale projects in rural areas. 
Changing political opportunities and the collapse of the communist insurgency also 
contributed to the growing NGO movement. After 1978 a period of gradual political 
liberalisation commenced which continued through the 1980s. Thai governments first 
incorporated the rhetoric of participation into the Fifth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1982-1986) (Demaine, 1986) and tentatively acknowledged the role 
of NGOs in the Sixth Plan (1987-1992) (Gohlert, 1991:23). Furthermore, after the CPT-
led insurgency came to an end in the early 1980s the NGO sector provided a channel for 
middle class activism and struggle for social reform and democratisation. As Prudhisan 
and Maneerat (1997) note, some of the activists who had joined the communists 
"retained their commitment to social change and pursued this through peaceful means, 
working in [NGOs] and in rural development" (1997: 199). NGO work enabled them to 
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continue the strategy of building relationships and alliances with the rural and urban 
poor who made up the majority of the population and were seen as the social base of 
any potential social change. Moreover, "rural development," "community development" 
and "alternative development" could accommodate a broader range of ideological 
perspectives on social change. Many of these NGOs increasingly pursue what Sheth 
(1987) has called "alternative development as political practice". 
NGO Strategies and Alternative Development 
NGOs initially aimed to address local problems of poverty and livelihood through 
small-scale, local activities that required villagers working together cooperatively in 
groups. A common philosophy of NGO workers during the 1980s was that "The answer 
is in the villages" (Anek, 1997: 12). Their strategies of community development focused 
on promoting and supporting villagers' involvement in rice banks, small cooperatives, 
revolving funds, handicraft groups and the like. NGOs promoted a philosophy of self-
reliance and people's participation in village-level self-help groups to enable them to 
work collectively and cooperatively to tackle problems of poverty and income. 
Alternative livelihood strategies through small-scale integrated farming also came to be 
widely promoted and supported by NGOs and development projects. They worked 
closely with villagers in the local communities, and argued that villagers possess local 
know ledge and skills that should be recognised and utilised. This approach to 
community development was expressed in the community culture approach which 
became widely influential throughout the NGO community during the 1980s (Chatthip, 
1991). 
Out of the theory and practice of alternative development during the 1980s a focus on 
promoting and supporting villagers' organisations (ongkon chao-ban) emerged as a 
central strategy of NGO development work that has had growing political implications 
and a critical role in the development of the villagers' movements of the 1990s. Many 
NGO workers believe that "Community organizations really are the most important 
means for rural society and all of society to sustain itself' (NGO-CORD Isan, 1997:68). 
They see one of their main roles as supporting villagers' own local organisations by 
providing advice, information and resources. As Fisher (1993a; 1998) documents, this 
has been a widespread phenomena throughout the Third World. 
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Although there was an explosion of NGOs at the local, rural level, NGOs also were 
established at regional and national levels, with different relationships to rural 
development and target communities. NGO workers saw a need for the organised 
coordination and distribution of news and information to NGOs throughout the country, 
and hence founded the Thai Development Support Committee (TDSC) in Bangkok in 
1982. TDSC publishes and disseminates information in both Thai and English 
languages. The developing networks became better coordinated and more formalised in 
mid-1985 with the establishment of a national coordinating body, the NGO 
Coordinating Committee on Rural Development (NGO-CORD) (Suthy, 1995). NGO-
CORD operates from a national office in Bangkok and operates coordinating centres in 
each of the regions. 
Another example of an NGO playing a key role in NGO networks is the Thai Volunteer 
Service (TVS). TVS owes its origins to the activities of TRRM and the student 
movement of the 1970s (Interview, Det Phumkhacha, Bangkok, 27-10-1997). The 
organisation was established in 1980 with funding from the Ford Foundation. It aimed 
to be a "recruiting and training agency for Thai development workers" (Gohlert, 
1991:126) and recruited young graduates and paid them a small wage to work for two 
years in one of its member NGOs. By 1987 TVS had a membership network of 36 
NGOs where it was placing its young graduate "volunteers" (Gohlert, 1991: 126). 
During the mid-1990s TVS placed an average of twenty volunteers each year into 
internships with NGOs throughout the country. Most of these member NGOs worked on 
"issues of community rights and natural resource management which continue to be 
[the] one most critical social issue in Thai society" (Thai Volunteer Service, 1996:5). 
The current Director of TVS, Det Phumkhacha, has worked as a social activist since the 
early 1970s. Over the years he has built up an extensive network of colleagues in 
NGOs, academia, the media and government departments who support the broad social 
goals of the NGO sector and advocate political and democratic reform. In 1992 he and 
Kothom Ariya founded the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD), a coordinating 
network of democratic activists, to campaign against the prime ministership of General 
Suchinda Kraprayoon. In 1993 Det became the CPD ' s general secretary (Interview, Det 
Phumkhacha, Bangkok, 27-10-1997). 
The growing networks of cooperation between NGOs also enabled them to encourage 
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linkages between the local groups that they worked with. By the late 1980s NGOs, 
especially those within the regional NGO-CORD networks , increasingly worked 
towards building networks of villagers' organisations that extended beyond the local 
community. As the TVS director stated: 
Grassroots groups in different villages are encouraged to exchange and 
share their problems, solutions, skills and lessons learned so as to 
strengthen their demands and get mutual benefit from their activities .... 
Most of the NGO workers who work in rural areas focus their work on 
strengthening community organization networks. They see the 
networking of people's organizations as the groundwork for grassroots 
democratization (Thai Development Support Committee, 1995:39). 
In the Northeast, for example, NGO-CORD set up the Isan Farmers' Collective 
Organisation Support Committee in the early 1990s to promote and support networking 
between villagers' groups throughout the region. The networks they created included: 
Alternative Agriculture Group, Domestic Animals Group, Craftwork and Women' s 
Development Network, Isan Land and Forest Committee, Salt Soils Problem Group, 
River Issues Group (Water Pollution and Dams), Isan AIDS Group (established 1993) 
and the Slum Communities' Network (NGO-CORD Isan, 1997; Thai Development 
Support Committee, 1997). 
These networks were often based on environmental problems or livelihood issues that 
were shared across communities. Indeed, as accelerating economic growth and 
industrialisation resulted in rising demands for natural resources , and as rural villagers 
became increasingly drawn into conflicts over their local resources , more NGOs became 
involved in resource issues and as advocates for rural people in environmental disputes 
(Anek, 1997; Prudhisan & Maneerat, 1997). Resource conflicts and environmental 
degradation came to be seen as directly linked with state development policies and 
political processes. NGOs increasingly worked at educating local community members 
about the wider context of their problems, and encouraged them to join in broader 
networks for their campaigns. Furthermore, activists saw that environmentalism, as an 
ideology, could join different classes and groups with divergent material interests 
together in opposition and protest campaigns (Pinkaew & Rajesh, 1992:5-6). 
The Project for Ecological Recovery (PER) is one NGO which has played a key role in 
the environmental movement in Thailand. A young environmental activist who had 
participated in the 1970s student movement, Witoon Permpongsachareon, was 
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instrumental in establishing PER in 1986 with funding from foreign donors (Baker, 
1995). PER activists articulate a keen sense of the political causes of environmental 
destruction. According to Witoon: 
Our experiences in Thailand show that the environmental problems can 
only be solved together with economic and political problems. 
Conservation depends on strengthening the political influence of local 
people ... we have to study the kind of politics suited to ordinary people ... 
NGOs have to help building networks of local people at village, district, 
national and international levels. This may not just be around 
environmental issues. Such movements must be dynamic and avoid 
becoming institutionalized. Democracy must be both, the aim and the 
means (quoted in Pfirmann & Kron, 1992:62). 
Therefore, PER activists see their aim in terms of building 
a social movement that has bargaining power against the forces of 
destruction at the local, national and international levels, and is able to 
mobilise the participation and support of diverse communities and 
groups who have diverging interests (Pinkaew & Rajesh, 1992:4). 
In the mid-1980s, PER took on a coordinating role in the campaign against the proposed 
Nam Choan Dam on the Khwae Yai River in Kanchanaburi Province. The successful 
campaign became a watershed in Thai environmental politics, encouraging resistance to 
dam projects elsewhere, and marking the growing legitimacy of environmental 
discourse in public opposition to state development projects (Hirsch, 1993; Hirsch & 
Lohmann, 1989). Like the Thai Volunteer Service, PER has also adopted a strategy of 
placing "volunteers" in the field with local NGOs. 
Resurgence of Grassroots Politics: Direct Action and Nonviolent Protest 
By the late 1980s, as state agencies and business interests increasingly sought to exploit 
natural resources in regional Thailand, rural protest re-emerged for the first time since 
the suppression of 1976 (Pasuk & Baker, 1995:352). At first, collective protests were 
small in scale and focused on local grievances. In many areas villagers mounted 
demonstrations at local government and forestry company offices, destroyed seedlings 
in eucalyptus plantations or opposed eviction from land claimed as forest reserve by the 
state (Hirsch, 1993; Sanitsuda, 1990). Through their organising and networking efforts 
with rural villagers, however, NGOs increasingly channelled local grievances into 
broader-based demonstrations that could target national-level policies. By the end of the 
1980s many NGO activists had developed a three-tiered approach to their work: they 
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continued their grassroots work with villagers' organisations and networks; they sought 
to build alliances with academics, the media and other sections of middle class; and they 
campaigned for state policy reforms at a national level (Anek, 1997; Prudhisan & 
Maneerat, 1997; Suthy, 1995). Mobilised through villagers' organisations and networks, 
supported by NGOs and allies in the media, rural demonstrations became a powerful 
political strategy for campaigns targeting both concrete local grievances and the 
national policies which engendered them. 
In 1991 the government and army launched the "Project to Resettle Poor Villages in 
Degraded Forests" (abbreviated in Thai to Kho Jo Ko). The subsequent campaign 
against the Kho Jo Ko program provided a real turning point for rural mobilisation and 
protest, especially among villagers and NGO activists in the Northeast. The government 
justified the resettlement program in terms of the need to increase national forest 
coverage and aimed to reforest degraded and encroached reserve forest land. The 
project aimed to resettle forest dwellers into designated areas, with supporting 
community and infrastructure development, create community forest reserves, and 
replant degraded areas with a focus on commercial plantations of eucalypt and bamboo. 
If implemented fully, the program would affect 5.8 million villagers living on forest 
reserve land nationwide (Hirsch, 1993; Murray, 1992a). The project was a collaboration 
between the army and the Forestry Department, with overall coordination by the army, 
and projected to cost 12,000 million baht (US$480 million). The first target of the Kho 
Jo Ko program was the Northeast, which contains the largest areas of degraded forest. 
During implementation of the Kho Jo Ko program, the army often forcibly removed 
villagers from their land, destroying houses and village temples in the process to ensure 
that they would not return. Evicted villagers were relocated onto poor, infertile land 
with little infrastructure and had to start from scratch (Bangkok Post 17 December 
1991: 1, Mangkorn & Anutra, 1992). In other cases, villagers were relocated to nearby 
degraded forest land that was already settled, resulting in conflicts between relocated 
and established villagers. Evicted villagers often had no choice but to squat on other, 
unsettled forest land. 
Rural people responded in a range of ways. In many cases when faced with government 
officials, often backed up by the army, they had no choice but to comply with eviction 
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orders. Northeastern NGOs campaigned among affected communities in an effort to 
expand existing networks and develop a mass base for opposition. NGO-CORD formed 
the "Northeast Forest and Land Network" to coordinate and stimulate local actions. 
Villagers from 47 forest reserves in 17 Northeast provinces joined the network to 
oppose Kho Jo Ko and campaign for land rights (NGO-CORD Isan, 1997:73). The 
network found strong centres of support among villages which had previously come 
under CPT influence (Fieldnotes, Pak Chong, N akhon Ratchasima, 3-7-1997). Another 
newly-formed network, the Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers of the Northeast, helped 
bring representatives from widely spread affected communities together and mobilise 
villagers for protest campaigns (see next section for an account of this organisation). 
Northeastern NGOs, through NGO-CORD, mounted a media and educational campaign 
on the impact of Kho Jo Ko and organised popular forums for NGOs and villagers to 
voice their grievances and keep the issue a lively topic in the print media (Niran, 1994). 
The campaign culminated in mass demonstrations and a protest march by villagers in 
June and July 1992. NGO activists and villagers' leaders took advantage of political and 
ideological opportunities_ that opened up following the Black May protests and violence 
in Bangkok the previous month. In the wake of the resignation of Suchinda Kraprayoon, 
the decline of military influence in politics and a huge upsurge in public rejection of 
military force and violence to suppress dissent, activists "launched large scale 
demonstrations against the Kho Jo Ko lasting all through June" (Tjelland, 1995:202). 
Late in the month over ten thousand villagers rallied at the Provincial Hall in N akhon 
Ratchasima and began marching down the Mitraphap Highway towards Bangkok, 
"demanding that the Prime Minister come to meet them and stop the Kho Jo Ko, grant 
them the right to return to their land and legal land-right papers" (Tjelland, 1995:203). 
They rallied at Pak Chong, a geographic and symbolic 'doorway' to Isan, and closed the 
highway for several days until the Prime Minister sent a delegate, the Deputy Interior 
Minister, to meet and negotiate with the protesters. As a result the government agreed to 
cancel the program. 
According to many NGO activists, the success of the protest march boosted the 
confidence of villagers in public demonstrations as a political strategy, and protest 
actions by several different villagers' groups increased dramatically in the years that 
followed. After the successful campaign the Isan Forest and Land Network changed its 
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name to the Isan Farmers' Assembly for Protection of Land Rights3 (Samatcha chao-na 
chao-rai phak isan). To mark the importance of the Pak Chong rally, the Isan Farmers ' 
Assembly erected a shrine (san phi) overlooking the site and rally there every year in 
July to commemorate the original demonstration (Fieldnotes, 2-3 July 1997, Pak 
Chong). The network continues to campaign on behalf of members, seeking land reform 
and secure land tenure, as well as financial compensation for the impacts of the Kho Jo 
Ko program. 
Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers of the Northeast (ASFN) 
Another leading example of the resurgence of political organisation and protest by rural 
villagers at this time was the Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers of the Northeast 
(Samatcha kasettakon rai yoi, referred to here as the ASFN). While the Isan Farmers ' 
Assembly mobilised villagers around land rights issues stemming from the Kho Jo Ko 
program, the ASFN aimed to create a network for campaigns focusing on practical 
livelihood issues for small-scale farmers. In fact the two networks overlapped to a 
certain extent. The ASFN became famous throughout Thailand for its protest rallies and 
demonstrations during the early 1990s. By 1994, however, many NGO workers and 
activists were raising concerns about the effectiveness of such strategies. This was 
coupled with growing frustration that governments often responded to protest actions 
with empty promises to appease demonstrator's demands but rarely followed up with 
tangible action or real policy change (Sanitsuda, 1995). 
The ASFN emerged out of an NGO and villagers' campaign against a government 
proposal to create a National Agricultural Council (NAC), which they believed would 
"serve the benefits of the capitalist farmers and agribusiness groups instead of small 
farmers" (J arin, 1995 :34 ). Drawing on their networks of villagers' organisations and 
NGOs, NGO-CORD Isan organised a conference to discuss the NAC proposal in March 
1992. At this conference the formation of the ASFN was officially announced and a 
Secretarial Office to oversee its operations was established (J arin, 1995; Sanan, 1997). 
The ASFN' s constitution states that their goal is to "protect the rights and interests of 
3 This is its official title in English, from the Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations (Thai 
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northeastern Thai peasants with their dignity seen as equal to other groups of people in 
Thai society" (Jarin 1995:34). With its broad social base among small-scale farmers in 
Isan villages, the ASFN aimed to improve its members' position within the agricultural 
economy by petitioning the state on agricultural policy and demanding economic 
support for small farmers, for example on issues of agricultural debts. The ASFN 
anchored its campaigns firmly in the material grievances of its members, and this helps 
explain the rapid expansion of its membership from 1992 to 1995, and its ability to 
mobilise large numbers of villagers for demonstrations . Moreover it consistently linked 
specific grievances to attacks on government policy and advocacy for policy reform. 
Jarin (1995) reports that the organisation rapidly grew from about 3,000 members when 
it was first established to about 30,000 members by 1995. But, as Jarin points out, the 
membership is relatively fluid and variable: villagers participate according to their local 
situation and needs, some joining only when their community encounters a particular 
problem. Unlike the NGOs which support it, the ASFN raises most of its funding from 
its members. Members pay an annual fee of 100 baht and receive a membership card. 
When the ASFN stages rallies or demonstrations members make small contributions of 
money and provisions to support the campaign. 
ASFN members joined the huge demonstration march against the Kho Jo Ko program in 
1992 (NGO-CORD Isan, 1997:70; Somphan, Wichian, Mana, & Akanit, 1997:67). 
After this successful mass action the ASFN quickly became well known for its protest 
rallies and marches. The "Long March" down the Mitraphap Highway towards Bangkok 
became the main ASFN strategy of political agitation to gain media coverage and force 
the government into meetings and negotiations over their petitions (Jarin, 1995:45). 
During the following three years ASFN staged four major protest rallies and several 
smaller demonstrations demanding that the government respond to their petitions. In 
some cases, up to 15,000 villagers participated. Bamrung Kayotha, a founding member 
and leader of the ASFN until October 1995, emerged as a high-profile and influential 
leader. 
Development Support Committee, 1997) and not a direct translation from the Thai. 
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By the end of 1995 internal conflict and factionalism split the ASFN into at least three 
separate factions or organisations (Praphat, 1998:58). Several factors contributed to the 
organisational rupture. First, a conflict arose among ASFN leaders over the breadth of 
their campaign goals. One faction advocated continuing their struggles for the political 
rights of member groups. An emerging faction called for a return to a focus on small 
farmers' economic issues. The newly elected secretary-general who replaced Bamrung 
favoured economic issues. Second, organisers and leaders within the ASFN had faced 
harassment, threats and violence from influential figures and the police. Earlier in 1995 
an ASFN organiser, who was leading a campaign against rock quarry pollution in Loei 
Province, was shot and killed (Bangkok Post, Reuters Database, 30 July 1995). 
Bamrung stepped down before elections in 1995 quoting concerns for his own safety. 
Third, the New Aspiration political party, with its major social support base in Isan, set 
out to coopt ASFN leaders and use the network to canvass votes. The ASFN continues 
to exist but has split up into several different organisations, two of which still use the 
name (Praphat, 1998:58). 
The "Assembly of the Poor" Conference 
After factionalism split the ASFN in 1995, the stage was set for the formation of the 
first national organisation of poor villagers since the Peasants' Federation of Thailand 
twenty years previously. NGO activists from the ASFN, and villagers' leaders such as 
Bamrung, saw the need for a broad umbrella organisation concerned with fighting for 
community rights and not just narrow economic interests (Interview, Bamrung Kayotha, 
Khon -Kaen, 9-9-1997). They came up with the idea of a conference to coincide with the 
ASEAN Summit scheduled for Bangkok on 14-15 December 1995. The Asian Cultural 
Forum on Development (ACFOD) and Friends of the People (Klum pheuan 
phrachachon, who support villagers' groups facing dams and large-scale projects) were 
the main Bangkok-based NGOs who coordinated the conference. ACFOD, with 
established links with foreign NGOs, organised international representatives from the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Cambodia, Nepal and Australia and provided a 
translator. Other Thai NGOs represented included the Thai Volunteer Service, Project 
for Ecological Recovery, Student Federation of Thailand, Thai Development Support 
Committee and the Wildlife Fund Thailand (Bantorn Ondam, 1997). All of these NGOs 
have continued to play important support roles in the Assembly of the Poor. 
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On 10 December 1995 two hundred and fifty villagers' and NGO delegates gathered at 
Thammasat University in Bangkok to launch the conference, entitled "Assembly of the 
Poor: The consequences of large-scale development projects" (Samatcha khan jon: an 
neuang ma jak phonkratop khong khrongkan phatthana khanat yai). The villagers' 
organisations represented included break away groups from the ASFN, the Northern 
Farmers' Network, the Network of People Affected by Dams, the Isan Farmers' 
Assembly for Protection of Land Rights, and a network of urban slum dwellers. 
The conference was highly mobile, moving from the 'centre' (Bangkok) to the 
'periphery' and finally back to the 'centre'. Following the opening session at 
Thammasat University, the delegates travelled to Khong Jiam, a small district centre 
located at the confluence of the Mun and Mekong Rivers in the Northeast (see Map 1). 
Here in this peripheral community, local villagers' organisations campaigning over the 
impacts of two large dams (Pak Mun and Sirinthorn) acted as the symbolic hosts for the 
conference. Villagers, academics, students and NGO activists presented speeches and 
participated in a panel discussion on "Democracy, Human Rights and the Poor Today". 
Villagers' delegates spoke about their struggles to defend their communities against the 
depredations of industrial development, state incursions on land and forests, and large-
scale projects such as dams. Participants "agreed to form a loosely structured network 
called the '[Assembly] of the Poor' focussing on their problems and seeking solutions" 
(Bantorn, 1997). NGO activists prepared the "Mun River Declaration", a manifesto 
announcing the formation of the Assembly and presenting an ideological critique of 
industrial development. The Mun River Declaration proclaims that the Assembly of the 
Poor is a "platform ( wethi) for mutual learning and exchange of know ledge about our 
problems by poor and disadvantaged people in society". The Assembly aims to "to build 
the power and cooperation of the poor at the local, national and international levels to 
convince the public that states must manage resources in ways that ensure equity and 
fairness for all people, free rights, and popular participation and self-determination". 
The Declaration goes on to attack state policies that promote industrial development at 
the expense of the environment, the small-scale agricultural sector and urban labourers. 
Finally, the Declaration calls on all states to adopt development models that protect 
human rights and community rights to participate in decision-making about 
development that affects them. 
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On the final day of the conference in Khong Jiam, participants resolved to return to 
Bangkok to present the Mun River Declaration as a gesture of protest to ASEAN. After 
travelling by train to Bangkok, on 15 December six hundred people marched from 
Hualumphong Railway Station to the site of the ASEAN Summit, where they were 
stopped by police from presenting the Mun River Declaration to ASEAN delegates 
(Bantorn, 1997). Along with the Mun River Declaration, the Assembly submitted a 
petition to the government with a detailed list of grievances of member groups, 
declaring a 30 day deadline for a response (Assembly of the Poor, 1996). The Assembly 
of the Poor was born, announcing its intentions with its first manifesto, and grabbing 
media and public attention with its protest march and petition to the ASEAN Summit 
and the Thai government. 
Conclusion 
The Assembly of the Poor locates its own history in the resurgence of political activism 
and protest by rural villagers during the early 1990s. The Assembly' s version of its 
origins begins with the formation of the Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers of the 
Northeast in 1991 and then chronicles a series of mass mobilisations by villagers ' 
organisations, such as the protests against the Kho Jo Ko forest resettlement scheme, 
demonstrations against the Pak Mun Dam, and subsequent rallies by the ASFN. Thus , 
this history (written by NGO activists within the movement) emphasises the collective 
agency of rural villagers and their growing political assertiveness during the 1990s. It is 
a "History of the People's Struggle" and "Poor People' s Fighters" (Assembly of the 
Poor, 1997e). NGO activists are there, but in the background. As I discuss further in 
later chapters, this stems (at least in part) from a struggle to assert the collective agency 
and political identity of "the Poor", khan Jon. In this chapter I have also focused on the 
agency of rural villagers and peasants, but have also sought to account for another group 
of social actors , political activists and NGO workers , and the changing structural 
context of villager and NGO activity. 
I have argued that in order to understand the origins of the Assembly of the Poor, we 
need to see it in the context of a much longer history of the consequences of economic 
development, rural resistance to exploitation and middle class activism. Thus , I briefly 
described the changing socio-economic context that has been transformed by rapid 
industrialisation and economic development set in train in the early 1960s. By the 1980s 
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the environmental impacts of development and conflicts over resources were creating 
renewed threats to livelihoods and social cohesion in rural communities, many of which 
were already hard hit by economic inequality and exploitation and the structural decline 
of agriculture. Having outlined these structural forces , I explored the backgrounds of the 
two main social actors in the Assembly, rural villagers and middle class NGO activists . 
I related organised rural opposition to a long history of rural resistance and collective 
struggle against exploitation and domination, exemplified in the histories of the 
communist insurgency and the Peasants' Federation of Thailand, which, although 
expressing very different ideologies, strategies and social goals, were both brutally 
suppressed. The resurgence of rural organising and political protest in the 1990s was 
due in large part to the new forms of organisation and networking developed in alliance 
with the NGO movement. This NGO movement grew out of the student movement and 
middle class political activism which first emerged in the 1970s and gave many current 
activists first hand experience of working with rural villagers in the Peasants ' 
Federation of Thailand and the communist insurgency. 
In the next chapter I describe in greater detail the Assembly' s ideological expressions 
and campaign goals as part of a broad overview of the movement, including its 
organisational structure and membership. 
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3 From Local Struggles to National Social 
Movement: An Overview of the Assembly 
The Assembly of the Poor was established to enable villagers' organisations from 
around the country to come together in a forum to exchange information and resources, 
and to increase their bargaining power for their own campaigns through- a larger 
umbrella organisation. This chapter gives an overview of the Assembly of the Poor as a 
general context for the more ethnographic chapters which follow. I describe the social 
bases of its membership, its organisational structure, campaign goals, ideological 
expressions and social critique. The great majority of its members organise and 
campaign around local issues stemming from development projects or policy. Indeed, I 
argue that a key factor in the Assembly's ability to mobilise large numbers of people in 
campaigns and protests is its faithfulness to the concrete local grievances of each of the 
groups in its network. But this also presents problems for building a cohesive, broader 
movement able to campaign at the national level (Esteva & Prakash, 1992; Wolin, 
1992). Therefore, these tensions between local issues and national movement, and how 
the Assembly endeavours to overcome them through construction of a cohesive policy 
platform and political identity, constitute theoretical issues that run through the chapter. 
"Development" is often represented in terms of national interest and national 
development, especially in many of the large-scale projects contested by the Assembly 
of the Poor. On the other hand, environmental conflict usually begins with people facing 
concrete environmental problems in their own locality. A grounding in local issues is, of 
course, a common feature of environmental movements throughout the Third World. 
Thus, their grievances give people a local, concrete context from which to express 
opposition to "abstract national goals" of "development" (Esteva & Prakash, 1992:50). 
But, as Wolin (1992:252) writes, "the localism that is the strength of grassroots 
organizations is also their limitation". People in a particular locality have limited power 
to oppose the state and oppose "disruptive forces that pretend to speak in the name of 
'the nation' " (Esteva & Prakash, 1992:50). Hence, they need to find allies and build 
coalitions. They need to find forms of opposition and protest that allow each local group 
to maintain their roots in their own territory, while also mounting a unified campaign at 
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the abstract national level. As Esteva and Prakash (1992:50) write about the Narmada 
campaign in India, "grassroots groups need to .. .. [resist] not only the dams, but also the 
language of ... [national development] used to promote them". 
If 'liberation ecology' movements in the Third World represent movements for 
progressive change and political transformation, then how do they move beyond the 
problems of localism? In the case of the Assembly of the Poor a number of strategies 
can be seen. First, the Assembly asserts a political identity as a national movement of 
the "poor" who are "victims of development". This political identity seeks to recognise 
and celebrate the geographic and cultural diversity of member groups, while promoting 
solidarity through recognition of a "common context of struggle"4 and shared political 
goals. Second, building on the concrete grievances that make the foundation of the 
movement, activists have developed a policy platform calling for democratisation and 
policy reforms to enhance the rights and avenues for participation of local communities. 
These processes of identity construction and representation are thus central to the 
Assembly's ideological critique of "development" and Thai society, and I return to 
consider them in greater depth later in this chapter. First, however, I will briefly review 
the membership, class base and organisational structure of the Assembly, and explain 
the nature of its petitions and campaigns. 
Who are the Assembly of the Poor? Villagers, NGOs and Academics 
Three main groups of actors make up the Assembly of the Poor: local villagers and 
slum-dwellers, development-oriented non-government organisations (NGOs) , and 
academics and student activists. The first group, villagers and slum-dwellers, constitute 
the grassroots constituency of the movement; they are "the Poor" in the Assembly of the 
Poor. NGO activists, mainly with urban, middle-class backgrounds, play a key role in 
providing information and support, maintaining and coordinating the network of groups 
in the Assembly, and communicating with other organisations. The third group, 
academics and student activists, have close ties with the NGOs and play similar roles. 
4 This phrase comes from Third World feminists who seek to develop a feminist consciousness that can 
accommodate and unite the diverse identities and class positions of women. Hence they speak of 
consciousness based on a "common context of struggle" rather than essentialising categories (see 
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Villagers' Organisations and Networks 
Groups of villagers from localities throughout Thailand constitute the rank and file 
membership of the Assembly. In the previous chapter I mentioned a number of 
villagers' organisations or networks which sent delegates to the conference in December 
1995 and subsequently established the Assembly of the Poor. By 1997 the following six 
villagers' organisations had joined: 
Network of People Affected by Dams (Khreua-khai kheuan), 
Isan Farmers' Assembly for Protection of Land Rights (Samatcha chao-
na chao-rai isan), 
Northern Farmer's Network (Khreua-khai klum-kasetakon phakneua), 
Slum Organisation for Democracy ( Ongkon salam pheua 
prachathipatai), 
Alternative Agriculture Network (Khreua-khai kasetthakam thang-
leuak), 
Thai National Network for Workplace and Environmental Illness 
(Khreua-khai phu-puay jak kanthamngan lae singwaetlom haeng prathet 
thai), 
Southern Local Fishers' Confederation (Samaphan chao-pramong 
pheun-ban phaktai) (Assembly of the Poor, 1997d; 1997h). 
According to the Assembly, these networks represent some 36,000 families from every 
region of the country. For the purposes of its campaigns and petitions, the Assembly 
breaks down its grassroots membership into seven "problem groups" (klum panha) 
according to the kind of grievance that each local group faces. These groups are: 
1. Forest and Land Group 
2. Dams Group 
3. State Development Projects 
4. Slum Community Group 
5. Work-Related and Environmental Illness 
6. Alternative Agriculture 
7. Small fishers 
(Assembly of the Poor, 19971) 
Forest and Land Group (Klum pa-mai thi-din) 
91 grievances 
15 grievances 
5 grievances 
8 grievances 
1 grievance 
1 grievance 
1 grievance 
This "problem group" basically includes the membership of the Isan Farmers' 
Assembly for Protection of Land Rights and the Northern Farmer's Network. Their 
campaigns stem from conflicts over land rights or control of local forest resources. In 
Mohanty, 1991 :7). 
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the previous chapter I explained the ong1ns of the Isan Farmers' Assembly in the 
conflict over the Kho Jo Ko forest resettlement program. It now has members from 
about 400 villages in 47 forest localities throughout the Northeast. According to Isan 
Farmers' Assembly leaders, 3,000 to 4,000 members participated in the Assembly of the 
Poor protest in 1997 (Interview, Phaibun, NGO coordinator, Khon Kaen, 20-8-1997). In 
1996 and 1997 this organisation made compensation for resettlement and disruption to 
livelihoods by the Kho Jo Ko program a central campaign goal in the Assembly' s 
petition to the state. 
Pratuang (1997) has described the origins of the Northern Farmers' Network, which was 
formed out of local community networks in Northern Thailand in the early 1990s, with 
the encouragement and assistance of NGOs and academics. This Network campaigns on 
resource rights and social justice for member communities, many of whom are from 
ethnic minority ("hill tribe") groups such as the Karen. Its membership extends to about 
fifty upland and forest-based villages (Praphat, 1997a; Pratuang, 1997). 
These two organisations also represent villagers facing eviction or displacement from 
land classified by the government as Public Land, National Park Land or Reserve 
Forest. They campaign for recognition of their land rights based on prior settlement, and 
demand either land title reform or fair compensation for displacement. In other cases 
local commons land or land traditionally used as community forest has been destroyed 
or taken over for commercial forestry or eucalyptus plantations. These groups campaign 
for revocation of eucalyptus concessions in the local area, rehabilitation of community 
forests and recognition and protection of local people's rights to manage and control 
local forest resources. Altogether villagers from 91 localities in the North and Northeast 
are represented in the Forest and Land Group (Assembly of the Poor, 19971). 
Dams Group (Klum kheuan) 
The Dams Group includes local people from proposed dam sites, and villagers affected 
by dams already completed. Villagers from six localities facing proposed dam 
construction constitute the first sub-group, the most controversial and high-profile in 
recent years being the Kaeng Seua Ten dam in the Northern province of Prae (see 
chapter 7 for more details). According to the Assembly of the Poor (1997i) this sub-
group of villagers facing proposed dams includes over 5000 families. All of these 
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proposed dams are under the administration of the Irrigation Department in the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives. The villagers' organisations represented here totally 
oppose dam construction and aim to have the projects cancelled. 
The second sub-group is called the "Group affected by dams already completed" and 
includes villagers from nine dam sites including the Pak Mun (see Chapter 4 ), Sirinton 
and Rasi Salai Dams. All are located in the Northeast, except for Huay Khon Kaen Dam 
in Petchabun, Central Thailand. All members of this group, consisting of about 7000 
families in total, petition for appropriate "compensation and assistance for affected 
communities" (Assembly of the Poor, 19971). 
State Development Projects (Klum khrongkan-rat) 
This group consists of about 1,300 families from five communities affected by state 
construction projects. In some cases, such as the small township of Chong Mek, Ubon 
Ratchathani Province, where villagers' farms were bulldozed to make way for 
redevelopment of a border checkpoint between Thailand and Laos , the projects are 
already complete and affected communities have been campaigning for appropriate 
compensation. In other cases, such as the Genco Waste Disposal Unit (General 
Environmental Conservation Company, partially state owned) proposed for Rayong, 
and the Phor Khiaw Government Offices in Suphanburi, groups of local villagers are 
waging ongoing campaigns to oppose construction. 
Slum Communities ( Klum chum-chon ae at) 
This is the major group of urban origin in the Assembly of the Poor, consisting of 
networks of slum dwellers in Bangkok and Chiang Mai. Although this group is urban-
based, their problems are very similar to rural villagers in the Forest and Land Group 
described above. They are members of slum communities situated on public or crown 
land without title deeds or secure tenure on their dwellings. Hence they have little 
bargaining power when faced with eviction for state projects such as the Hopewell 
Railway project or Khlong Toey redevelopment. The Hopewell Railway project in 
Bangkok was expected to displace 1,200 families , who petitioned for appropriate 
financial assistance to relocate their dwellings. In other cases groups of slum-dwellers 
seek to delay threats of eviction, and influence decisions about redevelopment. 
According to Sawang, an NGO advisor to the Slum Organisation for Democracy, this 
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group encompasses about 1,800 families (Interview, Sawang, 29-10-1997, Bangkok). 
Work-Related Illness Group (Klum phu-puay jak kanthamngan) 
This group is also urban-based and is the smallest group in the Assembly of the Poor. 
The Thai National Network for Workplace and Environmental Illness was established to 
gather information and represent industrial labourers whose working conditions cause 
chronic sickness. Many of them are subsequently laid off with little or no workers ' 
compensation or assistance with medical costs. In 1997 the compensation claims of 36 
workers were represented in the Assembly of the Poor. 
Alternative Agriculture Group (Klum kasetthakam thang-leuak) 
The Alternative Agriculture Network, which represents about 2000 farming families 
nationwide (Rawadee, 1996), joined the Assembly of the Poor before its mass protest in 
1997. This is the only organisation in the Assembly that does not campaign on specific 
local grievances. Rather, the Alternative Agriculture Network petitions for broader 
policy changes, including revision of the latest Agricultural Development Plan and state 
recognition and support, including financial support, for small-scale alternative 
agriculture projects (Assembly of the Poor, 19971). 
Small Fishers (Chao-pramong pheun-ban) 
The Southern Local Fishers' Confederation, a network of small-scale fishers from 
thirteen provinces in the South, joined the Assembly during its 1997 protest (Fieldnotes , 
20-2-1997, Bangkok). Its active membership was reported at approximately four 
hundred at the time (Chakrit, 1997c). The Fishers ' Confederation petitioned the state to 
enforce the 3,000 metre coastal exclusion zone to protect their members from the 
depredations of large, commercial fishing boats (Assembly of the Poor, 1997 g). 
Origins and Bases of Support 
Table 1 shows the approximate numbers of people in each problem group, according to 
Assembly of the Poor figures, presented in Praphat (1997a:4). The Forest and Land, and 
Dams Groups constitute the great majority of the Assembly' s membership. This reflects 
the fact that the Dams Network, the Isan Farmers' Assembly and the Northern Farmers 
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Network are key organisations in the movement. 
Problem Group 
1 Forest & Land 
2Dams 
3 State Projects 
4 Slum Communities 
5 Work-Related Illness 
6 Alternative Agriculture 
7 Small Fishers 
TOTAL 
I Number of 
Grievances 
93 
16 
5 
8 
1 
1 
1 
125 
Number of Families 
(approximately) 
21 ,900 
11 ,100 
1,300 
1,800 
36 
36,100 
Number of 
People 
(approximately) 
109,500 
55 ,500 
6,500 
9,000 
180,500 
Table 1 Approximate membership numbers in the Assembly of the Poor (from 
Praphat, 1997a:4) 
Table 2 shows the distribution of grievances by region. We can see that most of the 
communities are located in the Northeast with the North contributing the next largest 
group. 
Region I Forest & Land State Projects Dams Slums Work Small TOTAL 
Illness Fishers 
Northeast 59 3 12 74 
North 32 1 4 37 
South 3 1 4 
Central 1 1 2 
East 1 1 2 
Bangkok 4 1 5 
-TOTAL I 94 5 16 8 1 1 124 
Table 2 Distribution of grievances by region (from Praphat 1997a:5). Note: The 
Alternative Agriculture Network is nationwide and hence not listed here.) 
Development NGOs 
The second group to play a key role in the Assembly of the Poor is a network of 
development-oriented NGOs.5 They fall mostly into three groups: locally-based NGOs 
working directly with and supporting villagers' organisations and networks; NGO 
5 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the role of NGOs in the origins of the Assembly, and Chapter 5 for a 
detailed account of NGO activists' backgrounds and roles in the Assembly. 
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workers who staff and run the Assembly of the Poor secretarial office in Bangkok; other 
NGO staff based in Bangkok and regional centres who act as consultants or perform 
specialised tasks as required. But it is important to note that these three categories 
overlap to a degree because of the high mobility of NGO workers themselves. NGO 
activists provide technical knowledge, support and advice, prepare and produce most of 
the media releases and public relations material (including leaflets, magazines, and 
videos), and perform the work of linking the Assembly to other NGOs and 
organisations. 
An example is the Bangkok-based NGO, Friends of the People (Klum pheuan 
prachachon), whose office provides the main coordinating and secretarial centre for the 
Assembly. This small NGO was established in 1995 at the instigation of NGO activists 
in the Thai Volunteer Service and NGO-CORD. Its stated objectives are to "promote 
and support organisations and networks of villagers affected by state development 
projects" (Thai Development Support Committee, 1997:62). This NGO played a key 
role in arranging the first Assembly of the Poor conference in December 1995. It has a 
handful of staff, most of whom have several years experience as social activists , usually 
since their days as students (Interviews with Wiset and Jaroen, Friends of the People 
staff, Bangkok, 1-9-1997). 
Academics and Student Activists 
A number of academics and student activists work closely with the NGO activists and 
support Assembly activities in a range of ways. Student volunteers help out at Assembly 
protests and often assist with secretarial duties at Assembly meetings. The Student 
Federation of Thailand has remained a staunch supporter and makes public 
announcements and lobbies in support of Assembly campaigns. 
Academic supporters, such as a small group of political scientists based at 
Chulalongkorn University, frequently organise seminars to bring villagers' delegates 
and their NGO advisers together with academics, journalists and other political activists 
such as labour leaders to discuss Assembly campaigns and strategies. A small number 
of academics occupy reflexive positions in relation to the Assembly. That is, they work 
within the movement, advising on organisation and strategy, assisting with the 
preparation of documents and media releases, while also writing about the Assembly 
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and interpreting it to a broader academic and middle class community. 
Somkiat Phongpaibun is one example. Born in the Northeast, Somkiat studied education 
at Srinakharinwirot University and Khon Kaen University. He has been a lecturer at the 
Nakhon Ratchasima Rajabhat Institute (Teachers College) since 1975. After the violent 
suppression and coup of October 1976 he acted as a link between urban-based activists 
and CPT insurgents in the forests, a dangerous and risky occupation at the time. Later, 
he became an adviser to the Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers of the Northeast, an 
important precursor to the Assembly of the Poor. He told me that he regards himself as 
a "leftist radical" (using the English phrase) and took great pride in his political 
activism. For his efforts he has been subject to a number of disciplinary inquiries by the 
Ministry of Education. Somkiat has also been a regular columnist in several weekly 
current affairs magazines published for an urban, educated, middle class audience. In 
1994 he wrote a series of 32 articles for Than Setakit magazine about the history of the 
ASFN, and in 1996 published a series about the Assembly of the Poor in Khrungtep 
Turakit magazine (Fieldnotes, 26-7-1997, Hang Dong, Chiang Mai). He believes that 
poor people must "join forces to undertake direct political action and establish alliances 
to press the government to do something" to assist them. Somkiat describes the 
Assembly of the Poor as "a new social movement which is not only there for the benefit 
of members. It is also concerned about social issues, such as the environment, human 
rights and political reform, or so-called eco-politics which is a grassroots movement" 
(Ampa, 1997). · 
Building a Movement: Organisation and Decision-making 
The Assembly describes itself as a "network" (khreua-khai) rather than an organisation 
in its own right. Like a network, power and decision-making are decentralised diffusely 
throughout, rather than concentrated at the head of a hierarchical structure. Similarly, 
knowledge, information and resources are diffuse. In a way it has remained faithful to 
the process of its birth during the "Assembly of the Poor" conference in 1995. That is , 
the Assembly endeavours to retain the nature of a "forum" in which representatives of 
villagers' organisations, NGOs and academics come together to share knowledge and 
experiences, make decisions collectively and democratically, and devise collective 
responses and strategies. Financial and human resources, and decision-making power 
largely remain with the dispersed villagers' organisations and NGOs, except during 
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protest rallies. In any case, the relatively poor villagers and cash-strapped NGOs would 
not be able to fund or support a centralised bureaucratic structure or expensive 
secretariat. The decentralised, network-like structure of the rnovernent thus suits a 
rnovernent of poor, marginalised villagers. Nevertheless, as the rnovernent has grown 
and received donations of money and other resources, especially during protest rallies , 
the coordinating function and financial resources of the secretarial office have grown in 
importance. 
Figure 1 (following page) shows how the Assembly represented its own organisational 
"structure" in publicity leaflets published during the 1997 protest (Assembly of the 
Poor, 1997h). It would be a mistake to interpret this as depicting a highly structured, 
hierarchical organisation. Rather, through such a diagram. the Assembly airns to 
illustrate how "local comm.unities" (chumchon pheun-thi) with specific "problems" 
(panha) constitute the foundation of the rnovernent and are linked together through 
networks of people with similar grievances. Each specific "problem. case" (koroni 
panha) is represented in the Assembly ' s detailed petition to the state as a basis for 
negotiation. 
At the top of the structure are the pho khrua yai (literally: rnale "head chefs") who 
constitute the collective leadership of the Assembly. Through the pho khrua yai the 
Assembly has sought new ways of collective decision-making and democratic self-
rnanagernent. Each local group in the Assembly chooses one or rnore delegates to attend 
the pho khrua yai meetings, depending on their size. The number attending varies from. 
meeting to meeting, but in total there are usually about 260 delegates (Fieldnotes , 16-3-
1997, Assembly rally at Sanarn Luang, Bangkok). Thus , each "local comm.unity" is 
represented through its delegates in the leadership. According to the Assembly, pho 
khrua yai meetings represent the highest form of authority in the rnovernent, 
determining campaign tactics and strategies, protest actions , press releases and so on. 
As I will discuss further in Chapters 5 and 7, however, NGO activists (shown as 
"advisers" separate from. the pho khrua yai meetings in Figure 1) exercise power and 
influence in these meetings, and the rnovernent as whole, that far outweighs their small 
numbers and contradicts such democratic rhetoric. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the Assembly of the Poor, according to Publicity Leaflet No. 1 (1997) 
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The Power of Public Protest: Campaigns and Activities 
The Assembly of the Poor derives much of its political influence and bargaining power 
from its demonstrated ability to mobilise large numbers of people for sustained mass 
protest (see Chapter 6). Protest, however, is always employed as part of broader 
campaign strategies involving detailed written petitions, lobbying and negotiating with 
the government, as well as production of publicity materials such as leaflets, videos and 
other media. Villagers' leaders and activists argue that the only way that poor, 
politically and economically marginalised small farmers and other disadvantaged 
groups in Thai society can have their voices heard and their problems addressed by the 
government and bureaucracy is to stage a protest rally. Outside of the Assembly itself it 
is known mostly as a protest movement. 
A key factor in the success of the Assembly as a protest movement has been its 
faithfulness to the specific grievances and aims of each and every group of local people 
who constitute its membership. Concrete local grievances caused by state sponsored 
development constitute the foundation of the Assembly, and each of these grievances is 
detailed in the written petition submitted to the government for negotiation (1996; 
Assembly of the Poor, 19971). Therefore, every group that joins in a protest rally is 
motivated first and foremost by the material benefits it stands to gain for its own 
members. This connection to local communities is vital to the ability to stage sustained 
mass protest rallies for long periods of time, not just in terms of numbers of participants, 
but for mobilising resources and supplies just to feed and sustain people for long periods 
of time. 
In 1995-96 the Assembly of the Poor presented a petition to the government based on 
47 specific grievances of its member groups, divided into four groups: Dams, Forest and 
Land disputes, Government Projects and Slums, and Workplace and Environmental 
Illness (Assembly of the Poor, 1996). By 1997, their petition had grown to 122 specific 
grievances (Assembly of the Poor, 19971). 
However, as an Assembly leaflet says, 
the matters of the Assembly's petition are just a starting point to our 
rights ... We also oppose centralised authority and decision-making, and 
campaign for the redistribution and decentralisation of authority and for 
community participation in determining our own future (Assembly of 
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the Poor, 1997h). 
NGO activists have developed an overarching policy platform advocating political 
reform and changes in national development policies. This policy platform, in other 
words, seeks to go beyond local problems by explicitly relating them to the national 
policy arenas and political processes from which they arise. Thus, in 1997 the Assembly 
submitted an eight point policy platform as part of its petition, calling for substantial 
changes to development policy. I summarise these policies briefly here, based on the 
Assembly's petition to the government in 1997 and public relations material they 
published at the time explaining their petition and policies (1997h; 1997i; Assembly of 
the Poor, 19971). 
Community Forestry Act 
For several years sections of the NGO movement have lobbied for a Community 
Forestry Act to codify and protect the rights of villagers to use local forest resources , 
and in 1996 the government prepared a draft after consultation with technocrats, 
academic experts, development NGOs and forest villagers. In this policy the Assembly 
demands that the draft act to be implemented into law, and calls for an emphasis on 
environmental conservation, sustainable forestry, recognition and conservation of 
biological and human cultural diversity in forests, and ecological sustainability. 
Slum Act 
Slum dwellers and the NGOs who work with them desire to give them security of 
dwelling and protect them from "trespassing" and compulsory eviction from their land 
and dwellings. Hence, the Assembly proposes an act to give existing communities 
ownership rights over their dwellings, or help them resettle and re-establish new 
communities in more secure locations. It also advocates community participation in 
addressing slum problems and developing their communities in cooperation with the 
state. 
Farmers' Rights Act 
The Assembly demands greater recognition of the importance of farmers in national 
development and in conserving and developing plant varieties. It proposes an act to 
protect small-scale farmers' security of livelihood and the sustainability of the small-
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scale agriculture. 
Freedom of Information Act 
This is a basic platform in the Assembly's campaign for democratic reform, and reform 
of state-controlled development processes. Freedom of information is advocated as a 
basic right of the public in a democratic system and essential for making states 
accountable to their citizens. It should apply to the private sector as well as the state for 
projects that affect the public. 
Independent Court Act 
The Assembly of the Poor argues that all its members' problems arise from conflicts 
between the state and the people. Hence it advocates an independent court as a 
mechanism to arbitrate such disputes fairly and justly. This was an idea widely 
discussed during 1997 while the popularly-elected Constitution Drafting Committee 
was preparing a new constitution for Thailand. 
Fair Land Holding and Progressive Tax Policy 
The Assembly calls for a policy to discourage non-productive land speculation in order 
to protect poor people in the city and countryside against loss of land to speculators. It 
also calls for a progressive land tax system that would place the tax burden on large land 
owners. 
International Policy 
The Assembly demands that the government widely publicise international treaties and 
conventions such as GATT and biological diversity agreements that have effects on the 
public and farmers. It advocates a review of such agreements, and consultation with the 
people most affected by them, particularly the rural sector. 
Political Reform 
Through this policy the Assembly expresses support for the Constitution Drafting 
Committee and the process of public participation in constitutional reform. It calls for 
self determination for individuals and communities; for example, community rights in 
local natural resources management, and for citizens to have greater participation and 
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voice in government. 
Ideology and Social Critique: Contesting Development 
For the Assembly, the social critique presented in its petition and documents such as the 
Mun River Declaration serves to link the localised, material grievances of its members 
into a cohesive ideological attack on state development policies and practice. This 
ideological critique is drawn from perspectives and literature on alternative 
development generated within the Thai and international NGO community (see Chapter 
2). Within the Assembly it is written by a handful of NGO activists and academics , who 
perform the intellectual work of writing petitions, media releases and public relations 
material. The Assembly consciously and deliberately draws on discourses of 
environmentalism and human rights that have re-emerged in international currency 
during the 1990s. This ideological critique links development with social inequality and 
environmental degradation. 
The ideological discourse of the Assembly addresses at least two different audiences. 
On the one hand it addresses the members of the Assembly themselves, calling on them 
to recognise their shared problems, political identity and solidarity, and their potential 
political power. On the other hand the Assembly's published documents seek to 
advocate on behalf of "the poor" in the public sphere and the state, and engage in 
ongoing debates about economic development and political reform. 
The Assembly argues that the rapid economic development of the last few decades has 
benefited only a small, privileged minority. It suggests a class-based analysis in their 
portrayal of Thai society as based on political and economic inequality and exploitation, 
and the concentration and centralisation of power in the hands of the wealthy. For 
example, the Mun River Declaration asserts that 
Under the dominance of capitalist development and consumerism 
governments promote a system that benefits only a few at the top. This 
is closely aligned with the centralisation and concentration of power and 
authority that enables the easy skimming off of benefits (Assembly of 
the Poor, 1995). 
The Assembly asserts that unequal and exploitative power relations in society are the 
cause of poverty and disadvantage. The Mun River Declaration identifies small farmers 
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and industrial labourers as subjected to this economic exploitation and oppression: 
Until the present day farmers have been oppressed, mistreated, and their 
means and methods of production exploited, bringing about their 
bankruptcy, indebtedness and impoverishment. .. The state, and national 
and international capitalists see farmers only as tools of production. 
They skim off the benefits and profits from the market and free trade ... 
Industrial development has brought about a new age of slavery. 
Labourers are still exploited in a complex and well integrated system 
where we must work hard to exchange our labour for wages that are not 
enough to sustain the basic needs of life in environments that are risky to 
life, health, fitness and mental health (Assembly of the Poor, 1995). 
In this view the rapid economic and industrial development experienced by Thailand 
over the previous few · decades has mainly served to exacerbate inequalities and 
economic exploitation. The state, controlled by capitalists and high-ranking state 
officials, has promoted the hegemony of economic growth and industrial development 
to the exclusion of other social goals. Within this context, the rural and urban poor, who 
actually constitute the majority, have been excluded from the benefits of economic 
development, which accrued instead to capitalists and powerful bureaucrats and served 
to strengthen their power and privilege. The Mun River Declaration states: 
Economic development which is dominated by the industrial sector but 
ignores the rural agricultural sector has brought about great differences 
between the incomes of the people in the agricultural sector and those of 
people outside that sector .... Violent conflict [over resources] arises 
continuously. These problems are the result of economic development 
policies determined by capitalists that are not balanced with protecting 
the welfare of workers (Assembly of the Poor, 1995). 
In the face of this destructive development which stems from social inequality and 
exploitation, discourses which appeal to environmental protection, human rights and 
democracy offer subversive ideologies to attack the hegemony of industrial 
development and stake out a program for change. 
Environmentalism 
The environmentalism expressed by the Assembly is principally concerned with 
defending people's Ii velihoods and community rights to manage and control local 
resources such as land and forests. Staking their political claims using the language of 
environmentalism provides a politically powerful discourse to attack development that 
resonates with middle class environmentalism expressed in the media. Stated most 
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baldly, the Assembly asserts that capitalist development and industrialisation have been 
ecologically destructive and have resulted in a great deal of social conflict over 
resources: 
Industrial development that ignores the quality of life of the people and 
the ecological balance has caused conflict over natural resources 
between the rural sector and the urban sector, deterioration of natural 
resources, and conflict over the administration of land, forests, and water 
resources in the community (Assembly of the Poor, 1995). 
The environmental destructiveness of large-scale development is represented very 
clearly in the section of the Mun River Declaration under the heading "Dams and the 
Destruction of Ecology and Nature": 
In the 50 years of development of dam technology we have learned a 
lesson that forests, rivers and communities are destroyed and wiped out. 
This has been a very expensive lesson about the suffering and hardship 
of people behind dams, and negative effects on the ecology of rivers and 
forests. River after river has been destroyed, their fertility destroyed. 
Can we summarise this lesson yet or not, that using the energy of water 
to generate electric power, or damming rivers to respond to the needs of 
consumption that know no limits - is it worth the loss of natural 
resources and wealth of the environment that should be passed on to 
generations of our children, and grandchildren to come? (Assembly of 
the Poor, 1995). 
The Assembly argues that it is not just poor people's livelihoods at stake, but that 
distinct "cultures" and "ways of life" are being destroyed. These local cultures are 
closely associated with people's relationships with their environment. "The different 
models of state development projects have attacked ordinary ways of life, violated 
rights in resource management by local communities and destroyed different cultures" 
(Assembly of the Poor, 1997h). 
Against this picture of harmful and unfettered economic development, the Assembly 
calls for an approach to "sustainable development" based on community rights and local 
knowledge. The Assembly calls for "natural resources to be used appropriately, and for 
ecological sustainability for the future of our children, our grandchildren and our 
country" (Khaosot newspaper, 18-3-1997:31). Whereas urban-based, industrial forces 
have proved insatiable and destructive in their exploitation of natural resources, local 
communities are based on long-established and sustainable patterns of local resource 
use. For example, the Mun River Declaration speaks of indigenous, hill-tribe people in 
these terms: 
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Native people care for the forest and nature, care for the world's 
ecology. They have lived in the forest that their forefathers cared for 
right up to the present day ... The forest is their home, their community, 
their life. The state should accept the truth, accept what can be seen and 
proved: we tribal people care for the forest and live together with the 
forest in a balanced and appropriate way. 
Therefore, the Assembly argues that "Community Forestry is the solution to 
conservation and sustainable management of forests" (Assembly of the Poor, 1997i). 
Both ecological diversity and local communities must be conserved. The Assembly ' s 
position is to put the rights of local communities first, in order to "promote the 
abundance of cultures and traditions of communities, and build processes of cooperation 
between the state and communities in sustainably conserving the forest" (Assembly of 
the Poor, 1997h). 
Human Rights and Democracy 
Discourses of democracy and human rights have become pervasive and closely 
intertwined in international NGO literature and activism on alternative development. 
These discourses are central to the Assembly's attacks on state development policies 
and its ideological project for social change, even if they are not precisely defined or 
elaborated in detail in campaign documents. The Assembly does not reject the idea of 
"development" outright, but seeks "participation" in economic growth, the 
democratisation of Thai politics, and a socially just society that safeguards the rights of 
its citizens. The Mun River Declaration states that: 
Development is a people's right. But it is meaningless unless it is 
grounded in universal human rights. Without human rights guarantees of 
freedom of organisation, freedom of assembly and freedom of 
expression, the people will not be able to participate in the development 
process (Assembly of the Poor, 1995). 
The discourse of "universal human rights" has come under attack from some Third 
World activists and academics. Critics such as Esteva and Prakash (1997; 1998:117-
119) argue that human rights discourse represents a new form of "cultural imperialism" 
perpetrated by agencies of Western nations and based on biased claims about the 
"universal" nature of Western culture and individualism. Indeed, during the few years 
after issuing the Mun River Declaration the Assembly has shifted towards an emphasis 
on collective forms of rights and "community rights" in its discourses . Nevertheless, the 
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human rights discourse gives its members a political language with which to attack 
abuses of power and defend themselves against exploitation and suppression. 
In its 1997 publicity leaflets, the Assembly asserts that its protest is "For community 
rights, for the environment, and for people everywhere in the country". State 
development projects "have attacked ordinary ways of life, violated rights in resource 
management by local communities and destroyed different cultures". In response, the 
Assembly demands that the government "guarantee communities' rights, especially in 
the case of community forest. The government must give the duty to manage natural 
resources to the community" (Assembly of the Poor, 1997h). 
Similarly, the language of "participation" (kan-mi-suan-ruam) and "democracy" 
(prachatipathai) offers another politically charged discourse that is influential in the 
international arena and in Thailand. The Assembly of the Poor struggles over the 
meanings and practice of democracy in several ways. First, it expresses a critique of 
existing electoral politics in Thailand. It attacks the centralised and hierarchical 
structure of the Thai state, the domination of electoral politics by a wealthy and 
powerful elite who rely on vote-buying to gain elected positions, and the exercise of 
state power to benefit the economic elite and maintain structures of economic inequality 
and exploitation. In this discursive battle, appeals to democracy are used to criticise the 
state and legitimate calls for political reform. 
Second, at the heart of Assembly struggles to protect its members' livelihoods and 
rights over local resources, the movement campaigns for the democratisation of 
development through institutionalised forms of community participation in decision-
making on development projects and policies. The rhetoric of participation in 
development is central to this campaign. Third, as I mentioned earlier in my discussion 
of collective leadership, the Assembly endeavours to enact democratic processes within 
the organisations and networks which constitute it (see Chapter 7). 
The Assembly's public statements attack representative democracy as practised in 
Thailand and argue that it has not seen a redistribution of power or enabled greater 
public participation: 
The decline of the parliamentary system, deterioration in the 
77 
countryside, environmental problems and so on reflect and show the 
deformity of our representative democracy, the centralization of 
authority within an inefficient bureaucratic system, and paths of national 
development that fail to allow public participation. We can't rely on 
MPs and the government bureaucracy to solve these problems, for we 
know that they are one part of the problem (Assembly of the Poor, 
1997h). 
The Assembly's submission to the Constitution Drafting Committee during the period 
of their protest rally in Bangkok in 1997 provided an important vehicle to advocate the 
sorts of democratic reforms and changes to the new constitution which would recognise 
and protect the rights of the "poor". In 1997, during a broad-reaching process of public 
consultation over the drafting of a new constitution and public debate in the media, the 
. Assembly wrote its own submission which was accepted by the Constitution Drafting 
Commission (Assembly of the Poor, 1997c). 
Furthermore, the Assembly's calls for democratic reform are also expressed in attacks 
on top-down development projects implemented by the powerful and paternalistic state. 
As I discuss in Chapter 2, the practice of development has been a central form of 
domination and exploitation by the state. The concept of "participation" plays a central 
role in the discourse of democratic reform of development practice. This is expressed 
most clearly in the Assembly's efforts to protect rights over local resources of 
community groups within its network. They advocate the institutionalisation of "Public 
Hearings" (pracha-phijan) to enable participation by people whose way of life stands to 
be affected by state projects. NGOs and academics have been advocating the use of 
Public Hearings in development planning for several years in an attempt to enable 
public participation, but most particularly the participation by people affected by 
proposed development projects in the assessment and decision-making process. 
Another central issue in the Assembly's struggle to democratise development is the 
ongoing campaign and conflict over drafting the Community Forestry Bill to legally 
clarify and protect collective community rights to use local forests and have authority 
over them. At the heart of this campaign is a struggle for decentralisation of power and 
authority over local forest resources to local communities as collective entities. 
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"Solidarity is Power": Forging Identity and Solidarity 
The Assembly of the Poor brings together a large number of local groups of villagers 
and slum dwellers. Local material grievances caused by state-sponsored development 
projects constitute the primary motivation for villagers to participate in Assembly 
campaigns and protests, and the Assembly utilises this in its approach to campaigning. 
It is this grounding in local material problems that I argue represents a strength of the 
Assembly in its ability to mobilise large numbers of people to protest for long periods of 
time. But it also presents a problem for building solidarity and unity among a number of 
diverse groups, and constructing a collective identity in the public sphere and in 
negotiations with the state. 
Most of the groups in the Assembly articulate a local identity that is linked with claims 
about a way of life and livelihood faced with destruction by "development". As Castells 
(1997: 10) argues, for many people their locality offers "the most immediate source of 
self-recognition and autonomous organization". Panya Tongyu's song which begins this 
thesis represents a good example. When Panya introduces his song as "the history of the 
Assembly and the Mun-River" he claims a special place for his own group's struggle in 
the history of the Assembly, but no one group leads the movement. Panya portrays 
fishing as a way of life, a living culture, as well as a fundamental livelihood strategy, 
which was destroyed by the Pak Mun Dam. In his song at least, it was fishers, sharing a 
common way of life and livelihood, who joined together to fight for compensation. 
Panya's song expresses identity in multiple and complex ways, of course, that do much 
more than link him to the Mun River. He sings in the mo lam style in Lao, and hence 
identifies with Isan, the Lao-speaking Northeast, and addresses the Isan majority of the 
Assembly. But he also invokes Thai nationality as a source of unity with the broader 
social family and the political right to demonstrate. 
The Assembly works at overcoming such localising and fragmenting issues in two 
ways. First, members of the Assembly enter into a social contract which is underscored 
by their shared political goal. Second, activists and villagers in the movement articulate 
and promote a collective identity that also serves as a foundation for expressing a 
culture of solidarity. In other words, the articulation of a collective identity carries a 
double role in that it addresses (at least) two audiences - movement insiders in order to 
integrate and promote solidarity, and outsiders in the public and the state. 
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The Social Contract 
When I asked NGO activists and villagers' leaders what all of the groups in the 
Assembly shared in common, several replied that, "We all share the same goal" (mi 
paomai diawkan) of pressuring the state to address their petition. This suggests a 
solidarity based on contingency and political pragmatism. Each group or villagers' 
organisation that joins the Assembly does so with an undertaking that when it joins in 
Assembly campaigns, notably protest rallies, it will support the Assembly as a whole 
and not withdraw or drop out in the event that its particular grievances are resolved 
(various interviews during protest rally in Bangkok, February & March 1997). This 
social contract has been particularly important in mobilising the Assembly as a political 
. force. Every villager who joins in a mass protest or some other campaign activity stands 
to benefit in material ways in terms of their own family's livelihood and welfare. The 
social contract makes clear that the success of their particular petition is tied to their 
support for every other group's campaign and continued participation in collective 
action. 
Collective Identity: Representing "the Poor" and "the People" 
The Assembly of the Poor is the people, people Ii ving in poverty, people 
facing troubles from government policies, law, the bureaucratic chain of 
command, and national development that doesn't respect the people, 
community, culture, or sustainability of resources (Assembly of the 
Poor, 1997h). 
In the Mun River Declaration the Assembly identifies its members as "common people" 
(samanchon) and "poor people" (khon Jon) who are the "victims of incorrect 
development". Appealing to the label "common people" is a widespread strategy for 
many groups opposing state or corporate power throughout the world. To be "common 
people" asserts that you are not associated with or backed by powerful patrons or vested 
interests. At the same time it invokes the modem democratic concept of sovereignty 
resting with and stemming from the people. Therefore, "common people" appeals to 
ideas of the sovereign powers of citizens, their rights to have a voice in modem liberal 
democracies and the responsibilities of states to protect them. 
There is a strong appeal to Marxist ideas of class relations in the Assembly's 
representation of "poor people". In their 1997 video "poor people" represent the 
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"grassroots" but also the primary productive classes of society: 
No matter what country in the world, poor people are the largest group 
in the nation, the most important productive force in society. The 
importance of poor people is like the grassroots everywhere which are 
the force which constructs and nourishes a modernising society. But 
under the development direction that leads our country towards 
modernity and progress, poor people, the largest portion of our country, 
have fallen to be the victims of development for a minority to prosper 
(Assembly of the Poor, 1997j). 
Thus, the claim to be "the people", implies that the Assembly represents (in the sense of 
'stands for') the popular majority of rural and urban poor. 
The title samatcha khan Jon was deliberately and thoughtfully chosen, apparently by 
NGO activists. It proved to be very evocative in the media, both Thai and English, 
especially during the Assembly's protests in 1996 and 1997. Indeed, these three words 
carry multiple meanings and connotations with implications for the representation of 
political identity. I have already mentioned in Chapter 2 the two Northeastern samatcha 
which helped form the Assembly of the Poor: Samatcha kasettakon rai-yoi (Assembly 
of Small-Scale Farmers of the Northeast) and Samatcha chao-na chao-rai (Isan 
Farmers' Assembly for Protection of Land Rights). These two villagers' organisations 
became well-known for demonstrations and protest marches, and the name signals 
direct continuity with them. Moreover, many NGO activists told me that the word 
samatcha was first used by the Communist Party of Thailand for its general assemblies 
during the insurgency. Cholthira Satayawathana, a radical Thai academic, believes that 
this was the case. In the early 1990s when activists chose to name the emerging 
villagers' organisations samatcha, they invoked that radical history. Indeed, Cholthira 
believes that "some key persons in almost every samatcha had been CPT cadre or at 
least have had some connection, or been influenced by CPT policy" (email 
communication, 22-6-1999). Some activists stressed the egalitarian connotations of 
samatcha in terms of a "forum" (foram, wethi) where people come together as equals. 
An NGO activist told me that the name "Assembly of the Poor" appealed to them 
because the phrase "Assembly of people suffering from the negative consequences of 
development" (samatcha phu thi dai rap phon-krathop jak kan-phattana) was far too 
long (Fieldnotes, 24-7-1997, Khong Jiam). Another activist, Wiset, with Friends of the 
People was probably more to the point. He explained to me that in the lead up to the 
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1995 conference, "we considered that it would be a network of people who'd all 
suffered the same fate (chatakam diawkan), therefore we got the 'concept' of the words 
'poor people' (khan Jon) in terms of bringing opportunities (kan mi orkat), power (mi 
amnat), and rights (mi sitthi) to bargain (to rang)" (Interview, Wiset, Bangkok, 2-9-
1997). In other words, identifying collectively as "the poor" was seen as a useful 
political identity from which to launch petitions, demands and negotiations with the 
state. It could cover all the groups "suffering from the negative consequences of 
development" but was even more inclusive. 
Of course, the assertion of a mass of "poor people" "suffering the consequences of 
development" is symbolic condemnation of the process of industrialisation and 
development, highlighting the inequality, inequitable distribution of the benefits of 
growth, and lending weight to the claim that many have sacrificed for the few to 
prosper. In Chapter 6 I describe how that symbolism was made into a tangible spectacle 
during the protest rally in the form of the "Village of the Poor" besieging Government 
House. 
The representation of a collective identity in the "Assembly of the Poor" is part of a 
struggle to have a right to speak and a right to political activity (i.e. being perceived as a 
legitimate political agency). The claim to represent "the poor" also presented certain 
problems or tensions during the course of the Assembly's campaigns, however. For 
instance, some sections of the media questioned just how "poor" the protesters were if 
they could afford to rally in Bangkok for long periods of time. Attacks on their 
legitimacy were often joined with a claim that they were a "hired mob" (mop rap Jang) 
manipulated by some powerful "third hand" (meu thi-sam) for cynical political 
purposes, perhaps an opposition party. This is a long established way in Thai politics of 
undermining the legitimacy of protesting groups, and is sometimes well founded. Closer 
to the actual reality, some Members of Parliament announced that they knew who the 
third hand behind the Assembly protests really was: "NGOs". Representing the 
movement as "the poor" has created tensions or problems for how to position the NGO 
advisers and supporters in relation to the movement, for they can hardly claim to be 
"poor", "disadvantaged", or the "victims of development". 
We cannot argue that the Assembly unambiguously expresses a counter-hegemonic 
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struggle (as, for instance, does Suthy, 1997). The movement challenges the hegemony 
of economic development, which has long served to legitimise elite power and control 
of the state. However, in contrast to the rural-based communist insurgency of a few 
decades previously, the Assembly does not attack the national symbols of Nation, 
Religion and King. An ideology of "Thainess" (khwampenthai) or national identity 
(ekkhalak khong chat) has long been used by political rulers as a hegemonic discourse 
to build national unity among a culturally diverse population, legitimise the social order 
and attack challenges from other social groups (Bowie, 1997; Keyes, 1989; Reynolds, 
1991). For example, the Thai state has long regarded communist activity as un-Thai and 
did its best to associate the insurgency with foreign threats to the Thai nation 
(Thongchai, 1994). 
In fact, the Assembly uses symbols of Nation, Religion and King during its protests (see 
Photograph 9). Nationalism and religion offer powerful symbolic and ideological 
resources for constructing collective identity and a culture of solidarity for groups in 
Thailand. While the Assembly attacks the ideology of development and the 
authoritarianism of the state, it invokes Thai nationalism in order to stress that this is not 
a revolutionary or insurgent movement. Rather than attack the basis of Thai nationalism 
the Assembly invokes it to support its claims and build solidarity. Moreover, the 
Assembly of the Poor uses appeals to nationalist ideology to reject the ideology of 
difference and otherness that is often attached to poor protesters from regional Thailand, 
who are mostly ethnically distinct from the Central Thais of Bangkok, and seek the 
moral support and sympathy of the public. The words to the mo lam song which begins 
the next chapter provides a good example. The song, performed in Lao by a key leader 
of the Mun River villagers' organisation fighting the Pak Mun Dam, marks the Isan 
identity of the singer and his audience. But at the same time it declares that "We are 
Thai people, too. Every one of us has the right to speak ... What kind of democracy is 
this!". 
The articulation of collective identity by the Assembly of the Poor, of course, addresses 
participants as well as an external audience. The rank and file members are asked to 
recognise themselves and express solidarity with the Assembly. Consider the words to 
song that was written by a "music for life" folk singer for the Assembly and released on 
an audio tape during the 1997 protest. The song is titled "Assembly of the Poor for Thai 
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People" (Samatcha khon Jon pheua khon thai) and was broadcast repeatedly throughout 
the rally site: 
Nation, religion, king are the wealth that binds us 
They have great meaning and importance, enduring and secure 
This solidarity is power 
Thai creativity still has value 
We'll combine our blood and flesh, sacrifice our lives 
For Thais everywhere, for democracy ... 
Assembly of the Poor will resist to the death 
Assembly of the Poor will resist to the ends of our lives 
Assembly of the Poor will endure for Thai people 
Assembly of the Poor will fight for Thai people 
(from audio tape Samatch khon Jon LIVE, published by Assembly of the 
Poor 1997). 
The articulation of these ideologies that address members of the Assembly and 
encourage them to recognise their shared identity, are important, but as I will show, 
shared experiences and the stories developed about those shared experiences -
especially in the protest - also become central to developing collective identity and 
solidarity. The experience of mobilisation, collective action and protest plays a central 
part in participants developing a culture of solidarity (see Chapter 6). In other words , 
solidarity and identity are continually constructed and renegotiated. 
Conclusion 
The ability of the Assembly to mobilise large numbers of people in protest campaigns 
stems from its grounding in local struggles. Material grievances provide the 
fundamental motivation for members of communities to get involved, and the 
Assembly ' s written petitions to the government combine the details of each specific, 
local grievance. Moreover, for many of these groups the primary source of a collective 
identity on which to base their struggles is their local community and relationships with 
place and environment. That is because the social impacts of development projects such 
as dams, or moves by state agencies to assert control over land and forests , are 
experienced by villagers in their own locality. However, in arguing that this represents a 
strength of the Assembly, I have also explored how it attempts to overcome the 
fragmenting impetus of linking diverse, locally-grounded conflicts into a country-wide 
movement able to campaign at a national level. 
One aspect of this is the Assembly's efforts to express an overarching ideological 
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critique of development processes and policies, that explicitly relates specific, material 
problems to the national context of state development policy and social structures of 
inequality. Another aspect is the expression of a unifying oppositional identity based on 
a "common context of struggle" (see Callahan, 1998; Mohanty, 1991) and thus able to 
incorporate diversity. The assertion of collective identity in symbolic and ideological 
terms addresses both outsiders (such as the government in Assembly petitions) and 
members of the Assembly, seeking to have them recognise their shared interests and 
political project. 
I have presented a broad overview of the make-up, structure and ideology of the 
Assembly in this chapter. In order to demonstrate how the development of villagers ' 
organisations mobilising around local issues constitutes the foundation of the Assembly, 
in the following chapter I tum to an ethnographic case study of the emergence and 
activities of the Mun River Villagers' Committee and its campaign against the Pak Mun 
Dam. 
85 
4 The Rise of a Villagers' Movement: A Case 
Study of The Mun River Villagers' Committee 
Fisher folk, don't hurry to escape on your separate ways! 
Every single one went to find the government 
And present them with the truth 
They told us the dam didn't destroy the fish 
We, who knew first, knew the rapids when the river began to quicken 
We are Thai people, too 
Every one of us has the right to speak, 
Not to argue over the right place and the wrong place 
What kind of democracy is this! 
(Extract from "The Story of Pak Mun People's Struggle" a mo lam song 
by Pho Siang6, Chair of the Mun River Villagers' Committee, recorded 
during interview, 2-7-1997, Khong Jiam) 
In Chapter 2 I outlined the historical origins of the Assembly of the Poor, arguing that 
rapid economic growth and industrial development, especially since the early 1980s, 
caused a crisis in the countryside as local people were increasingly drawn into conflicts 
over land, forests and other resources throughout rural Thailand. This chapter explores 
how this crisis in the countryside stimulated instances of grassroots collective action in 
opposition to centrally-controlled development through a case study of the Pak Mun 
Dam campaign. I illustrate how top-down, authoritarian approaches to development, in 
this case dam construction, have seen local villagers respond collectively, build 
organisations to mount their campaigns and also seek out allies in NGOs and other 
sectors of the middle class. 
The story of grassroots opposition to the Pak Mun Dam, organised and developed 
through the Mun River Villagers' Committee, not only represents an example of local, 
collective action in opposition to state-led development. This villagers' organisation 
became a core group in the Assembly of the Poor, and has created a thriving centre of 
opposition and activism on a range of development issues in Ubon Ratchathani 
province. Furthermore, many of the NGO activists in the Assembly have a long 
association and experience with the Pak Mun dam campaign. A close study of the 
6 Pho is a fictive kin term in Thai and Lao meaning "father" and is used here as a polite title. 
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history and development of the Mun River Villagers' Committee gives us an insight 
into the history and development of the Assembly of the Poor as a whole. 
Perspectives on Grassroots Action 
In this chapter I explore the links between development, environment and collective 
grassroots action, based on accounts and oral histories from local villagers and NGO 
activists. I try to show just how complex local responses to development and the 
processes of organising collective action can be, as they reflect local power structures 
and socio-economic differentiation. This attention to the complexity and social 
differentiation of grassroots responses to development has been lacking in the political 
ecology literature. Villagers and the poor are often portrayed in political ecology 
literature in a rather simplistic and uniform way. That is, they are seen as all being 
affected uniformly by development and environmental change, and therefore responding 
collectively as a mass. If grassroots collective actors have become so important, then we 
need more anthropological detail about local social processes in the building and 
development of grassroots organisations and movements . 
In the case of the Pak Mun Dam it was not a foregone conclusion that an organised, 
broad-based villagers' movement would emerge to oppose the dam. Government 
agencies and officials disseminated pro-dam propaganda, restricted information and 
used ideological and coercive means to promote local support for the dam project and 
suppress dissent. The dam project divided the community, and many people such as 
village-level officials, stood to gain. Also, the social base of the villagers' opposition 
movement, and their activities and goals, changed over time as the dam project 
progressed and its environmental consequences began to be felt. Increasing numbers of 
villagers joined the local anti-dam organisation, partly because of the growing local 
perceptions of the dam's adverse impact on the riverine environment and local 
livelihoods, but also partly because of the limited successes and gains won by the 
opposition movement. The villagers' opposition organisation acquired a momentum of 
its own. It grew in terms of membership but also stimulated organised opposition and 
campaigns on other local issues. Most notable of these was the emergence of an 
organised villagers' campaign for fair compensation for the effects of the Sirin th om 
Dam, constructed almost three decades earlier. 
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Everyday Life and Livelihood Before the Dam 
The Mun River rises on the heights of Khao Yai Mountain in the Sankambeng Range 
and flows eastwards across North-east Thailand. Along with its tributary, the Chi River, 
it drains 75 percent of the region, and constitutes the major tributary of the Mekong 
River inside Thailand (Donner, 1978). The Mun River joins the Mekong at the township 
of Khong Jiam in Ubon Ratchathani Province. Until recently Khong Jiam was famous 
for its spectacular views across the expanse of water called the mae nam song si, the 
"two coloured river", where the blue waters of the Mun mingled with the brown, muddy 
waters of the Mekong. Across the Mekong rise up the thickly forested hills of Laos. 
This is the pak mun, the "mouth of the Mun." 
Life in the village communities located along the lower Mun River in the Districts of 
Phi bun and Khong Jiam has long been "bound up with the river". Along a stretch of 
some 40 kilometres from the river's mouth at Khong Jiam to Phibun Mangsahan 
township are located about 55 villages on or near the river's banks (see Map 2). Many 
of these villages were originally settled about 227 years ago, with a second wave of 
settlement about 177 years ago (Buchidta, 1997:41). The land is mostly poor and 
infertile for cash crops or rice farming, and some villages have no farmland at all, but 
depended entirely on fishing for their income. Among the communities closest to the 
river many villagers would trade fish for rice and other produce from other villages, to 
the extent that a common local saying was "Go carrying fish, return carrying rice" (pai 
hap pla ma hap khao). 
My first introduction to stories of life and livelihoods along the Mun River before and 
after the dam came in November 1996 on my first visit to the Mun River Villagers' 
Centre, over two years after completion of the Pak Mun Dam. My wife and I were 
invited to attend a meeting of fishers at the Villagers' Centre in Pha Pratu Thong 
Village, Khong Jiam, as observers (Fieldnotes 20-11-1996). Before the meeting began, 
a wiry old grandfather showed us the Centre's collection of traditional fishing gear and 
traps, housed in a dilapidated bamboo hut (which NGO staff based in the Centre 
ironically call a "museum", phiphithaphan). He explained how to use the caste nets 
(hae) and gill nets (mong khai) and demonstrated the workings of bamboo baskets (jip) 
and bamboo fish traps such as the large tum. 
88 
Ubon 
..-- Ratchathani 
..._ 
~ 
ci: 
' '«> 
>-
§ 
c3 
~ >: 
• Villages affected by Pak Mun Dam 
0 5 10 
kilometres 
N 
Map 2. The lower Mun River, showing locations of villages affected by the Pak Mun Dam. 
Ban Pha 
Pratu Thong 
• 
LAOS 
• 
.THAILAND 
l . 
• 
. :'\ 
.. ~.-
_.,,,,, 
./ 
/. 
/. LAOS 
Fifteen fishers attended the meeting, thirteen men and two women, from fifteen 
different villages along the 40 kilometre stretch of river flooded by the dam. Two staff 
members of the locally-based NGO, Mun River Basin Conservation Project, Maliwan 
and Noi, chaired the meeting. Two women from the Bangkok-based Rural 
Reconstruction Alumni and Friends Association (RRAFA) also attended. Their role was 
to record and write up the findings of the seminar. Maliwan introduced the goals to the 
villagers: they had all been professional fishers on the Mun River before dam 
construction, making most of their income from fishing. Now the Mun River Villagers' 
Committee needed its own data and information, based on local knowledge, to use in its 
ongoing campaign for compensation. Maliwan asked them to draw on their experience 
and memories together to develop a record of fishing before and after the dam. They 
would also record the kinds of plants which had been harvested along the banks of the 
Mun River. 
A lively and enthusiastic discussion followed. The fishers were being asked to 
remember their catches during the two years before dam construction started, 1989 and 
1990, and over six years previously. They talked about some of the common fish 
varieties from the Mun River, such as pa i-tu (labeo erythrurus, or morulius 
chrysophekadion), pa taphian (various species of puntius), pa peung (catfish, pangasius 
lamaudii), pa oen (probarbus jullieni) and pa ka-man (Giant carp, catlocarpio 
siamensis) which made up the basis of their livelihood.7 Pa beuk, the giant Mekong 
catfish (Pangasianodon gigas), held a legendary status, reportedly growing up 300 
kilograms and selling for 300 baht per kilogram. A fisher was lucky if she or he ever 
caught one of these monsters. With one fish they could land the equivalent of a whole 
year's income. 
The villagers eventually listed 66 varieties of fish with economic value caught in the 
Mun River prior to 1991. They recorded their seasonal cycles, maximum catches and 
selling price per kilogram on the local market. They named 41 varieties of wild 
vegetables, 10 varieties of bamboo and 45 varieties of mushrooms that their families 
had harvested along the river banks. Their stories and their knowledge of Mun River 
7 Pa (Lao) or pla (Thai): "fish". These are almost all local Lao names. The scientific equivalents have 
been documented in a Fisheries Department report ( 1994). 
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fishing ecology underscored the variety and abundance of natural resources yielded by 
the river. By mid-afternoon, Maliwan was ready to move on to the second part of the 
agenda that she had set them. What was the situation like now that the dam was 
finished? Of the fish they had recorded, which could be caught now? 
The meeting fell into a bemused silenced. They had all stopped fishing as a commercial 
activity. The variety and sizes of fish could not be caught in the river upstream from the 
dam any more, they said. The sites where wild vegetables, mushrooms and bamboo 
could be harvested had all been flooded. 
In dozens of interviews that I conducted over the following year, villagers living along 
the Mun River told the same story. Siang, an office holder in the Mun River Villagers ' 
Committee, summed it up as follows: 
Most people in Khong Jiam had two prominent ways of making a living: 
first fishing, second rice farming. Rice farming for our own 
consumption. After working the rice fields, most villagers go fishing. 
This has been our culture since our ancestor's time. It is our identity. 
Almost every family depended on these economic means to allow us to 
accumulate assets within the family and make our lives better. Then in 
1991 they started building the dam. They had to blast away the rapids to 
construct a water channel. The local fishers thought that this would have 
a direct effect on the fish. During the period of construction our catches 
declined, it was hard to catch fish. We realised when they built the dam 
that it would be certain to adversely affect our brothers and sisters living 
along both banks of the Mun River, because our way of life was bound 
up with the river (Interview, Pho Siang, Wang Mai Village, Khong Jiam, 
2-7-1997). 
The coming of the dam changed the way that stories were told about life on the Mun 
River. As can be seen in the account of the fishers' seminar above, many Mun River 
villagers have been actively reconstructing the past for political reasons. Many now tell 
their stories as part of their collective attack on the dam project and their claims for 
compensation. This is not to say that their accounts are not true to their own 
experiences, but that they are now used for a new purpose, even when told to a foreign 
researchers like myself, and we need to take this into account. They have become 
"before the dam" stories. Mae Daeng, 8 another leading figure in the Mun River 
8 Mae is a polite title for older women in Isan meaning "mother" in Thai and Lao. 
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Villagers' Committee, told me her family's experience: 
Before the dam we fished and worked like this [making brooms] ... If my 
children came, me and father and my children would go fishing when we 
felt like it. If it was the right season. We would fish during the months of 
May and August as those were the times when you could catch the most. 
Those times we could make money to use for the rest of the year. 1000, 
2000 baht a day, 40 to 50 kilograms of fish each day. For our family . 
After that we saved for a better fish net. And we bought fish from other 
villagers nearby and made profits of about 3 to 4000 all year round. I 
didn't work my rice fields at all .. .I have rice fields but the land is not 
very fertile (Mae Daeng, Interview, Wang Sabaeng Tai Village, Khong 
Jiam 23-9-1997). 
Research findings from both state agencies and environmental NGOs support local 
people's own accounts. But it is important to emphasise that very little systematic, 
scientific study of Mun River fisheries or their economic importance to local people was 
undertaken before dam construction. Certainly, the potential effects of the dam on pre-
existing fisheries were not assessed. The agency responsible for the dam, the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), did commission a study of fisheries 
resources on the lower Mun River that was published in May 1991 , well before dam 
construction started. This study found that 99% of village households sampled go 
fishing, and on average derived an income of 5576 baht per year from fishing 
(Theerapat et al 1991, cited in Chalotom, 1994). A belated survey of 161 households in 
eleven villages by the Department of Fisheries in 1994 estimated that fishing families 
consumed about 38 baht of fish a day and sold an average of 340 baht of fish per day. 
On average the families surveyed had fished for 252 days each year before dam 
construction (Fisheries Department, 1994). 
Similarly, a survey of 291 families in 11 villages by the environmental NGO, Project for 
Ecological Recovery (PER), underscored the economic importance of Mun River 
fisheries. PER found that before dam construction 81 % of families depended on the 
river fisheries for livelihood, either for subsistence consumption or income generation. 
73% of fishing families surveyed sold some of their catch to generate income in 1990. 
Fishers reported their own consumption at 1.5 kg per day per family in 1989 and 1990. 
The commercial catch during those years averaged 9 kilograms per day per family; and 
these families made on average 218 baht per day of fishing (Project for Ecological 
Recovery, 1993). 
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The Pak Mun Dam Project 
The Pak Mun Dam is located near the mouth of the Mun River at Hua Haew Village, 
four kilometres upstream from the river's confluence with the Mekong. Feasibility 
studies of the site for a hydroelectric dam to provide power for the Northeast region had 
been made since 1970 (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, 1984). Pak Mun is 
a "run-of-the-river" hydropower dam. "This means that, unlike a normal storage-type 
dam, Pak Mun does not hold a large stagnant lake of water" (World Bank, 1994:5). 
Instead, the dam holds back a much lower "head" of water while relying on a fast flow 
through the hydropower dynamos. Pak Mun is the first "run-of-the-river" type dam ever 
constructed in Thailand. It consists of a dam wall 17 metres high, containing a reservoir 
which has submerged about 66 square kilometres, "most of which would normally have 
been submerged during the annual wet season floods" (World Bank, 1994:5). The dam 
affects water levels in the river for over 40 kilometres upstream from the wall. The 
maximum water level is 108 metres above sea level. 
EGAT claimed that the "run-of-the-river" style of the dam would have a minimal 
environmental and social impact as it would only raise the river to levels just above the 
normal rainy season flood levels anyway (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, 
1982; 1984). In their project proposal EGAT actually claimed that an additional benefit 
of the dam, apart from hydroelectricity production, would be an increase in fishery 
production in the dam reservoir. EGAT based this prediction on studies of fishery 
production in seven other existing large dams in Thailand, but they had no comparative 
data on "run-of-the-river" style dams. Moreover, EGAT consistently ignored or under-
emphasised the economic importance of the pre-existing fisheries along the lower Mun 
River in their cost-benefit analysis and EIA, even though they had conducted fishery 
surveys prior to construction (Chalotom, 1994). 
The cabinet of former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan approved the Pak Mun 
Dam Project in April 1989 with the EGAT as the implementing agency. EGAT justified 
the Pak Mun Dam as providing a source of renewable and sustainable hydroelectric 
energy which was needed to supply Thailand's rapidly growing energy demands at a 
time of rapid economic growth and industrialisation. At that time Thailand's energy 
needs were growing at 1000 megawatts per year, of which the Pak Mun project would 
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provide 136 megawatts (World Bank, 1994). EGAT also claimed that it would be a 
"dual purpose" dam, providing both hydroelectricity and water for irrigation, but EGAT 
has never included any irrigation component in the project' s budget. Moreover, the 
feasibility of EGAT' s proposed irrigation scheme has been called into question and it 
now seems unlikely that an integrated irrigation scheme will ever be developed for the 
Pak Mun Dam (Chalotom, 1994). EGAT estimated that the project would cost a total of 
US$230 million and applied to the World Bank for a loan of US$23 million, ten percent 
of the total cost. 
After approval of the project, the public, NGOs and media found it very difficult to get 
access to information from EGAT about the numbers of village households who would 
be displaced by the dam. Apparently in order to pre-empt opposition to the project 
EGAT consistently down-played the size and impact of the dam, claiming in their 
submissions to the cabinet in 1990 that only 262 families would need to be resettled 
(Anurak, 1996) and that the dam would have little effect on the river ' s flow or riverine 
environment. EGAT began construction in May 1991. The World Bank finally 
approved its loan in December 1991 (see below). Construction of the dam wall was 
completed and hydropower production began with one generator in June 1994 (Bangkok 
Post, Reuters Database, 12 June 1994). 
The dam Resettlement Plan, prepared for EGAT as part of the EIA process, reported 
that 278 households would need to be relocated, based on survey data from 1984 
(Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, 1984). During the construction period 
protests and media reports continually forced EGAT to acknowledge growing numbers 
of affected and displaced villagers. By the time construction and inundation was 
completed in June 1994, 1821 families in thirty-one villages had received financial 
compensation for the flooding of their houses and/or land or been resettled (Bangkok 
Post, Reuters Database, The dam's done, conflict's not, 3 July 1994). 
Emergence of Local Opposition 
In many villages along the lower Mun River which stood to be affected by the dam, 
EGAT and other state officials carried out an intensive public relations exercise to 
promote support for the dam, and manage and suppress the emergence of opposition 
(see also Hubbel, 1992). EGAT withheld accurate information about the maximum 
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water levels to be flooded. At the same time they disseminated pro-dam propaganda 
which under-estimated and down-played the eventual extent of local flooding, and gave 
assurances that the few villagers affected would be suitably compensated. Local 
authorities such as Village Heads and Tambon9 Heads ( called kamnan) were instructed 
to use their authority to prohibit expressions of opposition. Once the villagers 
opposition campaign commenced and started to attract media attention, government and 
EGAT officials consistently denied the legitimacy of the demonstrators (Hubbel, 1992), 
claiming that they were outsiders or paid by outsiders. EGAT and their allies in the 
provincial and local authorities used the strict application of the law to suppress dissent. 
In the face of such a concerted campaign to suppress and disorganise the villagers' 
capacity for organised opposition, one question I address here is how a local organised 
opposition movement emerged among the villagers at all. 
A range of influential people and officials at local, district, provincial and national 
levels stood to gain from the dam project and hence were determined to circumvent and 
suppress opposition. Buchidta (1997) argues that EGAT formed an alliance with the 
Provincial administration and an Ubon-based Member of Parliament to push for the 
dam. According to villagers, this group also found an ally in a local kamnan, who 
owned a construction contracting business. Villagers claim that these "influential 
people" (phu mi itthiphon) paid people to demonstrate in support of the dam and 
violently harass and threaten anti-dam groups. 
EGAT' s publicity campaign was most intense in villages closest to the proposed 
construction site at Ban 10 Hua Haew. Villagers from Ban Huay Hai, two kilometres 
upstream from the dam site, recalled that many of them initially believed that the dam 
would bring great benefits to the local communities. EGAT promised that the dam 
project would bring jobs for young people, and create improved fisheries. EGAT 
guaranteed new and better infrastructure for villagers who had to resettle, and took them 
on study tours to other dams, "but didn ' t stop to give us time to talk with people there" 
(Fieldnotes, 1-8-1997, Khong Jiam). 
9 Tambon, a Thai word, is sometimes translated as "sub-district". It means an administrative unit usually 
consisting of ten to twelve administrative villages. Tambon heads are called kamnan. 
10 Ban means "village". 
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Mae Bun, who was to play an important role in organising and leading the villagers 
opposing the dam, recounted how the dam project was announced in her village right 
next to the construction site, Ban Hua Haew: 
In 1989 they first started publicising the dam in our village. The Village 
Head called for each household to send a person to a meeting. So I went 
to listen. He said they were going to bring a dam project to Ban Hua 
Haew. 'Our village will become a town (meuang) in the future', he said. 
That Village Head said that the state would bring abundance and 
prosperity (khwam udom sombun) to us. 'I want the villagers to 
understand. I won't have one single person oppose this in our village, 
Ban Hua Haew,' he said. 'Our village is located in the hills, therefore 
they sympathise and will bring a dam to restore water, bring electricity 
for us,' he said. 'So I'd like to call on my brothers and sisters of our 
village to co-operate and support this project,' he said. 'If any person 
loses anything they don't have to have regrets, the state won't neglect 
them. They say the state is like a father,' he said. 'But if anyone loses 
anything they will compensate that person. But I won't allow any 
opposition; it's not like the Sirinthom Dam. The Sirinthom Dam was the 
Irrigation Department. This is a state enterprise. And this time they 
won't allow the people to oppose or resist, not one single person ... If our 
mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters support this, we'll be rewarded. 
So everyone agrees with this project. If you agree please clap your hands 
like this.' So they all clapped in answer. I was the only one who didn't. 
The village head said, 'Mae yai [grandmother], you didn't clap your 
hands with everyone, if you have any worries please explain them. I 
have received orders from the district office and the provincial office, so 
I must explain to them why you didn't clap your hands.' 
Agree or don't agree with the project, I'll explain. Take Sirinthom Dam 
as an example, not far from Ban Hua Haew. How many more dams are 
they going to build on top of that? (I spoke in our language [Lao].) It's 
not necessary to bring any more, I said. Because I see very clearly -
Sirinthom Dam - I see how much sorrow and hardship they have. People 
suffer from dam construction, no matter whether it's by a state enterprise 
or irrigation project it has the same characteristics, dams the water and 
floods rice fields, crops, fences, gardens, houses, everything that the 
community can see near the river. This is what villagers loose. But the 
state gains, yes. They don't allow opposition, but they get the benefits ... 
The village head said, 'I'm going to ask you, do you agree? Do you 
agree with the project I've just announced?' 
If I have to say whether I agree or not, if I have to say what's in my heart 
about dam construction, then I'll say out loud I don't agree with building 
a dam near the village. 
A district official was there and he asked my name then, my second 
name, and my house number. So I told him and he wrote it down. Then 
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he explained all the benefits - only good things. 'Our country lacks 
electric power, we have to use electricity from Laos,' he talked like that. 
I said I wanted to say one more thing. I don't oppose the way of 
development, but I want the state to be certain about the costs and 
benefits for villagers. I didn't oppose it, I spoke about my reasons and 
they held that this was opposition ... Later after the meeting the village 
head came to my house to persuade me not to talk like that if he [the 
district official] came again. I argued with him here. 
I work weaving brooms and mats to sell. At that time we would sit 
together as a group weaving, talking together. The villagers [in that 
group] didn't understand. They said that they would arrest you for sure 
(Interview, Mae Bun, Hua Haew Village, 3-8-1997). 
Mae Bun's account vividly illustrates the alliance between EGAT and local level 
authorities in their attempts to head off any village-based opposition. As will be 
obvious, Mae Bun is a highly articulate and confident speaker in her own language. She 
was 50 years old in 1989, a mother of six, who had lived in Ban Hua Haew most of her 
life. As she points out, even simply daring to express her negative opinion about the 
dam was taken as opposition. Many of her friends and fellow villagers were unwilling 
to speak or act against · the dam at this early stage as they were unsure of their legal 
rights and feared arrest if they publicly objected. Mae Bun, and others like her who I 
met in other villagers, were not only sceptical about the state propaganda, but were 
confident enough to express their concerns and criticisms, and provide arguments 
against the dam and the beginnings of an opposition discourse. 
After that first meeting, the village head tried to exclude Mae Bun from further 
meetings about the dam. But she set about building a network of people from nearby 
villages who also opposed the project, and also sought advice and allies from 
professional and middle class people outside the local area. Here kinship and friendship 
networks proved to be crucial. Mae Bun visited a close friend in nearby Ban Tung 
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Lung, another woman of her generation, and together they started building a network of 
villagers against the dam. She went to Khong Jiam township to consult with a nephew 
who had studied law. He suggested she consult with lawyers at the Union for Civil 
Liberties office in Ubon city, where she also had plenty of relatives who provided 
accommodation. She also contacted Isara Noi, an Ubon-based lawyer and former MP, 
who became an important ally and advocate for the anti-dam villagers during the early 
stages of the conflict. 
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Many other villagers first heard about the dam project through the media, particularly 
the government-controlled radio station. Mae Daeng recalled: 
The first I heard about it was on the radio and in the newspapers. They 
announced that the Pak Mun Dam would be constructed. Surveys had 
been completed already. The dam would bring great benefits. Villagers 
started feeling dissatisfied. We hurried to meet and talk with each other. 
We rode our bicycles to spread the word around. They said the dam 
would be good, and wouldn't have any effects within villages. The first 
rallies there were only villagers... but we were scattered and 
disorganised at that time (Interview, Ban Wang Sabaeng Tai, 23-9-
1997). 
Mae Daeng was about forty years old at that time in 1989. A mother of three, she had 
been participating in village development activities and various village committees for 
the previous twenty years, and had already fallen out with her village head several times 
because of her outspokenness. An opposition network slowly coalesced around villagers 
like Mae Daeng and Mae Bun, who became local leaders within their own villages and 
key organisers within the network. As I mentioned above, kinship and friendship 
networks, which linked families from different villages along the river, played an 
important part. 
In Ban Hua Haew, Ban Huay Hai and many other villages the dam controversy quickly 
divided the community between pro-dam villagers allied with the Village Heads, and 
anti-dam villagers. Village Heads and kamnan, who were under pressure from their 
superiors to enforce compliance with state authority in the village, also found 
themselves in a position to exploit their fellow villagers affected by the dam project. For 
example, all compensation claims to EGAT for land or house plots to be flooded by the 
dam had to be submitted through the Village Head and Kamnan. According to villagers , 
many of them demanded a percentage of the compensation pay out before they would 
register each villager's claim. Up to 80 percent of villagers whose land or houses would 
be flooded held no land title documents (World Bank, 1994) and this put them in a weak 
and vulnerable position to oppose or negotiate with EGAT. 
By May 1991 the opposition villagers' network included representatives from 20 
villages along the lower Mun River in Khong Jiam and Phibun districts. In an effort to 
formalise their growing network of villagers and improve their organisational capacity 
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to campaign they established the Love the Mun River Group (Lao: klum hak mae mun) . 
The founding chairman of the Group, a villager from Ban Sai Mun, Khong Jiam 
District, said that, "Mostly, it is a chance for villagers to gain confidence to oppose the 
dam, local officials and police, and EGAT. When villagers are threatened, or when the 
village groups have a problem, the Group is a good place to come" ( quoted in Hubbel, 
1992:68). The following year (1992) the organisation changed its name to the Mun 
River Villagers' Committee for Rehabilitation of Life and Community (Khanakamakan 
chao-ban pheuafeunfu chewit lae chumchon lum nam mun). 
As I noted above, construction of the Pak Mun dam started in May 1991 and continued 
over the following three years or so. Whereas during the previous two years local 
opposition had been primarily based in the seven or eight villages closest to the dam 
site, events during construction and then the eventual completion of the dam only 
helped to galvanise growing numbers of villagers to join in protest rallies and other 
activities of the Mun River Villagers' Committee. One turning point in the attitudes of 
local people came when EGAT began blasting the rapids downstream of the dam wall to 
construct a run-off channel within Kaeng Tana National Park in April 1992. The 
explosions and tremors were heard for several kilometres and local fishers became 
concerned about the effects of the blasting on nearby fish and fish migration past the 
blasting site (various interviews, including Winai, Head of Huay Haew Village, 1-8-
1997; Siang, 2-7-1997). The villagers' organisation reached its greatest strength 
numerically after the dam was completed, as the river banks were flooded for some 40 
kilometres and the loss of the fishing grounds started to be felt among the local people. 
By the end of 1994 some 2500 families from 53 villages had joined the organisation ' s 
activities. 
NGO and Student Activists 
The most important allies of the Mun River villagers in the campaign, first against the 
dam, and then later for fair compensation, were NGOs and student activists. NGOs 
pushed the campaign into national and international arenas, provided advice, 
encouragement, information and resources to support the villagers' organisations ' 
campaign. As mentioned above, a lawyer and former-MP, Isara Noi, also became an 
early advocate and ally of the anti-dam villagers, encouraging them to organise together 
to oppose the dam and reassuring them that this was their legal right. Isara gained 
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widespread admiration and support in the area for his public stand against the dam, and 
campaigned in the national elections promising to oppose the dam once elected. Once 
successfully re-elected, however, Isara backed out of the campaign. 
In 1989 Isara and the Union for Civil Liberties helped organise the Pak Mun Dam 
Opposition Campaign Committee, which also included representatives of villagers, 
small business owners from Phibun township, and NGOs. As Buchidta (1997) reports, 
the committee's goal was to coordinate the efforts of NGOs, academics, students and 
others with the villagers' campaign. This committee linked the opposition villagers to 
national environmental NGOs such as the Wildlife Foundation of Thailand and the 
Project for Ecological Recovery (PER). With sponsorship from such NGOs the 
committee produced leaflets and media releases to publicise the anti-dam campaign. At 
this stage the key arguments against the dam were that it would destroy villagers' 
farmland and local forest, worsen the effects of periodic flooding on the lower Mun 
River, cause schistosomiasis outbreaks, destroy fish diversity in the whole river system, 
destroy the rivers' rapids which were a natural tourist attraction, and affect the lifestyle 
and culture of local Mun River communities (Pak Mun Dam Opposition Campaign 
Committee & Wildlife Fund Thailand, no date). 
The relationship between local villagers and NGO activists developed as local people 
built their opposition network. NGO and student activists had encouraged the villagers 
to establish the Love the Mun River Group in order to formalise and better organise 
their campaign. The Director of PER at the time said: 
An organised, village-level network opposed to Pak Moon allowed PER 
the opportunity to receive information from throughout the Pak Moon 
project area and beyond. [The Group] marked the beginning of a 
villager-NGO partnership that served to make the villagers' voice heard 
in Isaan, Bangkok, and Washington. Maybe this was the most important 
thing about the villagers' groups (quoted in Hubbel 1992:71). 
PER organised seminars in Bangkok universities and invited academics, technical 
experts and government technocrats, as well as local village representatives to discuss 
the dam effects. Through their campaign against the Nam Choan Dam in the mid-1980s 
they had already built links with international environmental organisations, such as the 
World Wide Fund for Nature and the International Rivers Network, which began 
international campaigns against the Pak Mun Dam, focusing especially on World Bank 
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funding. 
PER also employed activists and volunteers at the local level in Ubon to work closely 
with the villagers' organisation and its leaders. One of these activists was Mali wan, who 
was to have a great influence on NGO strategies and the anti-dam campaign. She first 
came to the Mun River in 1991. During her time with PER Maliwan worked with two 
local communities threatened by large dams, Kaeng Seua Ten in Northern Thailand and 
the Mun River in the Northeast. 
Maliwan decided to devote her energies full-time to the Pak Mun campaign. She 
resigned from PER and established a small, locally-based NGO, called the Mun River 
Basin Conservation Project, to support the Mun River villagers' campaign at the local 
level. At first Maliwan and a handful of other activists and volunteers worked out of a 
rented house in Phibun township, which served as headquarters for the NGO and 
villagers' organisation. Later, they moved to a cluster of small bamboo shacks that they 
built themselves on land donated by villagers in Ban Pha Pratu Tong. 
Campaigns and Protests 
Obviously, the villagers' and NGO's campaign was unable to stop the dam. But in the 
process they built a well-organised and broad-based local villagers' organisation, 
cultivated experienced local leaders and built alliances and networks with other 
villagers' organisations and NGOs. For many of the NGO activists and village 
organisers the Pak Mun dam campaign gave them experience and skills that they have 
applied more broadly within the Assembly of the Poor. 
There were several important turning points in their campaign, which related roughly to 
the stages of the dam project and the campaign to stop World Bank funding. As I note 
throughout, the conflict over Pak Mun Dam raged at a number of levels, from the local 
to the international, and involved a number of different social actors, from local 
villagers to the World Bank, but this chapter focuses primarily on the role and 
experience of local villagers. This social group constituted the social foundation of the 
campaign, both numerically in terms of their membership, but also in terms of an 
ideologically constructed legitimacy to speak about the local social and environmental 
effects of the dam. 
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Stop the Dam! 
For almost four years the villagers aimed to stop the dam altogether, and pursued this 
goal long after construction began. To this end, they submitted letters and petitions to 
authorities, despatched delegations to lobby MPs, state officials and the World bank, 
organised demonstrations and protest marches, and sought to gain publicity in the 
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media. Villagers' leaders and their NGO advisers believed that if a realistic assessment 
of the effects of the dam was made public, the government would be forced to cancel it. 
They petitioned the government to suspend the project and enable villagers and NGOs 
to participate in a review of the social and environmental impacts. At the same time, 
they continually fought for greater transparency and public access to information in 
EGAT' s implementation process. 
The villagers found that conventional methods such as written submissions and signed 
petitions were largely ineffective. EGAT and the government mostly ignored them or 
made empty promises as token gestures of appeasement. This reinforced the villagers' 
feeling of total exclusion from participation or influence in decisions about the dam. 
The rallying cry of many NGOs at the time - that local people must participate 
democratically in making decisions about development projects that directly affect them 
- held great appeal to local Mun River people. They staged a series of demonstrations to 
gain media attention and force EGAT and state officials to negotiate on the villagers' 
grievances. These rallies and demonstrations became the most well-known and public 
face of their activities. They also proved to be their most effective and successful 
strategy for gaining recognition and concessions from EGAT and the state. Between the 
announcement in 1989 and completion of the dam in 1994 they rallied dozens of times 
in strategic locations, ranging from the dam site itself, the district markets in Phibun, the 
Ubon provincial offices, to Government House in Bangkok (Various interviews, see 
also Buchidta, 1997). From the start villagers endeavoured to stage nonviolent, peaceful 
rallies, and to a large extent this tactic was chosen in order to avoid giving the police 
justification to intervene, but also because physical conflict and violence were poorly 
regarded by the media. Nevertheless, several demonstrations erupted into violence as 
pro-dam demonstrators and police clashed with the opposition villagers. 
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Villagers' leaders such as Siang and Daeng talked about the importance of culture as a 
rallying point and tactic. As Siang said to me: 
The Pak Mun Dam struggle has been not only a struggle over 
information, it has been a cultural struggle, a struggle on many fronts. 
It's been not only a contest of strength, there have been many methods 
of struggle. A good example is culture (wathanatham), which we linked 
in with our campaign. We incorporated all of the hit sip song khlong sip 
si (12 annual festivals, 14 traditional laws) (Interview, Wang Mai ' 
Village, 2-7-1997). 
The "twelve annual festivals, fourteen traditional laws" that Siang refers to make up a 
central element of Isan village culture and identity. 11 For the most part they represent 
important Buddhist festivals which bring villagers together to make merit. The anti-dam 
villagers began using these festivals as opportunities to promote their arguments against 
the dam and recruit local people. Some local cultural practices were also used to express 
opposition and assert villagers' claims over the environment as guardians of the spirits 
of the place. For example, in May 1990 about 700 villagers and students rallied at the 
Kaeng Sapeu rapids, a local tourist attraction just outside Phibun township, after the 
cabinet of Prime Minister Chatichai approved funding for the dam. They then travelled 
to the proposed dam site where they built a small spirit shrine (san jao) for the spirit of 
the place, forbidding anyone to touch it (Interview, Daeng, Wang Sabaeng Tai Village, 
23-9-1997). When EGAT started dam construction and destroyed the spirit shrine one 
year later, this sparked an immediate response from the anti-dam villagers. At a 
symbolic level EG,6 T's destruction of the shrine represented an attack by the Central 
Thai state on local identity and culture. About 1000 villagers rallied at the Tung Lung 
Creek Bridge on the Phibun-Khong Jiam Road that formed the main access route to the 
construction site. After 13 days camped at the bridge, they walked in procession 
towards the construction site but were blocked by the police. Subsequently 150 
representatives of the group travelled to Bangkok to deliver another petition to the 
Minister responsible for EGAT. 
After the military coup of 23 February 1991 the National Peace Keeping Council 
(NPKC) imposed martial law prohibiting rallies or large gatherings throughout the 
11 They are a series of monthly merit making rituals and laws, many of which are specific to Northeast 
Thailand and lowland Laos, that follow the older Lao calendar whereby the first month is December (see 
also Seri & Hewison, 1990:24-32; Tambiah, 1970: 152-160). 
103 
whole country. In July 1991, when they lifted these restrictions in most districts , they 
retained them in Khong Jiam and Phibun Mangsahan districts to suppress protests 
against the dam (Pfirmann & Kron, 1992). During this time EGAT hurried to accelerate 
construction in order to take advantage of the restrictions on public protest. 
Nevertheless, local villagers continued to assemble near the construction site (Interview, 
Noi, NGO adviser to the Mun River Villagers' Committee, Khong Jiam, 2-8-1997). 
These repressive laws of the NPKC period were later invoked in arrest warrants for 
Mali wan and the Chair of the Mun River Villagers' Committee. 
Funding and the World Bank 
Although the World Bank loan would only amount to 10 percent of the project budget, 
their involvement as a funding body for the project spurred activists to take the anti-dam 
campaign to international levels, not just to put pressure on the Bank but also to find 
ways of exerting international pressure on the Thai government. Environmental NGOs 
disseminated information to international NGOs such as the World Wide Fund for 
Nature and the US-based International Rivers Network, who mounted an international 
campaign against the dam and World Bank funding. 
Mun River villagers sent representatives to the World Bank office in Bangkok several 
times. In March 1991 village representatives submitted a 12,000 signature petition 
opposing the dam to the Executive Director of the World Bank and Prime Minister 
Anand's office in Bangkok. In August 1991 the World Bank announced approval for the 
loan to EGAT, but by September the Bank decided to postpone the transfer of funds 
until their annual meeting in Bangkok in October that year (Buchita 1997:58). In 
September USAid recommended that the US government oppose World Bank funding 
because of adverse social and environmental impacts, and criticised the EIA made by 
EGAT. 
During the annual meeting of the World Bank and IMF in Bangkok in October 1991 , a 
parallel international "People's Forum" organised by NGOs gave a high profile to anti-
dam arguments and maintained a barrage of criticism against the World Bank that was 
well reported in the print media (for example Bangkok Post 8 October 1991:6, Nusara & 
Veera, 1991). Also during this time about 50 Mun River villagers' representatives 
travelled to Bangkok to meet with six World Bank Executive Directors and officials at 
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Chulalongkorn University to lobby for the World Bank to cancel its loan to EGAT. The 
Siam Environmental Club and the Students' Environmental Organisation from 16 
Institutes also sent representatives. PER organised the meeting, and Witoon 
Permpongsachareon acted as translator: 
I moderated that meeting. This was the first time that people affected by 
the Bank's project had a chance to talk to the decision-making of the 
Bank. And it was the first time that the Bank's people came face to face 
with people affected by their project. ... The Executive Directors tried io 
only talk about what the people wanted for compensation. Whatever 
they said, the people said no dam. We don't want Pak Mun. Don't offer 
anything. Please stop the project. And then the people invited them to 
the dam site, the area (Interview in English, Witoon 
Permpongsachareon, Bangkok, 2-9-1997). 
Villagers presented their case, arguing that the dam will destroy the lowland 
environment along the river on which villagers' depend, as well as fisheries. As one 
villager said, "In my opinion, there is a close relationship between the Mun River and 
the people. If the river is destroyed the fish will be gone forever. The Mun River is the 
life of the people and the community" (Project for Ecological Recovery, 1991). They 
emphatically opposed resettlement, even with full monetary compensation, as they 
wished to stay in their home villages. A few days later on 17 October the government 
arranged a study tour for the World Bank officials to the dam site. They met with about 
1000 villagers at Kaeng Sapeu Rapids in Phibun township. 
The following month, November 1991, the World Wide Fund for Nature began an 
international campaign against World Bank funding for the dam. Under international 
pressure the Bank delayed its decision. In December the Bank finally approved funding 
of US$22 million (Murray, 1992b ). But this represented only a small proportion of the 
total cost, and by this stage construction had been under way for six months. EGAT 
were determined to push the project ahead, and it seems fairly certain that even if the 
World Bank had pulled out, the project would have gone ahead. 
Compensation Demands and Direct action 
By early 1993 it became increasingly clear that the dam would not be stopped. National 
elections in the wake of the popular uprising and violent crackdown by the military in 
May 1992 brought a coalition led by the Democrat Party to power, with Chuan Leekpai 
as Prime Minister. Chuan' s government fended off attacks on the dam with the claim 
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that so much had been invested and construction had proceeded so far already that the 
project must now go ahead. 
Stimulated by growing frustration with EGAT and the government, the Mun River 
Villagers' Committee turned to more direct and confrontational action for the first time 
to press their demands. That is, prior to this time anti-dam villagers, NGO and student 
activists had staged protest rallies as shows of strength to gain public attention, but had 
not actually obstructed access to the dam or physically stopped construction work. This 
form of popular protest was much more risky and dangerous. 
One of the first instances of direct action took place in March 1993, almost 2 years after 
construction started. The Villagers' Committee established a new aim to gain a 
guarantee from EGAT and the government that they would take full responsibility for 
any and all adverse affects once the dam was completed, and that local people would be 
fully and appropriate! y compensated, for example if the river's fisheries and 
consequently local fishers' livelihoods were destroyed. Mali wan explained to me: 
Whatever we did, whether we went to petition in Bangkok, or rallied 
near the construction site, we weren't able to stop them. The border 
police kept the site clear so that construction could progress. They 
weren't interested in whether anyone opposed the project. Construction 
continued unabated ... So the villagers began to realise that when they 
spoke with the government, the government wasn't interested, didn't 
understand. So they went to occupy the dam site. They closed it, stopped 
construction work. At that time there were a few thousand construction 
workers who couldn't work ... but not a large number of villagers, maybe 
400, who stopped construction work (Interview, Maliwan, Khong Jiam, 
19-11-1996). 
On 2 March some 400 odd villagers who had been rallying nearby marched on the 
construction site and occupied the roadway across the dam wall, effectively stopping 
construction. As Maliwan said, "This was a big threat to the government and EGAT as 
they were losing money paying the contractors. So they brought in a large number of 
police to disperse the rally." The police cut this group occupying the dam wall off from 
the media and from receiving any food or supplies from supporters outside. At about 11 
pm on 6 March a group of "pro-dam villagers," backed up by the police, forcibly broke 
up the rally. Many of the protestors were beaten and badly injured. Local people believe 
that the "pro-dam" group was organised and paid by a local influential Tambon Head 
(Fieldnotes, 24-7-1997, Khong Jiam, see also Fahn & Rojanaphruk, 1993). 
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Amid the uproar in the newspapers about the outbreak of violence in the dispute, a 
deputation of 100 villagers and activists went to protest at Government House in 
Bangkok about the use of force and violence against them. After nine days of 
negotiations EGAT agreed to the villagers' demands to set up a tripartite committee to 
resolve the dispute and to sign a "memorandum of understanding" undertaking to 
provide a detailed map of land to be flooded, fairly compensate all villagers adversely 
affected, and take responsibility for the dam's impact on fisheries. 12 These agreements 
came to nothing, as the Minister responsible for EGAT refuted their authority as he had 
not participated in the negotiations (Bangkok Post 7 August 1997:3). 
Following the villagers' protest and occupation of the dam site in March provincial 
authorities issued arrest warrants for Maliwan and some of the villagers leaders for 
trespassing, inciting unrest and libel. On 5 December Mali wan and the chair of the Mun 
River Villagers' Committee were arrested and jailed for a night. Maliwan told me that 
many concerned villagers gathered outside the police lockup, and she received a 
telephone call from the . US Ambassador to check on her welfare. The police, many of 
whom were related to local villagers, made sure that she was very comfortable. The next 
morning a lawyer from the Union for Civil Liberties (UCL) bailed them out. In 1997 the 
case was still being tried in the Ubon courts. Indeed, I travelled with Maliwan to the 
Ubon Provincial Courthouse one day in July 1997 and attended her hearing. UCL had 
flown a lawyer up from Bangkok to represent her, and Siang the following day. In the 
event, her hearing lasted barely twenty minutes before the prosecution requested an 
adjournment for several months. Mali wan believes that the authorities use the court case 
to harass her and force her to return to Ubon on a regular basis (Fieldnotes, Khong Jiam 
and Ubon Ratchathani city, 24-7-1997). 
Following that first instance of direct action, the anti-dam villagers repeated the strategy 
several times. For example, in 1994 about 300 village women climbed onto construction 
12 Bantheuk khwam khaojai reuang neaw thang kaekhai panha thi at koetkheun jak kheuan pak mun 18 
minakhon 2536 (Memorandum of understanding on addressing problems which might arise from Pak 
Mun Dam 18 March 1993), signed by the Governor of EGAT, a representative of the Office of the Prime 
Minister, one villagers' representative. Document obtained from the Mun River Villagers' Centre, Khong 
Jiam. 
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equipment at the dam site during protests over the 1effects of channel blasting on the 
residents of nearby Ban Hua Haew. As a result EGAT finally agreed to pay full 
relocation expenses for 15~ households who were threatened by blasting (Interview, 
Mali wan, Khong Jiam, 19-11-1996; Mae Bun, Hua Haew Village, 3-8-1997). 
Identity and Opposition 
One of the points at which the concerns of political ecology and social movements 
theory might be seen to intersect is in the relationship between the environment and 
identity within the political struggles and conflicts over the environment. Recently, 
some writers have explored the importance of place and place-making to the social 
construction of identity (see, for example Gupta & Ferguson, 1997:19; Pile, 1997:27-
30). For the Mun River villagers, as for all groups in the Assembly, the articulation and 
assertion of collective identities has been important to their political struggle. 
Representation of identity emerged and changed throughout the conflict but the identity 
that eventually became most powerful was the one which Panya Tongyu introduces at 
the very start of this thesis - fishers - which combined claims about locality, livelihood, 
culture and the injustice of their destruction. In Pan ya' s mo lam song, these claims are 
also couched in a folk idiom invoking the cultural identity of the Lao-speaking people 
of the Northeast. This representation of a collective identity as fishers addressed at least 
two audiences, as it provided a rallying point for local people to identify with and to 
join the villagers' organisation and mobilise for compensation. This identity is also 
explicitly about relationship to place and environment. Villagers claim to be local 
environmentalists who cared for the river and its resources, and sustainably used the 
nver. 
The Fishers' Long March and Marathon Protest 
The Mun River villagers long march and protest in 1994-95 represents a turning point in 
the development of the Mun River Village Committee and its popular support among 
local villagers. Moreover, at this time the activism, protests and media coverage of the 
Mun River villagers' actions stimulated the emergence and organisation of other local 
groups in Ubon with grievances stemming from state projects, most notably villagers 
affected by the Sirinthorn Dam which had been constructed some 28 years before. 
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In 1994, with growing concern expressed by local people and environment NGOs about 
the effects of blasting, dam construction and the dam itself on fisheries in the Mun 
River, EGAT and the Department of Fisheries proposed an ad hoc solution; they built a 
fish ladder on the dam and established a Fish Conservation and Breeding Centre 
upstream from the dam wall. Mun River villagers found it hard to believe that the fish 
ladder would rehabilitate the river. They joked that "Thai fish can't jump!" (see 
Photograph 3). No scientific studies of a fish ladder's appropriateness to Mun River fish 
species had ever been made. EGAT carried out a massive public relations exercise with 
advertisements on TV and in newspapers claiming that these moves had successfully 
rehabilitated the river: "EGAT has never been unconcerned to help the public in every 
locality where EGAT works, because dam construction and electric power generation 
are necessary to answer the country's needs" (Thithipat, 1995). 
After the dam was completed and the gates were closed in June 1994 the Mun River 
Villagers' Committee became increasingly concerned that they would be left to suffer 
the future consequences and carry the costs. In mid-October about 1000 villagers began 
a protest rally at the Provincial Hall in Ubon Ratchathani, petitioning for compensation 
for all Mun River fishers whose livelihood was ruined during three year construction 
period from 1991 to 1994. They demanded compensation for loss of livelihood during 
the three year construction period amounting to 35,000 baht per year per family. At that 
time the provincial governor chaired a committee established to address the fisheries 
compensation issue. After almost two weeks this committee offered 10,000 baht per 
family for the entire three year period. The villagers rejected this offer. 
We rallied at the Provincial Hall but didn't receive a satisfactory answer. 
The government offered 10,000 baht per family only, whereas we'd 
proposed 105,000 baht, which was 35,000 baht per year. But they said 
that was impossible. On average their offer meant 9 baht a day per 
family over three years. Villagers pointed out that they previously 
caught 1000 baht of fish a day. Even if you catch one fish you had made 
100 baht already, so the villagers rejected that offer and decided to 
march out in procession to the dam, about 1000 people at first 
(Interview, Noi, Khong Jiam, 2-8-1997). 
Consequently, in mid-November the protesters marched out from the Provincial Office 
in Ubon and took to the highway leading to the dam in Khong Jiam, about 100 
kilometres away. The procession took fourteen days to reach the dam. As they walked 
they presented their case at villages and towns along the way, and slept in village 
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temples at night. Their numbers grew as they walked, so that by the time they arrived at 
the dam there were between 1,500 to 2,000 people in their ranks, and 2,230 families 
listed in their compensation claim. Kan, from Latwari Village and member of the Mun 
River Villagers' Committee told me the story during the Assembly's protest in 
Bangkok: 
When we reached the dam we met a barbed wire barrier. We decided 
that EGAT must remove the barbed wire, or we would remove it 
ourselves, for the people have a free right to travel where we wish. They 
can't just block the road. So we removed it while the police stood and 
watched, they could do nothing. We marched onto the dam wall. EGAT 
brought in ten wheeled trucks and blocked the road on the ridge of the 
dam, so we stopped right there. 'Right here will be where we rally! ' So 
we rallied there for another 4 months from 27 November until 23 March 
[1995]. During that time we all moved our families in to live there. We 
had our own village, food stalls ... we had a school, we had everything 
there ... a school for kids, a meeting room. We made everything together. 
And there were many rounds of negotiations. In the bargaining the 
105,000 baht came down to 90,000 baht, they offered to pay 30,000 baht 
in cash and 60,000 into revolving funds that the Provincial Governor 
would oversee and Village Heads would administer. We wouldn ' t accept 
that, for if the money went to Village Heads you never knew who it 
would end up with, probably only with Village Head' s relatives. We 
proposed a cooperative. At least then the members could look after the 
money. So the government accepted as they already sponsor 
cooperatives. It's their policy, and has the King ' s approval too 
(Interview, Kan, Bangkok, 21-2-1997). 
As Kan says, the protest was very well organised. Indeed they had to be to sustain 
themselves for four months. Volunteer guards looked after order and security. Women 
volunteers tended to health and hygiene. The villagers selected a handful of 
representatives for their negotiating team. This experience of creating a well-organised 
community with a sense of solidarity and common purpose that could maintain morale 
and protest for a long period of time, was an important antecedent to the two mass 
rallies that the Assembly of the Poor was to stage in Bangkok. 
Events during the marathon rally marked the growing importance of the alliance and 
support of other grassroots organisations to the Pak Mun campaign. The growth of the 
local anti-Pak Mun movement over the previous few years and its attendant publicity 
stimulated villagers displaced by the Sirinthorn Dam in 1971 to join their campaign for 
just compensation with the Mun River villagers. A few days after the Mun River 
villagers occupied the dam site, about 300 Sirinthorn Dam villagers decided to join the 
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rally and submit a petition to EGAT. They marched together towards the Pak Mun Dam 
but police stopped them on a bridge a few kilometres from the rally. That evening (3 
December) police moved on them from both ends of the bridge, giving them no way to 
retreat or disperse. More than 50 people were injured and 14 were arrested (Interviews 
with Sirithom Dam villagers' leaders, Pho Somli and Pho Frida, Nikhom Village, 
Sirinthom District, Ubon, 18-7-1997, see also Bangkok Post, Reuters Database, 18 
December 1994). 
If the authorities and police feared the growth of an organised Sirinthom Dam villagers ' 
movement throwing its weight in with the Pak Mun movement, this is exactly what 
happened. A week after the violent dispersal of their group, the Union for Civil 
Liberties in Ubon conducted an investigation of the Sirin thorn villagers' grievances and 
the events of 3 December. 13 The media publicity this stimulated and widespread 
condemnation of the use of violence by the police also forced the Interior Ministry to 
conduct an investigation into the incident. 
The police crackdown only spurred on the villagers ' leaders. They began visiting the 
dozens of villages where people displaced by the dam over twenty years previously had 
ended up, building their own network to pursue just compensation. By 1996 over 2500 
families had joined and the Sirinthom Dam group had become the largest of a cluster of 
villagers' organisations in the province who allied with the Mun River Villagers ' 
Committee and were coordinated from the Mun River Villagers ' Centre and the NGO 
activists based there. 
This rally also revealed the growing capacity to mobilise support and resources through 
NGO and villagers' networks. The Mun River Villagers ' Committee was a member of 
the NGO-CORD network and the Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers of the Northeast 
(ASFN), and both organisations sent representatives, food and other supplies, as did a 
slum dwellers' network in Bangkok. Academics and grassroots organisations from 
around the country submitted letters to the Prime Minister and the government calling 
13 A document from the UCL office in Ubon, Kan lamoet sit chao-ban kheuan sirinthorn (Violation of 
Sirinthorn Dam villagers' rights), 13 December 1994, presents a number of verbal testimonies and 
accounts of the events by Sirnthorn villagers. 
111 
on them to respond fairly to the Mun River villagers grievances and demands (Bangkok 
Post 24 November 1994). Chulalongkom University hosted a seminar in which 
villagers, EGAT representatives and academics exchanged their views about the dam's 
impacts on fishing (Bangkok Post 2 December 1994). 
This protest was one of their most successful ever. On 23 March 1995 the villagers 
packed up their rally and returned home to their villages in triumph. As Kan relates in 
the quote above, after five months this demonstration succeeded in forcing EGAT and 
the government to accede to villagers demands for compensation for loss of Mun River 
fisheries during the three-year dam construction period. In March EGAT agreed to pay 
30,000 baht per family for each of the three years to each of 2,211 families. Of the total 
of 90,000 baht compensation per family, 30,000 would be paid in cash and 60,000 
would be paid into an agricultural cooperative to be established for that purpose and 
administered by the villagers themselves. 
The rally' s success brought a reinvigorated sense of confidence in their capacity to work 
together within the villagers' organisation to influence the state and gain material 
benefits for members. They had forced EGAT and the government to accept 
responsibility for the dam's destruction of local people's fishing livelihoods during the 
construction period. This was unprecedented in the history of dam compensation in 
Thailand. As Kan explained, "That rally is very famous, and has stimulated many more 
rallies, in many places using the same approach. That is, struggle using nonviolence 
(ahingsa), not physically attacking anyone, peaceful methods free of weapons, struggle 
by means of our bare hands, our feet" (Interview, Bangkok, 21-2-1997). 
Mun River Villagers' Centre 
When payment of the 30,000 baht cash component began in 1995 the steering 
committee of the Mun River Villagers' Committee asked each family to donate a small 
proportion to help build a new headquarters on the land at Ban Pha Pratu Thong. 
Villagers also contributed their labour and built the first stage of the new Mun River 
Villagers Centre next to the bamboo shacks that had housed the NGO activists (see 
Photographs 4, 5 & 6). The building is still unfinished, awaiting another injection of 
funds and labour, but the roof is on and two offices have been walled in to house the 
day to day work of the Centre, and mezzanine floors above the offices provide sleeping 
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quarters for the handful of NGO staff that live on the premises. 
The Mun River Villagers' Centre is the headquarters of both the villagers' organisation 
and the NGO activists. In 1996 it also became the temporary headquarters of the new 
Pak Mun Villagers Agricultural Cooperative. The new cooperative, flush with funds 
from the government compensation package, is directed by a committee elected from 
among its member villagers and has challenged them to develop new organisational 
capacities and activities beyond the protest campaign focused on the dam. The 
cooperative is enabled under Thai law to invest in activities to develop and support new 
forms of livelihood and income generation for its members, and provide for their 
welfare. In 1997 it started providing discount fertiliser to members, purchased land and 
contracted a local builder to build its own office and storage facility. 
Since 1995 the Mun River Villagers' Centre has become a coordinating centre, not just 
for the Pak Mun dam campaign, but for a cluster of local villagers' groups in Ubon. As 
the local Pak Mun opposition movement grew and became better organised and highly 
publicised in the mass media, it attracted the attention of other local communities 
embroiled in conflicts over development and land rights. Many contacted Mun River 
villagers' leaders and NGO activists seeking advice and allies for their own local 
campaigns. As I mentioned above, one of the first groups to join with the Mun River 
villagers campaigns and protests was a group of villagers displaced by construction of 
the Sirinthom Dam. In 1994 when they first acted to campaign for fair compensation 
from the state only a few hundred families had joined their organisation. By 1997 
almost 2,500 families from about seventy villages in three districts had joined the 
Sirinthom Dam villagers' organisation. 
Other groups include villagers displaced by the Chong Mek border checkpoint 
redevelopment, villagers threatened with eviction from their homes and land within 
recently declared national parks such as Tana Rapids on the Mun River and Pha Taem 
National Park on the banks of the Mekong, and villagers opposing the proposed Dorm 
Y ai River irrigation dam. Representatives of all these groups meet on a routine basis at 
the Mun River Villagers' Centre, ensuring interaction between them. They attend each 
other's activities and support each other's campaigns. When they can, some of these 
other local groups contribute resources to the centre. In 1997, when the Chong Mek 
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Group finally received financial compensation from the government that was won 
during the Assembly of the Poor rally in Bangkok, they each donated a proportion of 
their payment to purchase a second-hand pickup truck for the Centre. 
Conclusion 
The efforts of Mun River villagers to build an organised and sustained opposition to the 
dam illustrate the problems of how to get organised in the first place. The dam divided 
local communities, many villagers believing officials' claims that the dam would bring 
jobs and modernity to the area, others fearing the coercive power of the authorities if 
they dissented. Those who did join opposition rallies were accused of being outsiders 
not representing local people's interests, of being manipulated by communists, urban 
environmentalists or some "influential" figure. This was a struggle over the assertion 
and representation of agency, of who has the right to speak and act. Organised 
opposition first emerged in twenty or so villages nearest to the proposed dam 
construction site, and coalesced around people who had the experience or confidence to 
claim a right to speak and oppose the dam. Early on, many of these villagers used their 
kinship and friendship networks to promote debate and rally people against the dam. 
Student activists, NGO activists and lawyers from the Union for Civil Liberties 
encouraged villagers to oppose the dam and helped them find allies and build networks 
of support which linked them with national and international environmental 
organisations. 
Villagers used cultural resources in sophisticated and complex ways to express their 
opposition, rally support and articulate a collective identity. The spirit shrine 
constructed at the dam site, the use of merit-making festivals to rally people, and the 
popular expression of their struggle through mo lam songs performed at rallies and 
protests, are all examples presented here. Through such means villagers expressed an 
identity that closely linked their way of life and livelihood with the river. This identity 
as fishers whose culture and livelihood expressed a dependence on the environment and 
a local knowledge of its ecology has served as a rallying point for a growing number of 
villagers joining the organisation since construction and underscores their demands for 
compensation. 
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The villagers' organisation's numbers and political strategies continued to develop 
during and after dam construction. As one villagers' leader said to me after we attended 
an Assembly of the Poor meeting, "I think it may be a good thing sometimes to 
encounter problems, it brings people together". Of particular importance for the 
emergence of the Assembly of the Poor was the galvanising of other nearby villagers ' 
groups to mount their own campaigns and protests, and to form alliances with the Mun 
River villagers. This growing alliance of villagers' organisations, engaged in conflicts 
over a range of different issues from dams to national parks, has become one important 
centre of rural activism in the Assembly. The network has been coordinated by NGO 
workers based at the Mun River Villagers' Centre and it is to these activists, and their 
central roles in the Assembly of the Poor that I tum in the next chapter. 
115 
Photograph 3. The Pak Mun Dam wall and fish ladder that was added on to it in 
1995. Local people declare "Thai fish can't jump!" 
Photograph 4. The Mun River Villagers' Centre in 1996. NGO activists first built 
the bamboo huts in the foreground and lived there without power or running 
water. When the villagers won some financial compensation from the government 
in 1995, they contributed towards the new building which can be seen in the 
background. It remains unfinished (see next photograph). 
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Photograph S. The entrance to the Mun River Villagers' Centre. Only two back 
rooms have been walled in to create offices for the NGO workers, with a 
mezzanine floor above each for sleeping quarters. 
Photograph 6. A meeting of villagers' representatives at the Centre. Somchai, the 
NGO activist (standing), and Siang (seated, with hat), jointly chair the meeting. 
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S 'Candles in the Darkness' or 'Third Hand'? 
NGO Activists In The Movement 
The NGOs are like candles (thian) in the darkness. If the light is not 
bright, we can't progress (mai pai). NGOs are like one source of light 
(saeng sawang) for us (Jan, Mun River villager, during the Assembly of 
the Poor protest in Bangkok, 3-2-1997). 
We know who the third hand (meu thi-sam) behind the Assembly of the 
Poor protest is. It's the NGOs (Chingchai Mongkhontham, Minister 
Assisting the Prime Minister, during a television interview on Channel 
9, 15-2-1997). 
I paid my first visit to the Mun River Villagers' Centre in November 1996 to meet 
Mali wan, manager of the Mun River Basin Conservation Project, an NGO established to 
support the local villagers' campaign against the Pak Mun Dam. Mali wan had become 
well known for her anti-dam activism and I had already read several articles about her 
in Thai newspapers. My wife and I arrived after dark and found her and another four 
young NGO staff watching television inside the Centre. Maliwan led us to a crumbling 
bamboo hut just outside, where we sat cross-legged on the rough floor and talked. She 
seemed in a relaxed, affable mood, but her eyes, accentuated by her thick, broad-
rimmed glasses, followed me intently as I explained my research. During our interview 
she talked for an hour or so about how she joined the NGO movement and came to get 
involved in the Mun River villagers' fight against the dam. The Mun River villagers' 
story has already been outlined in the previous chapter. In this chapter I tell on a 
different, parallel story, focusing on NGO activists like Maliwan, how and why they got 
involved in the NGO movement, their roles in the Assembly of the Poor and their 
relationships with villagers. 
NGOs and Activism 
In Chapter 2 I presented a brief historical account of the recent history and development 
of NGOs in Thailand in order to explain their importance in understanding the 
emergence of the Assembly of the Poor. I argued that a predominantly middle-class 
democratic movement has largely channelled its energy and activities through NGOs 
since the early 1980s. In this chapter, I focus more on the activists themselves in order 
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to explore and analyse how and why such a small group of people can play such central 
roles within the Assembly. 
There has been a huge amount written about NGOs, their contribution to alternative 
strategies of development and the expansion of civil society in the Third World during 
recent decades. 14 Similarly, Thai academics and journalists have written a large amount 
about NGO activities in their country. 15 Furthermore, Thai NGOs produce a large 
amount of literature and this is an important part of their campaigns and development 
work. And yet there is very little written about the actual people who work within these 
NGOs, apart from observing that they tend to be staffed by educated, middle class 
professionals from urban backgrounds. NGOs are held to be important political agents, 
but what of the actual people, the individual activists who actually perform the work of 
NGOs? This chapter explores their motivations and the meanings that their work carries 
for them. It describes how the day to day work of social activists is socially constructed, 
how they interact with other social groups, particularly the villagers who make up the 
rank and file members of the Assembly of the Poor. 
NGO activists working with villagers' organisations in the Assembly of the Poor say 
that power and authority to determine activities and goals lies entirely with the villagers 
through processes of democratic decision-making. NGOs, in this view, offer support, 
not leadership. A number of studies, however, have raised questions about the 
relationship between NGOs and their grassroots constituency. Recent work by Rigg 
(1991; 1994) and Tjelland (1995) in Thailand argues that real power in such 
relationships lies with the urban, educated NGO activists. 
Rigg' s and Tjelland' s critiques are based on an analysis of Thai society as 
fundamentally structured around patron-client relations. "In Thailand, patron-client 
links are more pervasive and have greater power in explaining why certain villages or 
individuals become involved (and succeed) in certain activities" (Rigg, 1991:204). From 
this perspective, the relationship between NGO activists and villagers "is not an 
14 Examples include (Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Clark, 1991; Clarke, 1998; Julie Fisher, 1993; 1998; 
Korten, 1990; Macdonald, 1997; Silliman & Noble, 1998). 
15 Some useful examples are (Amara & Nitaya, 1994; Naruemon, 1997; Pasuk, 1999; Prudhisan & 
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interaction of equals" (Rigg, 1991:204). Rigg argues that "most NGO activists accept 
that villagers are by nature passive" and "there is a tendency for [NGO] facilitators to 
become leaders, to take decisions without consulting the people, and to create a 
hierarchy of relationships" (1994:22). 
Rigg writes in general about the limitations, as he sees them, of NGO approaches to 
alternative, grassroots development in Thailand. Tjelland (1995), on the other hand, 
gives an ethnographic account of a particular villagers' organisation, the samatcha 
chao-na chao-rai isan (Northeastern Farmers' Assembly for Protection of Land Rights) 
which later joined the Assembly of the Poor (see Chapter 2). He argues that NGO 
activists occupy positions as political "brokers" to the outside socio-political system. 
Villagers' mobilisation within the organisation is dependent on the activities of the 
NGO activists, whom villagers seek out as patrons to help them deal with local 
problems. In other words, villagers acquire power to oppose incursions and threats from 
the state not through popular organisation but through aligning themselves under higher 
level patrons. The unavoidable conclusion is that power rests with the NGOs. 
This is a very different characterisation of the villagers' organisation-NGO relationship 
than that mentioned above as promoted by NGOs. It is important to consider the issue 
here, because it has become a common way in which politicians, government officials 
and others in Thailand attack the legitimacy of grassroots organisations' campaigns and 
popular protests. These critics say that the middle class NGO activists are the "third 
hand" behind organised villagers protests, implying that villagers are largely followers 
and NGOs are the real instigators and leaders who set the movement's agenda and 
goals. In this way they seek to discredit the collective agency of poor, rural villagers , 
trying to defuse the power of mass protest by portraying them as a "mob" being 
manipulated by NGOs for their own purposes. 
NGO Activists: Who Are They and Why Do They Get Involved? 
There are three types of people in Assembly of the Poor: one, villagers; 
two, outstanding villagers' leaders. And there is one more group that 
people call NGOs, only about 20 people in all. These advisers are NGO 
Maneerat, 1997; Quinn, 1997; Suthy, 1995; Thai Development Support Committee, 1997) 
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activists ... many are middle aged, university graduates, and with long 
experience as activists, some as student activists, some from being 
leaders in earlier struggles (Interview, Sawat, Senior NGO activist and 
adviser to Assembly, Bangkok, 29-10-1997). 
NGOs have become the institutions through which members of the educated middle 
class have been drawn into advocacy and development work with the rural and urban 
poor. As Sawat suggests, the NGO staff who work closely with the Assembly are social 
activists, as they all see their work as contributing to social change and constructing a 
fairer, more just society. They can almost all be described as 'middle class' as they are 
highly educated, mostly with a degree or tertiary diploma, are employed by NGOs as 
professional development workers and use a range of non-manual skills requiring high-
level literacy, communication and management abilities. Many come from urban, 
middle class families but a large proportion were born into poor, rural village families 
and managed to gain entry to universities or colleges. Most of these (from village 
backgrounds) studied teaching but after graduating chose not to work as teachers. 
For example, in 1997 nine NGO workers (four women and five men) were employed on 
a regular basis at the Mun River Villagers Centre in either the Mun River Conservation 
Project (NGO) or the Pak Mun Agricultural Cooperative. 16 Four people worked for the 
NGO and five for the Cooperative. Of those nine NGO staff, only four came from an 
urban background: two from Bangkok (including Maliwan) and two from Ubon 
Ratchathani. Of the five staff from rural, village backgrounds, four were born locally 
either in Khong Jiam or Phibun districts, while one (Noi) came from Suphanburi in 
Central Thailand. Six out of the nine NGO staff had either undergraduate degrees or 
technical college diplomas, while one was still studying at Ramkhamhaeng Open 
University. The remaining two young men had completed six years of primary and three 
years of secondary schooling (mo 3). 
For most NGO activists their tertiary student years provided the crucial experiences and 
motivation which drew them into the NGO movement. The older generation 
16 Agricultural Cooperatives are not usually considered to be NGOs but there are good reasons for seeing 
this cooperative as a development NGO. It was established as a direct result of the Mun River Villagers' 
Organization's campaigns against the dam. Most of its administrative staff come from an NGO activist 
background, and some of them came directly from the Mun River Conservation Project. The Cooperative 
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participated in the flourishing student movement of the mid-1970s which met with 
violent repression in 1976 and forced many of them to flee into the forests to join the 
communist insurgency. As I mentioned in Chapter 2 this "October generation" of 
activists provided the driving force for the NGO movement during the time of its rapid 
expansion in the 1980s. This group plays a key role in the Assembly of the Poor. 
The 6 October Generation 
Many of the older generation of NGO activists (early 40s and older) in the Assembly of 
the Poor came of age in the students' movement in the mid-1970s. This provided a 
series of defining experiences. The student-led mass protests toppled the military 
dictatorship on 14 October 1973 and brought a short-lived democratic period until 1976, 
during which progressive and left-wing elements flourished. When right-wing and 
military forces violently repressed the student movement on 6 October 1976, many 
activist leaders and students chose to escape into regional forests to join the communist 
insurgency. 
Maliwan, the manager of the Mun River Conservation Project is one example of an 
activist from this generation who became prominent in the Pak Mun Dam conflict and, 
later, the Assembly of the Poor. The second oldest of seven children, Mali wan was born 
in 1955 in Bangkok to a Chinese family who were part-owners of a small manufacturing 
business. When she finished high school Maliwan entered Thammasat University in 
1974 to study political science. She was quickly caught up in the lively student 
movement for political reform and democratisation and joined the Student Federation of 
Thailand. Student activists worked with disadvantaged factory labourers in the city, 
rural villagers facing debt and landlessness, and participated in democracy education 
campaigns. As a student activist Maliwan worked with female textile workers in their 
campaign for fair wages. 
The right-wing crackdown on students in October 1976 provided another turning point. 
Maliwan saw several of her friends die. 
The incident had a major impact on my life ... I lost a lot of friends in that 
massacre. They were very courageous and dared to fight the authorities. 
works closely with this NGO and their activities are closely inter-linked. 
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I was not (Interview, Maliwan, Khong Jiam, 19-11-1996). 
Many student activists feared for their own safety but also wanted to keep fighting for 
the democratic reforms that they had seen starting to become reality during the 1973-76 
period. After the brutal repression Maliwan, along with thousands of other students and 
left-wing activists, joined the CPT insurgency in the forests. Pen, a close female friend 
of Mali wan and fellow student at Thammasat University, talked about the experience: 
We all agreed that working in the city under these circumstances was 
dangerous. We couldn't go anywhere, or if we wanted to return to our 
studies, would we be able to? My friends decided to go together into the 
countryside to keep struggling. For most of us it was like that. At that 
time, the CPT already had a process of coordination between the city 
and countryside. So they tried to draw people in. They tried to invite 
people to join to avoid arrest or whatever. .. At that time I didn't know 
much about the communist party. I hadn't learned much about it, just 
that we saw that Thailand must change, and saw that the people's 
movement was important, I mean joining together to call for justice ... 
but I really learned about them [the CPT] once I went into the forest ... 
I spent about 5 years in the forest. They had us go and live with 
villagers. Mostly we didn't go anywhere, but worked together with the 
villagers, living together as a village community and working with them, 
growing rice, other crops, teaching, Sometimes we'd go to talk with 
other groups of villagers - we'd go and help them in their work and 
explain about the CPT, what they were fighting for. But an internal 
problem in the CPT was that our group [students] had no opportunity to 
collectively influence their direction and strategies. They said they'd 
established that already, it was finalised already, and so we had to work 
this way. But we [students] had aligned ourselves with social justice. 
Later I heard from a friend who worked with the CPT in the city that 
there was conflict over strategies ... 
Bruce: Were you ever frightened? 
Yes, it was frightening. Our area where we lived was bombed. But living 
in the forest - I liked to learn about the indigenous people, hill tribe 
people - I feel that part was good, what I learned from them: culture, 
festivals, skills. They have particular skills and a great deal of 
knowledge. 
I met my husband in the forest and we married in the forest. But he had 
to take care of himself, he caught malaria in the forest. A lot of people 
caught malaria (Interview, Pen, Bangkok, 28-10-1997). 
Like Pen, Maliwan spent almost five years with the CPT in the forests. When the 
government offered a general moratorium in 1980 she returned to Bangkok and resumed 
her studies at Thammasat University. After graduating in 1984, she took a variety of 
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jobs to try to help her family, whose business had been bankrupt. She worked as vendor 
and tour guide, among other things. 
In 1990 Maliwan went to work for the Project for Ecological Recovery (PER), a 
Bangkok-based, environmental NGO. Two principle PER activists had been fellow 
students at Thammasat University, and it was this connection that drew Maliwan into 
the NGO movement. She, in tum, encouraged Pen to take up a position as PER's office 
manager at the same time. (Pen has been with PER ever since, and quickly shifted from 
administrative activities to campaign work on large dams and, most recently, the nuclear 
power industry. She acted as a technical adviser to the Dams Network in the Assembly 
of the Poor.) Maliwan worked with two local communities threatened by large dams, 
Kaeng Seua Ten in Northern Thailand and the Mun River in the Northeast. In 1992 a 
conflict arose between Maliwan and others in PER which threw into relief differences 
over NGO strategies and grassroots activism. Pen explained the conflict to me in these 
terms: 
It was a big issue that made Maliwan leave PER. PER determined its 
role to be a support organisation ( ongkon sanap-sasun) ... The villagers 
were joining together in the local area, and Mali wan announced that she 
came from PER and supported the villagers, so the media tried to hold 
her up as the person leading the villagers. This caused a difference of 
opinion - PER said that they wanted her to support the villagers but not 
take a high profile. This word 'support' (sanap-sasun) implied a limited, 
supporting role ... But Mali wan felt that to help the villagers fight you 
have to get involved, get involved in helping them form their own 
organisation, get involved and be a part of the villagers' organisation. 
According to her vision she wasn't worried about this issue. She felt that 
she didn't have to separate her role. A person with education, know ledge 
and ideas should be able to join with the villagers in their fight. But the 
view of PER was that the NGO and villagers' organisation were 
separate, different things and in the struggle you had to make your role 
and position clear. When dealing with the media you should have a 
villagers' leader rise and speak, or when contacting provincial 
authorities, or submitting petitions, not Maliwan. PER raised concrete 
issues like this. This was how the conflict emerged in 1992 (Interview, 
Bangkok, 28-10-1997). 
As a result of this conflict Maliwan left PER and set up the Mun River Conservation 
Project as a locally-based NGO to support the villagers' organisation. She retained 
strong links with PER, and with the help of NGO-CORD (the national NGO 
coordinating body) gained funding for the NGO from foreign donors. It is important to 
note that two other siblings of Maliwan have also become social activists. A younger 
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sister now works with the Human Settlement Foundation working with slum 
communities in Bangkok, while her brother is an activist journalist. 
Of the twenty or so NGO activists and activist academics who work most closely with 
the Assembly of the Poor there are a handful, about six or seven, who, like Maliwan, 
participated in the flourishing student movement of the mid-70s and joined the CPT 
insurgency in the forests. Sawang, secretary of the Human Settlement Foundation, an 
urban-based NGO which works with slum communities in Bangkok, is another 
example. Sawang was born in the eastern province of Chonburi in 1952, the second of 
eight children in a poor village family. His parents made their living from cultivating 
cassava. His older brother had only completed primary schooling, but with the help of 
relatives Sawang completed secondary school and gained entry to Srinakarinwirot 
University in Bang Saen, Chonburi, where he studied physics and education. In 1973, 
then in his third year of university, Sawang joined the student-led rallies in Bangkok 
that led to the fall of the Thanom-Praphat dictatorship on 14 October. The following 
year he was nominated and elected to Student President in his campus. After he 
graduated in 1975 took a job teaching at a progressive technical college. 
After 6 October 1976 I couldn't stay in the city. The government issued 
an arrest warrant for me. I could have been killed, the repression was 
very violent. So I retreated to the forest for a period ... The CPT held as 
its highest ideology (udomkan) that this society was failing, the people 
were exploited and their rights violated, and that there was only one way 
to fix society and that was to seize power and organise a new society. 
But the ideology of those of us who went into the forest after October 
wasn't the same, according to my experience. We held to liberal 
democracy not socialism. Only a very small number held the same 
ideology as the CPT (Interview, Sawang, Bangkok, 29-10-1997). 
When the government offered a general amnesty to insurgents in 1980 Sawang left the 
insurgency and found a job with a small NGO project supporting a small-scale coffee 
growers' association in Southern Thailand. 
In 1987 my mother became ill and I decided to return to work in the city 
to be closer to her. I came to work with the Duang Prateep Foundation 
[that undertakes development and social welfare work in Klong Teuy 
slum in Bangkok]. I kept in touch with my friends already working for 
the Foundation and they helped me get the job (Interview, Sawang, 
Bangkok, 29-10-1997). 
In 1989 Sawang married a fellow Duang Prateep worker who is still with the 
Foundation. Later that year he left to work for the Human Settlement Foundation, where 
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has stayed ever since. 
There are dozens of others from this generation, like Pen and others at PER mentioned 
above, who support the Assembly or are drawn into strategic activities on occasion. 
Their shared experiences have contributed to a sense of membership of a network or 
community who carry on an activist tradition with its roots in the rapid social changes 
of the 1970s. Sawang expressed this clearly: 
I can say that I've never worked in the state bureaucracy or with the 
privileged class. I've always stayed in social activist circles, always 
sided with the poor .... Some of this generation still hold the ideol_ogy 
that you have to empower the poor to address their problems. Some of 
us are still close, such as those of us who are advisers to the Assembly of 
the Poor. We are representatives of the October generation who identify 
with the problems of the poor (Interview, Bangkok, 29-10-1997). 
Of course, not all of the October generation who joined in the student movement in the 
1970s or spent time in the forest with the CPT later joined the NGO movement. A great 
many, probably the majority, returned to professional, business or civil service careers. 
Some took up, or resumed, academic careers. Many of the academics who work closely 
with the Assembly of the Poor, such as Somkiat Pongphaiboon, fall into this category. 
Some, for example Adisorn Plianket, a New Aspiration Party MP and cabinet minister 
in the Chavalit government, used successful business careers to launch themselves into 
politics. Many NGO activists believe that the shared experiences of the October 
generation help them find sympathetic allies and build networks among other influential 
professionals and government officials. As Sawang told me: 
When Thailand was governed by a military dictatorship we rose and 
struggled. A lot of people were killed. We said that if we are to have our 
nation develop we must have democratic government. So that bound us 
together in the past. I believe that those politicians who were fighters in 
the past have a much deeper understanding of social problems than 
politicians in general. Really in the present [New Aspiration Party] 
government there are three or four MPs who came of age as activists in 
that period. I knew them all then. We worked together in campaigns. We 
made joint announcements that we would fight for the future of our 
country, for Thai society, for our poor brothers and sisters (Interview, 
Bangkok, 29-10-1997). 
In this section I have focused on the experiences of the October generation of NGO 
activists to explore their motivations and bring out some of the connections and 
continuities with the influential student movement of the 1970s. In Chapter 2 I discuss 
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this in terms of the history and development of NGOs at an organisational level, 
whereas in this chapter I try to explore it in a more personal, subjective level in order to 
understand the experiences and motives of activists. As the manager of the Thai 
Volunteer Service put it: 
The 14 October movement, 6 October movement and lastly NGOs are 
the same group of people who developed out of volunteer student camp 
groups, developed out of opposition to dictatorship, developed out of the 
group who went into the forests, but they have a range of beliefs and 
approaches (Interview, Det Phumkhacha, 27-10-1997). 
If their experience of the 1970s student movement in organisations such as the Student 
Federation of Thailand provided the turning point and recruiting ground for the NGO 
movement which expanded rapidly from the early 1980s, then a younger generation has 
also been drawn into the movement through revitalised student organisations and the 
emergence of a growing environmental consciousness and activism among the student 
movement of the 1980s and 1990s. 
The "Young Turks" 
For most of the younger generation of NGO activists in the Assembly of the Poor their 
experience of student volunteer development camps, environmental conservation clubs 
and other student organisations designed to promote development activities, 
environmental or social activism, drew them into the NGO movement. The Thai 
Volunteer Service (TVS) began to play a key role as it provided a centralised recruiting 
agency for NGOs throughout the country. Graduates recruited into the TVS program are 
assigned as "volunteers" to NGOs needing staff. Although called "volunteers" these 
NGO recruits are actually paid a basic wage by TVS, thus providing financial and 
human resources for small NGO projects that often have very limited resources. PER 
also follows this strategy, and employs "volunteers" to work in small, local, 
environment-oriented NGO projects throughout regional Thailand. 
Noi represents a younger generation of socially-mobile NGO activists who, although 
from poor, village backgrounds have been able to take advantage of expanding 
opportunities for tertiary education, especially in teacher education. He was 27 years old 
when I interviewed him in 1997: 
I was born in a village in Suphanburi and went to primary school there. 
My father and mother grew rice and cash crops. I went to high school in 
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N akhon Pathom. After finishing high school I went to study education at 
Kasetsat University, Bangkhet campus [in Bangkok]. While I was a 
student I joined the University Rural Development Club. They held 
many types of development activities both within the university and 
during camps in rural communities ... At first it didn't mean much to me 
because I was from a rural family already. But with my opportunity to 
study in Bangkok, I saw changes in the city which made me look back to 
the countryside and see problems, see disadvantages, see that rural 
people still have few choices in our society. So I felt that if I had this 
opportunity to study I should make the most of it, and I should take the 
knowledge and experience back to help rural society. This seemed better 
than city life where everyone selfishly works only for themselves or 
their family (Interview, Khong Jiam, 2-8-1997. 
Noi joined the Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation society in his 
university which is part of a national organisation across 16 educational institutes 
(Khanakammakan anurak saphayakon thammachat lae saphapwaetlom 16 sathaban). 
With this society Noi visited the Mun River in 1991 to assist the villagers' campaign 
against the Pak Mun Dam. There he met Mali wan for the first time. After he graduated 
from Kasetsat University in 1992 Noi went to Maliwan and told her he wanted to get 
involved. Initially he was employed as a volunteer fieldworker by PER. "At that time I 
was field supervisor, responsible for coordinating and communicating with the 
villagers' representatives". When Maliwan resigned from PER and set up the Mun 
River Conservation Project, Noi became part of the new NGO team. 
Noi's experience is fairly typical of the young NGO staff at the Mun River Villagers ' 
Centre who have tertiary education. The same can be said for young activists based in 
regional centres and also Bangkok. For example, Phaibun, the Secretary for the Isan 
Farmers' Assembly, came from Trang Province in Southern Thailand and studied law at 
Ramkhamhaeng University in the early 1980s: 
I became an activist at university. I joined the Rural Development Club 
and went on camps to villages in the North. After I graduated in 1984 I 
approached the Thai Volunteer Service and they sent me to work for a 
project promoting farmers' groups in Surin [in the Northeast] (Interview, 
Khon Kaen, 20-8-1997). 
The two young coordinators of Friends of the People (FOP), who now run the Assembly 
of the Poor' s secretarial office in Bangkok, both became committed social activists 
during their student years. Wiset was 31 years old when I interviewed him in 1997. He 
comes from a family with a small business in Udon Thani in Northeast Thailand. He 
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entered Kasetsat University, Bangkok, in the mid-1980s to study teaching but left after 
two years to study law at Ramkhamhaeng open university. At Ramkhamhaeng he joined 
the Student Social Work Club which undertook development camps and other social 
development activities. Through the students' club and TVS Wiset was introduced to 
the Youth Training Program (YT), a small Bangkok-based NGO, where he worked as a 
student volunteer and was soon employed as the program administrator. He continued 
his legal studies but they took second place to his social activism (Interview, Wiset, 
Bangkok, 2-9-1997). 
Wiset' s colleague in FOP, J aroen, 27 years old in 1997, came from a village 
background in Southern Thailand. J aroen studied Mass Communications at 
Ramkhamhaeng University and in his second year he joined a group of students 
involved in practising public speaking and volunteer development camps. With them he 
joined in protest rallies organised by the Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers of the 
Northeast (ASFN) in 1994 and thus began a growing involvement in student activism. 
He was elected president of the Students' Federation of Thailand and still works closely 
with student activists from this organisation. After completing his degree Jaroen came 
to work for FOP (Interview, Jaroen, Bangkok, 1-9-1997). 
As the case studies and examples presented so far would indicate, most NGO activists 
are highly educated, with an undergraduate degree or college diploma. Their tertiary 
student years provide them with much of the knowledge and skills needed for their 
professional NGO work, but also contact and experience with student organisations and 
networks that motivates them to work for NGOs. Thus, as I mentioned above, to this 
extent NGOs might be characterized as "middle class", even though they come from a 
_variety of social backgrounds. But there is also a growing number of activists being 
drawn from local communities and villagers' organisations into voluntary and paid 
positions within NGOs, especially in the locally-based, grassroots-support NGOs. 
W ari, Porn and Mu, three young men who work at the Mun River Villagers' Centre, are 
examples of young activists who have been recruited into NGOs via a different route. 
All were aged in their early 20s when I met them in 1997. All had completed six years 
of primary schooling and two or three years of secondary school. They were all born 
and raised in local villages and had taken on very active roles in the Mun River 
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Villagers' Committee and its campaign against the Pak Mun dam. They worked closely 
with Maliwan, Noi and others in the Mun River Conservation Project. As they 
developed friendships and closer relationships with the paid NGO activists, they took on 
voluntary, unpaid positions as field-workers for the NGO and developed skills as 
community organisers. Eventually Porn and Wari were offered paid positions in the 
NGO and Cooperative respectively. Mu still works as an unpaid volunteer, and is the 
unofficial driver of the new NGO pickup truck. 
In this section I have discussed the backgrounds and motivations of activists who joined 
the NGO movement and now hold important roles within the Assembly of the Poor. In 
the next section I go on to discuss their roles and position within the Assembly. 
Grassroots Support Organisations and Activism at the Local Level 
The Mun River Villagers' Centre serves as headquarters for both the Mun River 
Villagers' Committee for Rehabilitation of Life and Community, and the NGO workers 
who support them. But despite the name, the centre is the activists' domain. They 
manage it and work there on a day to day basis. In 1997, of the two completed offices, 
one accommodated the staff of the Mun River Basin Conservation Project, while the 
administrators of the Pak Mun Villagers Agricultural Cooperative occupied the other. 
Some of them lived there, as I mentioned, in quarters above the offices. The Mun River 
Villagers Centre, therefore, was the main local site where NGO activists and villagers 
met and interacted (there are other places, as I will illustrate below). 
Maliwan and the other NGO staff conceive of the Mun River Basin Conservation 
Project as a locally-based "villagers' support organisation" employing a small number 
of well-educated and skilled people working to support and assist the villagers' 
organisation and its campaign against the Pak Mun Dam. The activists maintain a 
distinction between the NGO and the villagers' organisation that they support. They 
claim that authority, decision-making and the right to speak on villagers' behalf rests 
with the villagers' organisation, not the NGO. As we have already seen, however, at 
times this distinction seems to break down in practice. 
Noi explained the role of the Mun River Basin Conservation Project in the following 
terms: 
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We play a part in helping the villagers get organised. We are the ones 
who support them by organising a forum (wethi) in which to meet. In 
organising a forum like this we don't give orders or lead them in any 
way. Villagers do that themselves, they make their own decisions. For 
instance, when I was field supervisor I linked up with village organisers 
(kaen nam ). I went out to the villages and worked with community 
volunteers, such as youths and local leaders. I organised meetings and 
seminars. From this sort of coordination we would begin to see the form 
of an organisation emerge. 
Our NGO only has a few individuals, so we depend on the villagers' 
leaders (phu nam) to make sacrifices and coordinate work. The NGO' s 
role is probably to help communicate and coordinate with the state. If it 
happens that the villagers intend to submit a petition, we will contact the 
authority, we will request an appointment with the governor to have him 
accept the petition (Interview, Noi, Mun River Villagers' Centre, Khong 
Jiam, 2-8-1997). 
The kaen nam that Noi speaks of link the members of their own village with the 
villagers' organisation as a whole and work closely with the NGO activists. The phrase 
kaen nam connotes figuratively the position of these village-level organisers . Nam 
means to lead, guide or bring. Kaen means axis or axle. Therefore, a useful way to 
describe them is as the axis, or turning point of the organisation's (and the Assembly's) 
network in each village. The kaen nam is responsible for communicating with, 
organising and mobilising the members in his or her village. This is a two-way process, 
and kaen nam are often charged with ascertaining their fellow villagers' opinions on an 
issue before final decisions can be made. (I describe their roles during protest in Chapter 
6, and in local level democratic processes in Chapter 7). 
Activists emphasise the limitations of their very small numbers compared to the 
geographic spread and numbers of villagers they work with. Maliwan told me that 
because of this NGO activists have to use the skills they do have very strategically and 
that the bulk of the work must be performed by the villagers: 
Our NGO has a very small number of people and there are some 
volunteers and new graduates, just what you can see here today. But the 
area we work in is very large, particularly in the Pak Mun group there 
are over 50 villages, in the Sirinthorn Dam group another 70 to 80 
villages, and other problem groups throughout Ubon Province. And this 
is just speaking about Ubon. But we don't just work in Ubon Province, 
we work with the Assembly of the Poor right around the country ... So, 
villagers must really depend on themselves to a great extent. They must 
really help themselves, because we have limitations, no power in 
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numbers to speak of. Because of that we do the things that villagers 
aren't able to, such as documenting information, producing documents 
and books, preparing information to submit to the government - we help 
with a lot of that. 
Negotiation. Suppose there are meetings and negotiations, the NGO will 
send advisers and help the villagers prepare, plan what issues to 
prioritise, and we will submit a document summarising the negotiations 
to prevent any further distortion ... And publicise news with the media, 
we try to give as much news to the media as possible ... They want it 
quickly so we have to package it up for the media, we sum up the issues 
clearly for them ... 
NGOs have to accept that most of them are intellectuals (panyachon). 
University graduates like these here will be the brain matter of villagers ' 
organisations, because villagers haven' t had opportunities to study. We 
consider how to link these NGO workers with villagers, how to assist at 
the villagers' weak points in order to strengthen their movement 
(Interview, Maliwan, Mun River Villagers' Centre, Khong Jiam, 19-11-
1996). 
For their part, all of the villagers whom I interviewed held the NGO activists in high 
regard. Several used the metaphor, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, of "candles 
in the darkness" to describe them. A Sirinthom Dam villager enthusiastically told me he 
felt they were "angels" (thewada) who should run for parliament. Pho Dam, an 
influential village organiser in the Mun River Villagers' Committee, said that he was 
suspicious at first that the NGO workers wanted to exploit the villagers' desperate 
situation, but he soon realised that they were "sincere" and "trustworthy". "But I still 
don't know where they get their income from," he added. Although almost no villagers 
criticised the NGO workers during my time at the Villagers' Centre I occasionally 
found evidence of conflict and subtle power plays. I tell a story of factional conflict 
within the Cooperative over investments, and the way in which the activists used 
democratic processes to manage the conflict in Chapter 7. Daeng, another leading figure 
among the Mun River villagers, told me that they had had "problems" with NGO 
advisers in the past when the conflict between Maliwan and PER erupted, and this had 
taught the villagers not to rely too heavily on them. Daeng also told me of a rumour 
going around some discontented villagers that one NGO worker with the Cooperative 
had exploited his position to gain corrupt kickbacks from a local contractor. 
Siang talked about the relationship between the Mun River villagers' organisation and 
the NGO activists as "a pair of things that go together": 
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We villagers have local knowledge (phumpanya) about our own local 
area. We know full well what has been destroyed, what effects the dam 
has caused. We know clearly. But what we didn't know was where to 
travel to find the officials, which officials to go to. Where was EGAT' s 
office? Where was EGAT's head? It was necessary to depend on NGO 
workers. They are one important group who joined with the villagers. 
NGOs are people who work to give information to our local leaders, but 
they don't come to tell us what this means, what that means. We 
understand clearly already. And one more thing, NGOs act as advisers 
for the villagers. We might ask if we do this will we be arrested? If we 
do this will we be attacked? Villagers had no experience about those 
things. 
As for struggle, we already had experience of struggle. By this I mean 
we had fought against hardship, we had struggled for better lives for 
ourselves. But we had never fought against the state, we had never had 
to fight with authority (amnat). Therefore, I believe that NGOs and our 
struggle are a pair of things that go together (pen khong thi khukan). You 
can't have one without the other. But villagers must have order (rabiap). 
If the NGO advises us to go this way, we must go together. .. And the 
NGO workers must listen to what the villagers want. [NGOs and 
villagers are] different types of people but we must listen to each other. 
Different types of people but we must depend upon each other 
(Interview, Siang, Wang Mai Village, 2-7-1997). 
Expanding Local Networks of Activism 
While the Mun River Villagers' Centre provided a meeting place for villagers and 
headquarters for the NGO activists, the actual Mun River villagers' organisation was 
submerged in networks throughout the communities from which it drew its members. 
This network, which linked over fifty villages spread out along a forty kilometre reach 
of the river, hinged in turn on one or two organisers in each village who took on the 
responsibility of communicating between members in their village and the Centre. In an 
earlier quote Noi alludes to his work travelling from village to village to organise 
meetings, seek community volunteers to take on organising roles and thus build the 
network during earlier stages of the villagers' campaign. 
These networks, however, extend far beyond the Mun River Villagers' Committee, as 
Maliwan mentioned above. As I have explained, the Mun River Basin Conservation 
Project was initially established to support the activities of the Mun River villagers' 
organisation, but within a few years the NGO attracted a growing network of villagers' 
groups from nearby local communities involved in conflicts with the state over 
development. The small group of activists based at the Centre were called upon to 
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expand their activities to provide advice and support to several emerging villagers ' 
organisations wanting to campaign on a variety of grievances. 
The first of these groups to ally themselves with the Mun River Villagers' Organisation 
was a group of villagers affected by the construction of the Sirinthom Dam some 28 
years previously. Later, in 1995 villagers in Chong Mek who lost their land to a state 
border crossing development project approached activists at the Centre. Some of these 
people were already members of the Sirinthom Dam group and hence already had links 
with the NGO activists. Villagers opposing the proposed irrigation dam on the Dorm 
Yai River, a tributary of the Mun River, joined the network of villagers ' organisations 
coordinated by the NGO activists in 1996. 
The extent of the networks of villagers' organisations coordinated from the Centre was 
revealed to me vividly one day. Mali wan called a provincial meeting of Assembly of the 
Poor delegates three days before a national meeting was to be held in Northern 
Thailand. While she waited for everyone to arrive, Maliwan drew up a diagram on the 
blackboard representing the network of Assembly of the Poor groups here in Ubon 
Province (see Figure 2, following page). Nine groups of villagers were included under 
four different categories. Seven out of those nine groups sent representatives to that 
day's meeting. I calculated later that they represented more than 6,400 families , all 
coordinated by NGO activists here in the Mun River Villagers' Centre (Fieldnotes, Mun 
River Villagers' Centre, Khong Jiam, 23-7-1997). 
Figure 2 shows schematically the full range of villagers' groups that have linked up with 
the Mun River Villagers' Centre over the last few years and come under the 
coordination of the NGO activists based there. They also include villagers threatened 
with eviction from their homes and land within recently declared national parks such as 
Tana Rapids on the Mun River and Pha Taem National Park on the banks of the 
Mekong. Representatives of all these groups meet on a routine basis at the Mun River 
Villagers' Centre, ensuring interaction between them. They attend each other's activities 
and support each other's campaigns. The Centre acts as the key link between these local 
villagers ' organisations, and the regional and national NGO network, serving as local 
communications centre and secretarial office. 
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FOREST AND LAND NETWORK 
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Figure 2: The Assembly of the Poor network in Ubon Ratchathani Province 
The growing networks of villagers and villagers' organisations that the activists work 
with is also reflected in their own activities. During the time that I spent with them 
much of their work was directed at developing and maintaining these networks . While 
the Mun River Villagers' Centre is an important meeting place between villagers ' 
groups and activists, activists also travelled often to meet with villagers in their own 
localities. Furthermore, villagers' representatives and NGO activists are increasingly 
communicating and travelling within national, and sometimes international, networks. 
Networks and Mobility 
Over the last decade or so NGOs in Thailand have developed sophisticated networks to 
facilitate communication, cooperation and access to resources and funding among the 
large number of both rural and urban NGOs. The activities of the NGO Coordinating 
Committee on Rural Development (NGO-CORD), which was established in 1985, 
epitomise this. When we start to look at the activities of NGO activists within the 
Assembly of the Poor network we see a field of places or spaces where resources and 
people are located. This network features a constant movement of people ( activists and 
villagers), information and sometimes resources and funds. Indeed, the idea of a non-
government organisation as some sort of cohesive social actor needs to be questioned 
once we start to look at how NGOs and activists operate in Thailand. For example, 
individual activists may be employed under the name of a particular registered NGO 
but, within limits, may be free to move and work within a network of organisational 
spaces or activities. 
Networks enable not only the movement of people but also the movement and strategic 
deployment of resources. For example, when the Assembly staged its first mass protest 
rally in 1996 staff of the Thai Development Support Committee, based in Bangkok, 
collated and printed the petition documents and acted as the main secretarial office. By 
1997 the FOP office performed this function. This fluidness of organisational 
boundaries and mobility of people and resources throughout the NGO network seems to 
relate to the multiple social sites and levels at which activists work and also the methods 
and strategies of grassroots development they employ. But also, at a very pragmatic 
level, it seems to stem from constraints placed upon NGOs by limited funding, 
resources and personnel relative to their social goals. 
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Thus, during my stay with the activists at the Mun River Villagers' Centre I observed a 
constant flow of people, both villagers' organisation leaders and NGO activists, through 
the network. Many of them live an almost nomadic existence, moving between village 
level meetings, regional-level meetings and national-level meetings and negotiations 
with government officials. 
Somchai is a good example. Somchai was 27 years old in 1997. He was born in 
Bangkok and studied law externally at Ramkhamhaeng University. Student friends at 
university encouraged him to become involved in activism with workers' groups in 
Bangkok in the late 1980s. He joined the protests against unelected Prime Minister 
General Suchinda Kraprayoon that led to the events of "Black May 1992" and after that 
went to work with an environmental NGO in Phuket for two years. In 1994 activist 
friends invited him to work with the ASFN in the Northeast, and arranged for him to be 
paid a wage by the Duang Prateep Foundation as their coordinator in Ubon. Duang 
Prateep mostly worked with slum dwellers, " ... but I hardly worked for them at all. I 
joined the Mun River villagers in their protests, and became an adviser to the Sirinthorn 
Dam group." Later the same year Duang Prateep stopped paying his wages but Somchai 
continued working on a voluntary basis with no pay until the ASFN took up the slack 
and gave him a small wage as its coordinator in the provinces of Ubon, Surin and 
Srisaket. When the ASFN was itself riven by factionalism in 1995 and many of its NGO 
workers left to form the Assembly of the Poor (see Chapter 2) Somchai was then 
employed by the Mun River Basin Conservation Project, which has been his source of 
income ever since. Although Somchai changed organisation three times in three years 
his actual work and responsibilities remained the same, basically as NGO adviser to the 
Sirinthorn Dam and Mun River villagers (Interview, Somchai, Tung Lung Village, 
Khong Jiam, 27-9-1997). 
Somchai married a local woman whom he met during the Pak Mun Dam protest in 
1994. They lived with other activists in a small rented house in Ban Tung Lung, a 
village about a kilometre from the Mun River Villagers' Centre. They had their first 
baby in 1997. By 1997 Somchai's responsibilities had broadened considerably. He acted 
as adviser to all of the Ubon-based villagers' organisations in the Assembly of the Poor. 
When I arrived at the Centre in June 1997 he was in Bangkok, attending meetings with 
the government to follow up agreements reached during the ninety-nine day protest. 
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When he arrived back a few days later, Somchai immediately asked me if I would drive 
him to meetings he had arranged with Dorm Yai River villagers and Sirinthorn Dam 
villagers, the two groups furthermost from the Centre. In the following section I 
describe in some detail Somchai's meeting with the Dorm Yai River group, as an 
example of activism in action at the local level. 
Along with Somchai, Mali wan was the other most mobile activist within the local NGO. 
In fact, they often travelled together. Maliwan's official position is manager of the Mun 
River Conservation Project and she is paid by that NGO. But during 1997 she spent 
very little time in Ubon working at the Centre. Coordinating joint activities of the 
Assembly of the Poor as a whole demanded more and more of her time. After the 
Assembly concluded their rally in May she stayed on and based herself at the Friends of 
the People office in Bangkok in order to attend the meetings of the various committees 
that had been established to address their demands. In July she returned to the Centre in 
Ubon for a few days, then travelled with several other NGO activists and villagers to 
attend the national meeting of Assembly delegates (pho khrua yai meeting, see Chapter 
7) in a village outside Chiang Mai. Then she travelled to organise a protest rally at a 
regional cabinet meeting in Chiang Rai, before returning to Bangkok. Later in the year 
she travelled to Srisaket for a dams group meeting and to Kaeng Seua Ten in Phrae 
Province for the next three-monthly national meeting. I never saw Maliwan without her 
mobile phone hitched to her belt, and this was a very important tool for many of the 
activists that I met, enabling them to make telephone calls from just about any remote 
village or any situation. 
Activism in Action: NGO Activists and Local Opposition to the Lam Dorm Yai 
Dam 
On 28 June Somchai asked me to drive him to a meeting with the villagers' group 
opposing the proposed irrigation dam on the Lam Dorm Yai River, a tributary of the 
Mun River, about 30 kilometres west of Sirinthorn Dam. The previous year, after the 
Irrigation Department announced that the dam would be constructed, about 400 families 
from 24 villages who feared that their homes or land would be flooded contacted 
activists at the Mun River Villagers' Centre and subsequently joined the Assembly of 
the Poor. In this section I describe in detail the meeting with Lam Dorm Yai River 
villagers' representatives in order to illustrate and explore NGO activists' roles and 
138 
relationships with villagers, and how local activist networks are constructed and 
maintained within the Assembly. 
The case study I present here highlights the work of NGO activists in supporting and 
maintaining the networks of villagers' organisations that they work with. In this case, 
Somchai had just returned from meetings with the government in Bangkok and takes 
great pains to explain in fairly simple terms for the villagers their progress and 
implications for their own campaign. He quickly assumes the role of de facto chair of 
the meeting. Of particular note here is that, despite his rhetoric encouraging the 
villagers' representatives to make their own decisions through democratic processes 
such as voting, Somchai skilfully guides the agenda, elicits a consensus among the 
participants and leads them towards outcomes that he values. He encourages the 
villagers to reach a collective decision to take some action on the problems facing them. 
Also, importantly, he promotes a culture of solidarity linking this group with the 
broader network of the Assembly of the Poor. 
Even the success of this particular meeting depended on the communicative networks 
that had been developing among the activists and villages during the previous year. Two 
other young male NGO workers, Porn and Jip, had done much of the groundwork a 
week or so before, travelling to the area by motorcycle to arrange the meeting in 
consultation with some of the villagers' leaders. These key representatives, in tum, 
spread the word through their networks in 24 local villages and requested at least one 
representative from each village. Even so, on the day of the meeting 34 people attended, 
representing only 12 out of the 24 villages. The low turnout may have been partly 
because many of the villagers were still transplanting rice seedlings out into their fields 
now that the rainy season had started. 
On the arranged day Somchai, Porn, Jip and I set off in my old rented car to Meuang 
Village near the Dorm Yai River in Det Udom district. We drove for two hours on roads 
that steadily deteriorated into a deeply pot-holed dirt track and finally arrived at the 
temple on the outskirts of the village. The temple meeting hall (sala) was full of people. 
We arrived at midday, just as lunch was about to be served. After the brief lunch in the 
sala the meeting resumed as a handful of young women cleared and washed the plates. 
We sat cross-legged on the wooden floor. Tong, a man in his early thirties, appeared to 
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be chairing the meeting and announced that soon they would hear from hua-na Somchai 
but that first he would ask Watthana, another male villager, to introduce another issue 
for the meeting to discuss. Tong gave Somchai the title hua-na, meaning "chief' or 
"head", and this was commonly used as a politeness marker by villagers when talking 
with male NGO activists who were mostly younger than them. Everyone used Lao, 
except for Somchai. He mostly spoke slowly and clearly in Thai, but used an occasional 
Lao phrase such as maen bo? ("Right?") signifying an acknowledgement of the local 
language and ethnic identity. Somchai also frequently used inclusive language to 
emphasise solidarity, addressing assembled villagers using the Central Thai phrase phi 
nong ("brothers and sisters") and referring to klum rao ("our group"). 
Watthana began by saying that most of them there knew about Ajan17 Prasit's story 
already. He explained that Prasit was a village school teacher from a family with a long 
history in the local area. When he heard about the proposed dam, Prasit encouraged the 
people in his home village to fight against the dam. He consulted with a well-known 
engineer in Ubon University to obtain information and advice, which he then shared 
with local villagers. As a result, his Headmaster accused Prasit of inciting the villagers 
to protest, and he now faced investigation and disciplinary action by provincial 
authorities. "What can we do to support him? He's still our heart and soul (khwan jai). 
He still finds information to support our fight," declared Watthana. 
At this point Somchai interjected to rephrase the question in Thai, emphasising that the 
teacher had helped "our group" and as a direct result now faced problems. Somchai 
asked the gathering what they thought about the situation. There was general agreement 
that they wished to help the teacher, but it was less clear how to do that. Somchai 
encouraged as many villagers as possible to give their opinion and then summed up 
their responses: "There have been two kinds [ of suggestion]. Some say hunt up 
signatures for a petition. Some say we don't have to do that; we should just go [ie take 
direct action]. What do other people think? Please help think it through first before we 
do anything. Firstly, you need to say what you think about this issue. Secondly, we need 
to consider our group's preparedness (khwamphrom). Many people are ploughing their 
17 Ajan is a polite title for teachers, highly educated monks. 
140 
fields. If we consider which option to take, we must also consider the extent of our 
readiness." 
After a few more speakers and the suggestion that they wait to see the outcome of the 
provincial inquiry, Somchai spoke up again. "For myself, I think that one aspect is that 
we would be helping our own group. How does it help our own group? First, telling the 
government that any member of our group can't be persecuted. Second, it shows the 
strength and vitality of our group ... Third, there may be outsiders who are keeping an 
eye on us, who are considering coming to assist us, but they might be other teachers in 
the local area. But they wouldn't dare if they were afraid they'd face the same problems. 
They will dare to help us if they know that if they are accused of anything we will stand 
up for them. This is why I maintain that if we help Ajan Prasit we also help ourselves. 
Demonstrate our group's power. Show them that we love each other, that we care for 
people who work with us. Now, a moment ago we had two options, gather signatures or 
go directly. What do you think? Do you support either of these, or maybe there are other 
options?" 
Watthana pointed out that it was a case of "slit the chicken' s throat to show the 
monkeys" (cheuat kai hailing du), a Thai expression implying that the authorities were 
trying to scare the rest of the villagers by making an example of the teacher. Somchai 
soon brought the discussion back to the two options again, but this time added that they 
could choose both. At this point several people spoke out in support of this. One older 
man declared, "Take both options together. Gather signatures and we'll get a lot. We'll 
only have a few people go, but we have to go." 
Once again Somchai spoke up on the issue of where to actually go to submit their 
petition: "Can I give some information on this issue? Teachers are overseen by the 
Provincial Primary Education Office and the District Primary Education Office. But one 
other place you could submit your petition is with the Provincial Governor, as he is the 
Chair of the Provincial Primary Education Committee. Brothers and sisters, who would 
you choose? The administrator of the Provincial Primary Education Office or the 
Governor?" 
The villagers quickly decided on the Governor, and asked Somchai if he would go with 
141 
them. "No," he replied, "I won't go. You decided together and so you should do it 
together. But I will try to do two things. One, I will try to get it into the news, but I 
don't know yet which newspaper will be prepared to send a reporter. Two, before we 
returned from Bangkok [protest] we secured an agreement with the Prime Minister that 
not one of our people would be persecuted by government officials, isn't that right? In 
that case, I will raise the issue with the monitoring committee established to coordinate 
between us and the cabinet." 
Next Somchai asked the assembled villagers to decide when they would gather 
signatures for the petition and when they would submit it to the governor. Tong 
responded to this: "Each village's organiser can collect and check the signatures. It will 
only take two or three days. We should set a day and go together, and while we collect 
signatures we can encourage people to go together. .. When you go home this evening 
call a meeting of everyone who will be flooded by the dam. You should know who they 
are in your own area. Have them all come together to sign the petition." 
Somchai reminded them that only 12 villages had sent representatives to the meeting, 
and asked if they could arrange to spread the news of their decision to the other 12 
villages. He also asked hua-na Porn to help Watthana write the petition. As they 
discussed the final details Somchai hurried them to conclude so that he could move on 
the next issue. 
"Brothers and sisters, next I'd like to report on the results of the cabinet decision to 
establish committees and take action on our petitions after our ninety-nine day protest 
rally in Bangkok. The Committee for proposed dams tends to meet often, so that since 
the end of our protest they've met three times and set up a subcommittee which meets 
every Monday. They tend to be good, because all of the experts that they have invited to 
participate in the committee tend to agree about water management that doesn't use 
dams, but they are not able to cancel them all at once. Therefore, they must study each 
dam and they've already established a committee to consider the Kaeng Seua Ten Dam. 
Our problem is that we tape record each meeting but we're can't play it to you because 
as technical experts they speak more English than Thai. I went and listened and was 
very troubled. I didn't know what they said, only that it was English - technical 
engineering language. But to summarise, they see that the process of building dams has 
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real problems, and that there ought to be some other way instead, so they are studying 
the details of how that might be implemented. That's what I could follow in Thai, but as 
for the English, I don't know. Now, brothers and sisters, you don't have to be anxious -
many people are anxious that they are going to build the dam during this time. But the 
committee maintains that, according to their authority and responsibilities, as long as 
they are working and have not reached a conclusion we can be certain that the dam will 
not be built. I believe that will take a year. 
"Another thing that is more important: the irrigation department can't build the dam yet. 
Our group should think about what local people can do to ensure that we have enough 
water to drink and use, so that they don't have to build the dam. It is our river. How 
should we manage it to bring about the best results for ourselves? They [the Irrigation 
Department] talk about the problem of lack of water, so do we really lack water? If 
water for our rice fields and crops is really lacking but we don't want the dam, we must 
think how to address the problem here together. They have made their studies and we 
could simply wait until they build the dam - or, we could prepare our own catchment 
plan first. 
"This is something that you all should think about. Therefore, if possible after 
transplanting is finished I'd like to hold a general meeting and talk together about how 
we're going to manage this here. I'd like to bring everyone involved from all of the 24 
villages to work on our water management plan for the river basin ... Some possible 
ways include asking the irrigation department to dig small reservoirs above areas prone 
to flooding, or locks on creeks, or canals. Therefore you don't need a dam. Or if we 
have problems of lack of water for rice farming we could make improvements like 
Grandfather Pong who used organic agriculture (kaset thammachat) methods. He 
doesn't lack water, he doesn't need chemical fertilisers, and it helps conserve the river, 
too. 
"We need to discuss this again together and its up to you whether you do it or not. I only 
pass on information. You are the ones to decide because these decisions affect your 
lives, not mine. Brothers and sisters, you are the basis of addressing local problems no 
matter how many outsiders come to help, because you own your livelihoods, own this 
locality, own the river basin resources. Can we agree now? If we want to hold a general 
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meeting where and when can we do it?" 
Somchai promoted a similar idea a few weeks later at a meeting of about three hundred 
Sirinthorn Dam villagers' representatives at a villager's house in a resettlement 
community near the dam wall (Fieldnotes, Tambon Nikhom, Sirinthorn District, 18 July 
1997). This meeting had been called to disseminate the latest information about 
government moves - in response to Sirithorn villagers' petition and protest with the 
Assembly of the Poor - to pay compensation to families displaced by the Sirinthom 
Dam almost thirty years previously. There was a great sense of excitement, as Somchai 
reported that the government had established a multi-million baht fund in preparation 
for implementing the actual compensation process. After bringing the meeting up to 
date, Somchai went on to suggest that they needed to consider what they would do once 
compensation was made. He argued that they needed to collectively manage and 
conserve the remaining forest areas to protect the quality of life of their communities. 
Somchai suggested that the Sirin thorn Villagers' Organisation develop a local forest 
management plan and promote environmental conservation among its members. The 
meeting responded to this in silence, appearing unenthusiastic. No further mention was 
made of the idea that day, but Somchai told me during the drive back to the Villagers ' 
Centre that this was the first time he had raised it with them and he intended to keep 
promoting the idea at future meetings. 
At the Dorm Yai River meeting no one questioned Somchai ' s argument about their need 
for a local catchment management plan. After a brief discussion about convenient 
locations, the villagers proposed meeting in a nearby village school in August after they 
finished transplanting. Next Somchai told them about the Assembly of the Poor pho 
khrua yai meeting coming up in Chiang Mai in July and asked who they would send as 
their representative. He reminded them that at this meeting their representative may 
have to participate in making joint decisions for the Assembly as a whole. This led to 
Somchai reviewing the progress and problems of each of the other groups in the 
Assembly, a few of which had been successful and had received compensation 
payments from the government. Thus, Somchai tried to link them into the broader 
network, its successes and its problems. Somchai finished up with news about an 
upcoming media visit: 
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"The good news is that a team of Bangkok journalists want to visit and investigate the 
local area for the proposed dam, maybe we could invite them when we have the general 
meeting. Krungthep thurakit (Bangkok Business) are coming for certain, and we have a 
group of friends from Siam Post." 
Finally the meeting concluded with a return to the question of who will represent the 
Dorm Yai Villagers' Group in the national Assembly of the Poor meeting. This was no 
simple matter. The Mun River Villagers' Centre pickup truck had space for only one 
person from their group for the trip to Chiang Mai (indeed, I had to catch the bus). Up 
until now, a small group of villagers had acted as their key representatives - pho khrua 
yai- especially during the protest and negotiations in Bangkok. Finally Somchai 
requested that the "original person" act as their representative this time, but I was 
unclear who that actually meant. By now we had been meeting for almost two hours. 
Tong asked if there was anything else to discuss and quickly announced that the 
meeting was closed. Most of the villagers dispersed on foot, a few on motorcycles. Two 
young men remained and continued discussing the issue of who to delegate to send to 
the meeting in Chiang Mai. Finally, before we returned to the Mun River Villagers' 
Centre we followed them to their village a few kilometres away to see the river. This 
village, flanking the river, lay just upstream from the proposed site of the dam wall. 
Dozens of houses bore hand-painted signs protesting against the dam. 
Conclusions 
Villagers and their organisations are predominantly anchored in their specific local 
conditions and grievances, and their activities within the Assembly of the Poor stem 
from this. NGO activists, on the other hand, move between the different local worlds, 
and between local worlds and national arenas, and are crucial in building networks and 
villagers' consciousness of shared problems and shared goals. They perform much of 
the routine work of maintaining villagers' organisations and networks. For these reasons 
the NGO activists, although very small in number, occupy key positions in the 
Assembly of the Poor network, as they possess the "cultural capital" (Bourdieu, 1973) 
of their higher education and literacy in Central Thai, as well as the links with national 
and international NGO networks which provide access to resources, funding and 
knowledge. 
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As Det Phumkhacha argues in a quote above, the experiences and ideologies of the 
1970s activists and the 6 October generation are not uniform and homogeneous. 
Nevertheless, communist ideology and the experience of rural insurgency seems to have 
had a strong influence on the development-oriented NGO movement that followed. Ji 
Ungpakom (1997 :97) argues that the "blurring of class issues in favour of nationalism 
and the emphasis on the countryside are still major strands of thought in the radical 
sections of the NGO movement" that reveal this influence. Activists in the Assembly of 
the Poor say that the main legacy of the CPT insurgency has been the predominance of 
ideas of working with local communities and building community organisations in order 
to empower the poor (sang amnat hai kap khan Jon) (Interviews, Sawat, Bangkok, 29-
10-1997; Somchai, Khong Jiam, 27-9-1997). As I have mentioned in this chapter 
another important legacy has been the creation of a network of people - in the NGO 
movement, but also throughout many sectors of Thai society - who hold Leftist values 
of anti-authoritarianism, social justice and democracy, and who feel a sense of solidarity 
stemming from a common experience in the 1970s student movement and CPT 
insurgency. 
As the account of Somchai's work with the Lam Dorm Yai villagers reveals, activists 
act as "facilitators", promoting processes of democratic decision-making and collective 
action by villagers themselves, as well as ideas of solidarity with other groups in the 
network. However, the high value which NGO activists place on villager participation 
and democracy, and the constant ideological refrain that power and decision-making 
rest with the villagers' organisations, is contradicted by the power and influence which 
activists exercise by virtue of their position and education. I return to the ideology and 
practice of democracy in Chapter 7, where these contradictions continue to be explored. 
Nevertheless, I argue that villagers also hold a lot of power in the relationship and 
certainly do not see their NGO advisors in terms of patrons or leaders. 
Rather, I argue that Siang was largely right when he gave his assessment that they are 
"two things that go together" in a dialectical interplay. There are several reasons for this 
that can be drawn out of the Pak Mun story. Firstly, the capacity of the villagers' 
organisation to draw in people depends very much upon their ability to respond to local 
people's grievances and their perceptions of their own interests. Secondly, the relatively 
small numbers of NGO activists by themselves actually had little they could offer local 
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villagers in terms of economic resources or political power through traditional political 
channels such as parties, wealthy influential figures or through the bureaucracy. Thirdly, 
villagers' accounts of their struggle reveal a growing confidence in their own collective 
agency and power. They describe NGO activists as their allies and advisers, not as their 
leaders. This is not to say that NGOs did not advise and influence villagers about 
organisation and strategies. The NGO network provided an activist infrastructure -
which Suthy (1995) calls a "socio-political infrastructure" - that was crucial in 
accessing and disseminating information and news, and helping the villagers to get 
organised and seek out allies. 
Villagers' organisations gain their power and influence from their claims to represent a 
broad social constituency of poor people - the "grassroots" (rak-ya). The Assembly of 
the Poor' s primary political weapon is to demonstrate this grassroots power through 
mobilisation in high-profile, mass protests at strategic locations of power in order to 
compel the government to respond to their petitions and enter into negotiations. The 
following chapter presents an ethnographic account of one such demonstration, the 
Assembly's ninety-nine day rally in 1997. 
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6 The Village of the Poor Confronts the 
State: The Life of a Protest 
Marching in protest 
Doesn't trouble anyone 
We have the right, we have democracy 
We 're Thais all the same 
But 1-ve 're poor 
Walking is an everyday thing 
Like eating and sleeping 
Walking doesn't trouble anyone 
We use the strength of our own legs 
To march to a better place 
Politics is about livelihood 
Like parents and children living properly together 
Politics is engrossed only in the games of parliament 
And so how are the countryside and village to speak? 
We walk to vote in elections 
Politicians say, our hope is the Thai people 
But when we march in protest 
They accuse us of causing a disturbance 
But that's strange, politician's true feelings 
(Carabao, Doen khabuan (Protest march) from the CD Jaek kluay, 
Warner Music 1995)1 
On Saturday 25 January 1997 the Assembly of the Poor began a mass demonstration on 
the streets of Bangkok. Thousands of villagers from the North, Northeast and the South 
began flooding into the city. Many pooled their resources and hired vehicles to ensure 
that they arrived in a show of force to launch the protest. Others travelled together in 
small groups to the city by train and bus. Hundreds of Bangkok slum-dwellers joined 
thern. On the first day the protesters assembled several kilometres away and marched 
through the streets to Government House. Here they occupied the tail end of Rama V 
Road between Krungkasem and Sri Ayuthaya Roads, a stretch of approximately one 
kilometre (see Map 3, following page). Protesters continued to flood into the site for 
1 This song is not about the Assembly. It was released before the movement was founded and probably 
refers to ASFN and Isan Farmers' Assembly protests (Chapter 2). 
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several days. 
When I first arrived at the protest two days after it commenced, people were still pouring 
into the site, lugging tattered bags of clothes, old sacks full of rice and food, and the odd 
cooking pot and charcoal stove. Metal barricades and protest banners marked the 
entrances to the rally from Phitsanulok Road. Police assembled near the entrance paid no 
notice as I walked past them with the flow of people and in through the barricades. Just 
inside stood a makeshift medical tent under a blue tarpaulin, staffed by white-uniformed 
nurses from a nearby hospital and already receiving patients. Rows of portable awning-
style tents and make-shift shelters stretched away along both sides of the street, backing 
. onto the mosquito-infested canal on one side, and the blank, grey walls of the Civil 
Service Commission building on the other. Further along crews of villagers erected more 
tube metal frames. Under the tents villagers had piled their provisions together and sat or 
sprawled on old tattered reed mats. Banners and display boards hung everywhere, 
making a backdrop of protest rhetoric, mostly in Thai, some in English. 
I continued along the pathway through the middle of the ramshackle encampment. From 
loudspeakers somewhere a stream of announcements blared out over the site, drowning 
out the traffic noise from Pitsanulok Road. I came upon a stage that had been erected 
among the jumble of tents, protesters and provisions. A large elaborately painted 
backdrop rose behind the stage, featuring a giant fist rising beside the words: "The 
Assembly of the Poor demand what was promised 2" (samatcha khan Jon tuang sanya 
2). Under these words the painting depicted a sea of angry faces staring out, and 
interspersed among them, placards naming the main grievances of the Assembly: Dams, 
Forest and Land, State Projects, Slums, Alternative Agriculture. High above the stage 
were mounted two Thai national flags ( see Photo graph 1). 
Fanya Tongyu stood up on the stage at a microphone stand, making an announcement 
about the ban on alcohol and drugs during the protest: "If a member of the Assembly of 
the Poor drinks alcohol your membership will be cancelled and you can go to struggle 
somewhere else. Drunk people will spoil the image of the Assembly of the Poor in the 
mass media." 
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I continued on past the stage, moving with the constant circulation of people throughout 
the rally site. Many of the protesters had set up small stalls selling fruit, vegetables, 
noodles, somtam (papaya salad), chicken and fish grilled over earthenware charcoal 
stoves. Mostly these stalls consisted only of a reed mat, on which produce was laid out 
for sale. The air was heavy with the smell of roasting chicken and fish, and the sour, 
acrid odour of fermented fish (Lao: pa daek), a Northeastern staple. Past the tents were 
parked two Bangkok Metropolitan Authority toilet trucks. They looked like dirty brown 
public buses, but foul-smelling water dribbled out of each and ran away to the gutters. 
Women queued at both. Finally, against the barricades, a small crowd stood washing in 
the open, ladling water over themselves from portable washing stalls, the men bare-
chested in phakhaoma (loincloth) and the women discrete in their phasin (sarong). 
The time was approaching midday and it was very hot already. The rows of tamarind 
trees spaced along the street gave only dappled shade and little protection from the heat. 
Even under the makeshift shelters and tents people sweltered. Women sat knitting and 
crocheting bonnets and other craft products they would try to sell later. Some men wove 
fish nets. The tents, food stalls, heat, constant noise and movement reminded me of the 
many village temple fairs I had attended; almost everyone was speaking Lao, the 
language of the Northeast, but then again Lao was common throughout Bangkok these 
days. The tiring, oppressing heat only lifted late in the afternoon as shadows cast by 
adjacent buildings finally fell over the protesters. 
Panya descended from the stage and lead me to a group of villagers nearby who had 
staked out a section of the pavement with their mats and belongings. They were all 
family or friends from his village on the Mun River. This group made me welcome, 
probably because I had met some of them during my previous visits to the Mun River. 
They sat cross-legged on their reed mats, chatting among themselves and listening to the 
stage announcements. They prepared their food, ate and slept in this one spot for the 
next three months during the life of the rally. 
During the days and weeks that followed I talked with them about the living conditions 
here, their roles in the protest and the progress of negotiations with the government. 
"Life here is difficult," they assured me. "At home it is difficult, but better than here. 
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Here it is not comfortable. We lie exposed to the sun, exposed to the weather, short of 
everything here like this, exposed to mosquitoes." Lamkhang, a young woman told me: 
It's very difficult. I don't sleep. There are lots of mosquitoes. It's hard to 
rest during the day. There are queues to wash and we have to walk to the 
race track [bathrooms]. The government hasn't agreed with our demands 
yet - if they don't we won't go home. The worst problem is going to the 
toilet! If it's urgent they'll let you go ahead of the queue, but if not you 
have to wait in line (Interview, 1-2-1997). 
The heat only let up at night, but even then they found it hard to sleep. They slept on 
straw mats on the hard ground. They jokingly complained about the swarms of 
mosquitoes that rose from the canal and bothered them at night. Within a week or two 
donations of mosquito repellent coils and mosquito nets helped alleviate that problem. At 
night when the announcements and music from the stages finally stopped, the 
encampment looked like a huge billowing nest, as protesters settled down under their 
cotton nets. From March, an occasional storm burst over the city, drenching the streets. 
The protesters spent many sleepless nights standing, holding their belongings up out of 
the water running under their feet. 
These conditions played havoc with the health of the protesters. Colds and flu spread 
quickly through the rally. During the day they besieged the "health centre" requesting 
medicine and painkillers. When sickness overtook them many protesters returned to their 
villages and homes to rest and recover before returning to the rally. Eight protesters died 
during the rally, two of them suicides. Three babies were born (Assembly of the Poor, 
1997±). 
Interpreting Protest 
In the Introduction I raised the question of the extent to which the Assembly of the Poor 
has been able to transform unequal relations of power and effect meaningful social 
change. In their collective struggle the main political strategy, and hence source of 
power, of the Assembly is to mobilise villagers in high-profile, mass demonstrations to 
press the state to respond to its petitions. This chapter is an ethnographic account of one 
such rally. This extended protest represented a defining moment in the history and 
development of the Assembly for several reasons. First, it is during collective protest 
actions that the Assembly of the Poor actually exists most vividly in the immediate 
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experience of its members. Collective protest dramatises conflict and brings into relief 
issues of power and political strategy. Second, the demonstration, which endured for 
ninety-nine days, represents a historic achievement in its own right: Assembly activists 
claim that it "may be regarded as the longest lasting mass people's rally ever [in 
Thailand] and has shown that it held to the principles of enduring, patient struggle and 
nonviolence" (Assembly of the Poor, 1997j). Over such an extended period of time social 
processes become more visible, but also crucial to the maintenance and mobilisation of 
people, social order and nonviolent conflict. A central aim of this chapter, therefore, is to 
reveal just how complex this demonstration was and to explore the processes and 
meanings through which it was socially constructed. In particular I consider how the 
Assembly mobilises people and resources, the internal organisation and the constitution 
of a protest 'community', the significance of space and place, the relationship between 
political consciousness and political strategy, and the responses of the state and the 
media. 
Mobilisation to protest represents the main political strategy of social movements (Marx 
& McAdam, 1994) and·yet it remains relatively under-theorised in the literature. Protest 
"has been considered as a form of action typical of social movements because, unlike 
political parties and pressure groups, they have fewer channels through which to access 
decision makers" (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 170). As Della Porta and Diani (1999: 170, 
following Lipsky) note, "protest is a political resource of the powerless". Accordingly, 
protest is regarded as unconventional, as it falls outside of the 'conventional' political 
methods of influencing or participating in government decision-making processes (Ibid.). 
The dominant approach to protest in the social movement literature is to render it in 
strategic and instrumental terms; that is, this perspective leads to an analysis of protest in 
terms of political goals and the types of strategies and actions available to dissidents to 
achieve those goals (Della Porta & Diani 1999; Marx & McAdam 1994). This approach 
is exemplified by the work of Charles Tilly (1978, 1986) and his notion of 'repertoires of 
collective action' that has proved highly influential in the social movement literature. 
Repertoire of collective action refers to the whole range of collective forms of dissent or 
contention that are recognised and deployed by particular groups in particular historical 
contexts. Tilly's contribution was his analysis of the ways in which the repertoires of 
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contention of European peasants and revolutionary movements have changed with 
historical shifts in the political and economic organisation of European societies, and 
development of communication infrastructure, in the modem age. As Tilly (1986: 391-2) 
writes, 
the repertoire of the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century had a 
parochial scope: it addressed local actors or the local representatives of 
national actors. It also relied heavily on patronage - appealing to 
immediately available powerholders to convey grievances or settle 
disputes, temporarily acting in the place of unworthy or inactive 
powerholders only to abandon power after the action ( emphasis in 
original). 
Tilly shows how this repertoire was transformed during the nineteenth century: 
As capitalism advanced, national states became more powerful and 
centralised local affairs and nearby patrons mattered less to the fates of 
ordinary people ... .In response to the shifts of power and capital, ordinary 
people invented and adopted new forms of action, creating the electoral 
campaign, the public meeting, the social movement, and the other 
elements of the newer reperetoire (Tilly 1986: 395-6). 
Thus, Tilly largely sees collective action and protest in instrumental terms, constrained by 
available repertoires and shaped by modem locations of political and economic power 
and the influence of the mass media. 
The usefulness of this approach to protest is not in dispute here. As I illustrate below, the 
Assembly drew upon a broad repertoire of collective action well-established within 
Thailand, including the mass rally, demontration march, protest concert and non-violent 
civil disobedience. Their 1997 protest confronted the symbolic and practical centres of 
state power - Government House arid Parliament - while at the same time addressing and 
crucially relying on the mediation of the mass media. 
In contrast to Tilly, however, some writers argue that protest needs to be understood in 
more than strategic and instrumental terms. Firstly, as Rucht and Ohlemacher (1992:76) 
note, "protest campaigns can be seen as the outcome of a complex internal or semi-
internal process in which collective identities have to be formed, organizations and 
networks created and people persuaded and mobilized for action". Certainly, the 
Assembly's protest campaigns represent the culmination of all the complex processes of 
organisation, mobilisation, networking and identity formation introduced and explored in 
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earlier chapters of this thesis. In this chapter I show how all of these processes underly 
the Assembly's 1997 protest, and that is why protest represents a privileged domain in 
which to study social movements. 
Secondly, protest involves social movement actors in a cultural struggle to give meaning 
and legitimacy to their actions (Melluci 1998:425; Alvarez et al 1998:20). The power of 
protest lies in its expressive meanings as much as its instrumental purposes. The very act 
of protest expresses a social critique about the existing state of affairs ( Guha 1997). 
Turner (1995), in an ethnographic study of Japanese workers in protest, shows how 
protest dramatises ideological and political conflict. A demonstration, she writes, is "a 
highly symbolic event, an occasion during which the fact of the struggle [is] brought 
front and centre, made more visible, and its meanings addressed more explicitly" (p.200). 
In other words, protest necessarily involves cultural struggles over meanings and 
representation. An example from the Assembly of the Poor protest that I present in this 
chapter is the representation of the rally site as the "Village of the Poor", symbolically 
bringing the rural village into the heart of the city and revealing it to be in a state of crisis 
and under seige from · the very economic development that is underwriting urban 
prosperity. At perhaps a more fundamental level, the protest embroils the Assembly in a 
contest to be seen and acknowledged as a legitimate political organisation representing 
the interests of the "Poor" and able to assert knowledge in the face of silencing 
discourses of ignorance. 
Finally, as I discussed in the Introduction, ethnography leads to a focus on the experience 
and perspectives of villagers and NGO activists in the Assembly, and their roles in the 
construction of collective action and protest. As Turner (1995: 19) argues, careful 
ethnographic attention to the "choice of sites where people [are] actively engaged in 
efforts to transform their social worlds [makes] it easier to see the process of that 
transformation in both practice and conceptualisation, through time and in a rich 
context". Turner argues that demonstrations not only dramatise conflict but often 
encompass an intense emotional experience for participants that transforms their sense of 
identity and solidarity. "They were moving, all-encompassing, clearly bounded events in 
which some of the most important aspects of their social lives and identities were 
involved. And they occasioned lengthy reflection on identity, inequality, injustice, and 
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open conflict" (1995:217-218). Turner's book highlights the "dialectical relationship 
between experience and consciousness" (1995:63) for participants in demonstrations. 
Japanese workers' ideological attitudes and political behaviour were transformed 
through participation in union actions and demonstrations. Similarly, in this chapter I 
address this question of the relationship between political consciousness and participation 
in collective protest. I show that collective protests represent very important moments in 
the development of social movements and the experiences of those who participate in 
them. In Thailand NGO activists speak of consciousness being transformed through 
participation in these processes and of the poor being empowered through struggle. 
There is a well-developed tradition and history of popular protest against perceived 
injustice in Thailand, especially against military dictatorship. But popular versions of that 
history have always valued middle-class protest for democratic reform, seen in the value 
and emphasis placed on the student-led mass protests of 14 October 1973 and the rallies 
of Black May 1992. These two mass demonstrations are regarded as progressive turning 
points in modern Thai history and are usually portrayed as predominantly middle class 
movements. Furthermore, many middle-class Thais express a widespread suspicion that 
villagers' protests are manipulated or paid for by some "third hand" or social force 
behind the scenes. Rural villagers are regarded as uneducated and ignorant (which 
undermines the authority of their voices), and accused of being manipulated and 
mobilised by others. In this way the attribution of knowledge and ignorance (Hobart, 
1993) is closely linked with the attribution of agency in political struggles. As I show 
throughout the chapter, these contests over the attribution and representation of agency 
and knowledge were played out during the protest rally. 
Background and Course of Events 
The protest rally which I describe in detail in this chapter was the culmination of a series 
of demonstrations staged by the Assembly of the Poor in support of their petitions to the 
state. When the Assembly of the Poor publicly announced its foundation and released the 
Mun River Declaration in December 1995, it also submitted a carefully prepared, written 
petition to the government detailing 4 7 specific grievances, and announced a 30 day 
deadline for a government response (Assembly of the Poor, 1996). To gain media 
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publicity and underscore their ability to mobilise for collective action, 600 Assembly 
representatives marched from Hualumphong Railway Station to the ASEAN Summit 
which was then meeting in Bangkok, where they attempted to present the Mun River 
Declaration to ASEAN delegates. 
Dissatisfaction with government inaction on their petition lead to mounting threats of 
public protest. Eventually the Assembly declared that a mass protest rally would begin on 
Sunday 31 March 1996 in the streets outside Government House. 12,000 people joined 
this first mass protest rally, which lasted for five weeks and won extensive media 
coverage and public recognition for the Assembly. The rally concluded on 23 April after 
the government of Prime Minister Banham promised action on all grievances raised in 
the Assembly's petition. TV Channel 9 broadcast live the Assembly's final meeting with 
the Prime Minister before the rally dispersed. 2 
By mid-June Assembly representatives were complaining that the government had "failed 
to tackle their problems seriously". A committee headed by the Prime Minister, and 
including Assembly representatives and government officials, had been established to 
oversee the government response but proved ineffective. Furthermore, provincial 
administrators and police ignored the promises and agreements made by the central 
government (Bangkok Post, 11 June 1996:3). A delegation of about five hundred 
representatives returned to protest in Bangkok outside Government House from 13 to 19 
August 1996, demanding that the government and bureaucracy implement the 
agreements reached at the end of the protest rally in April (Assembly of the Poor, 
1997e). But the Assembly's agreements with the Banham administration were doomed, 
as the coalition lead by his Chart Thai Party collapsed on 27 September 1996. 
Fresh elections in November brought a coalition lead by the New Aspiration Party with 
General Chavalit Y ongchaiyudh as Prime Minister. The Assembly of the Poor found that 
the state bureaucracy and new government were reluctant to implement the agreements 
2 This brief account of the 1996 protest is based on a number of newspaper reports, including Bangkok 
Post (27 March 1996:1, 31 March 1996:1, 1 April 1996:3 , 16 April 1996:1, 23 April 1996:1) and 
Chitraporn (1996) as well as documents from the Assembly of the Poor (1996), and interviews with a 
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they had negotiated with the previous Banham administration. In December 1996 they 
sent delegates to Government House seeking to follow up their petitions and seeking 
appointments for face to face negotiation meetings. Later, on 28 December, Prime 
Minister Chavalit announced that he would meet with a combined meeting of delegates 
from a number of farmers' organisations, including the Assembly, from 15 to 17 January. 
At the same time, the Assembly of the Poor organised a series of meetings of villagers 
representatives to discuss strategies. The Assembly's network had grown and NGO 
activists now compiled a petition containing 122 separate grievances and demands for 
reforms in government policies (Assembly of the Poor, 19971, see Chapter 3 for more 
details on the points of the petition). During a meeting of 500 villagers' representatives 
at Khong Jiam on 14 and 15 December the delegates expressed enthusiastic support for a 
mass rally early in the new year (Fieldnotes, Khong Jiam, 14 & 15-12-1996). Then at a 
follow-up meeting in Buriram on 7 and 8 January 1997, they decided to withdraw from 
the meetings scheduled for 15 January. On 14 January Assembly delegates met with 
Prime Minister's Office Minister Chingchai Mongkhontham, resubmitted their petition 
and requested negotiation meetings on the specific grievances and demands, under the 
threat of a second mass demonstration. 
When the Assembly returned to Bangkok on 25 January for their second mass protest 
rally they promised not to move until they saw "tangible" efforts by the government to 
respond to their petition. This time, they declared, hollow promises and powerless 
committees would not be enough. According to the Assembly, approximately 20,000 
people joined the rally; at its peak in mid-March their numbers reached 25 ,000 
(Interviews with Secretariat, Bangkok, 2-9-1997). 3 Formal meetings with the 
government began two days after the rally commenced. One hundred and fifty Assembly 
number of participants in 1997. 
3 Although protesting groups tend to over-represent their own numbers in order to increase their 
political impact, the Assembly actually kept rolls of participants throughout the rally. Therefore, the 
Secretariat had access to relatively accurate numbers (Fieldnotes February 1997, Interview Wiset, 
Assembly Secretariat, 2-9-1997). The Bangkok Post reported 20,000 people early in the rally (6 
February 1997:Outlook 1) and then tended to report numbers as "more than 10,000" (eg 24 April 1997) . 
The Nation consistently reported 20,000 protesters (eg 19 March 1997:3). Other estimates in the media 
varied from 11,000 (eg Sayam rat 2 to 8 April 1997:20-21) to 30,000 participants in the Assembly's 
rally at Sanam Luang on 16 March 1997 (Sayam post 17 March 1997:1,8; Naewna 18 March 1997:1). 
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representatives and their NGO advisers met with government officials led by Chingchai 
Mongkhontham. Consequently, seven joint committees were established to consider the 
specific grievances of the Assembly (Supawadee Susanpoolthong & Yuwadee Tunyasiri, 
1997). The seven committees corresponded to the seven categories of grievances 
presented in the Assembly's petition to the government. 
Negotiations over their specific grievances progressed slowly, however. The turning 
point came in mid-March when the nationwide NGO community symbolically threw its 
weight behind the Assembly, demonstrating widespread middle-class support. To mark 
this show of support, the protesters marched through the streets and rallied in Sanam 
Luang, the famous public park near Thammasat University. After this the government 
accelerated its efforts. On 11 April the Prime Minister Chavalit became more personally 
involved and attended negotiation meetings for the first time (Bangkok Post, Internet 
Edition: www.bangkokpost.com, 4 May 1997). Chavalit agreed in principle to address 
all of the Assembly's grievances (Nation, Internet edition: www .nationmultimedia.com, 
24 April 1997). Negotiation meetings speeded up. By the end of the month the cabinet 
had passed resolutions on all 122 grievances, including compensation for the Pak Mun 
and Sirinthorn dam villagers. The government committed itself to establishing a 1.2 
billion baht fund which would then be used to compensate villagers affected by dams and 
other large development projects (Chakrit Ritmontri, 1997a). 
The Assembly had promised to maintain the protest until "tangible actions" were seen to 
be taken, but after three months the protesters were exhausted and their resources at an 
end. The final decision to conclude the rally and return home was taken by a special 
public meeting which media reporters were invited to attend. The protest finally 
dispersed on Friday 2 May, ninety-nine days after it began. The government provided 91 
buses and trucks to take remaining protesters to their home provinces. 
Mobilising People and Resources 
A key factor in the success of the Assembly in mobilising people to protest was its 
faithfulness to the specific grievances and aims of each group of local people who have 
joined the network. Concrete local problems and grievances caused by state sponsored 
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development constitute the foundation of the Assembly, and each and every one of these 
grievances is assembled into the list of demands presented to the government for 
negotiation. Therefore, every group that joins in a protest rally is motivated first and 
foremost by the material benefits it stands to gain for its own members. And this 
connection to local communities is vital to the ability to stage sustained mass protest 
rallies for long periods of time, not just in terms of numbers of participants, but for 
mobilising resources and supplies just to feed and sustain people for long periods of time. 
Fu1ihermore, each villagers' group or organisation in the Assembly had agreed to a 
social contract to support the petition of every member group and not withdraw or drop 
out in the event that its particular petitions were satisfied. Kan, a villager from the Mun 
River, explained the contract to me in these terms: 
We agreed together that we would speak [negotiate] from the smallest 
problem first through to the largest problem last. We will wait until we 
are capable of addressing every problem before we return home together. 
People whose grievances have been fixed rest and wait to give 
encouragement to their friends from then on. This was the agreement of 
our group (Interview, Bangkok, 21-2-1997). 
While the written petition and the social contract not to withdraw prematurely from the 
rally were prepared and agreed upon \Nell before the demonstration, the work of 
mobilising people at the village level largely fell to the kaen nani, or village level 
organisers of the Assembly. As one protester told me, 
The kaen nani for each village arranged everything. Had us combine our 
forces. Whether there were a lot or a few of us [protesters] they got us to 
prepare rice, dried food and travel together to Bangkok. We prepared 
food, charcoal, rice, fuel and money and such to bring and buy food, 
enough to live for a few days. Won't last long. It's like this: we poor 
people brought our supplies here and those left in the village have 
nothing left to eat. My father and my child are back at home, I came here 
with my mother (Mae Duang, Intervie'w, Bangkok, 28-1-1998). 
Manv kaen narn told me that they had been able to encourage more villagers than 
previous years to join the protest. Kan first jomed the Mun River Villagers' organisation 
in 1994 and had acted as kaen nani in his village for the last two years . 
Last year 30 people came from my village to join the protest. But this 
tune three times as many people were inclined to join. 92 families 
registered their names. We don't lead them along pointing the way like 
the government. We point out the truth of our situation. We show them 
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that we are capable to doing things if we join together. And the people 
who agree join us (Interview, Kan, Bangkok, 21-2-1997). 
In mid-February, about three weeks after the protest began, I visited villages on the 
lower Mun River, to try to find out what was happening back in some of the protesters ' 
home communities. In some villages nearest to the dam wall, almost every household 
sent representatives. For example, in Ban Hua Haew resettlement village every family 
sent representatives, as virtually the whole village had relied on fishing in the past. But, 
unlike many local Village Heads, the Head here actively encouraged every family to 
participate so that they would have a stake in the compensation pay-out expected to be 
won from the government (Fieldnotes and Interviews, Ban Hua Haew, Khong Jiam, 16-
2-1997). When I interviewed him later he explained that as Village Head he could not 
participate himself, but he sent his wife as the kaen nam for the village, and often drove 
villagers in his pickup to the train station in Ubon, to help them on their way to the rally 
(Interview, Ban Huay Haew, 1-8-1997). The villagers said that there was a constant 
turn-around between the village and the protest site. One family explained, 
People come and go. When they get tired, they return home. They might 
arrange for someone else from their family to replace them, or they might 
return themselves after a few day's rest. Yesterday a few groups returned 
to the village. They prepared fresh supplies and new representatives to go 
to the rally. If we don't go our name will be taken off the list (Fieldnotes, 
Ban Hua Haew, 16-2-1997). 
In nearby villages, such as Ban Tung Lung, they told a similar story. When the rally 
began every family sent representatives, but three families returned home, complaining 
that they "could not stay under those conditions". As in most villages, they reported that 
the proportions joining in the protest rallies had climbed over the years. 
I met many villagers who had returned home from the protest to rest or prepare fresh 
provisions. For example, I visited Mae Pla in her house a few kilometres north of Phibun 
township. She had returned a few days before with her mother and another villager, 
Kitthi, who were both ill with the flu. She was busy preparing rice and supplies to take 
back to Bangkok that afternoon. She would catch local buses to Ubon, where she would 
board the train to Bangkok. Pla is the kaen nam in her village. She tried to encourage a 
friend who lives nearby to go with her, but with no success. In her village, almost all of 
whom had relied on fishing before the dam according to Pla, only six families out of 
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about sixty sent representatives to join the protest. Pla left her husband and son at home 
to look after their house and their buffaloes. Kitthi is also a kaen nam from a nearby 
village. He recuperated at home with his wife for a few days and once he recovered he 
took some money, rice and food with him back to Bangkok. His young wife stayed at 
home to look after their two young children (Fieldnotes, Huay Sai Village, Phibun 
Mangsahan District, 17-2-1997; Interview, Kitthi, Bangkok, 29-1-1997). 
In some villages I met people who said that they wanted to join the protest but couldn' t 
afford it. They couldn't afford to go away from their homes for a long period of time and 
didn't have enough money for the bus and train fares to and from Bangkok. In some 
villages local people reported that the Village Head strongly discouraged participation, 
often promising villagers they he would submit his own list of villagers with grievances 
to the authorities. 
This flow of people and resources did not just link the rally with rural villages, but with 
communities of migrant workers in Bangkok. A fundamental problem for villagers in 
even getting organised in the first place is the disintegration of village communities as 
rapid industrialisation and decline of the agricultural sector has forced growing numbers 
of villagers to migrate to the cities to seek work for the short or the long term. During 
the protest this massive sector of migrant workers provided another source of support 
for the Assembly's rally, although it is impossible to quantify the extent of this support. 
A great majority of the protesters with whom I spoke had family members working in 
Bangkok who paid the occasional visit and helped with food and money. One kaen nam 
put it this way: 
You can see for yourself, the older people here who have come to fight -
in the evening their children come to visit them because their children 
work here in Bangkok. It [migrant labour] is a way of life that breaks 
families up ... Sometimes they bring money for their parents. They know 
that their parents are starving and tormented here so they buy food or 
supplies for them. Really, they're another source of strength for us ... 
They can't join with us here as they have to work, so they bring money to 
support us (Interview, Tawi, Bangkok, 21-2-1997). 
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Discourses of Protest and Nonviolence 
The objectives of the Assembly's protest rally were clearly stated in the Assembly's 
petition, public announcements and documents such as three Assembly Publicity Leaflets 
produced during the course of the rally and published word for word in Khaosot 
newspaper (18-3-1997:31). The public announcements of the Assembly, which were 
mainly written by NGO activists, took pains to give legitimacy to the rally through 
describing it as a "democratic social movement" of the "people" and the "poor". They 
also appeal to their "freedom and right to rally peacefully and nonviolently" within a 
democratic system. 
A discourse of protest was continually generated, discussed and disseminated throughout 
the protest site which emphasised the need of poor people to act collectively and the 
power they could achieve if they did. The other important aspect of their protest 
discourse was the constant reference to nonviolence (santiwithi; sometimes the Buddhist 
term ahingsa was used). To practice peaceful, nonviolent protest was argued to be a 
democratic right and according to social justice. If Assembly members enacted violent 
protest they would probably lose the support and goodwill they enjoyed from much of 
the print media and some sections of the middle class. But also, to appeal to nonviolent 
methods was an important means of protection from the deployment of military or police 
force against them by the state. 
Almost every protester who I talked to about their methods appealed to nonviolence as 
the underlying principle of their rally. This quote from Panya illustrates: 
We haven't come wanting to cause problems for the state. We haven't 
come wanting to make trouble with the bureaucracy. We have come 
peacefully and nonviolently; we want to be able to speak, to engage in 
talks about the issues. If we destroyed one official thing it would be over 
immediately, we'd be arrested, we couldn't stay. But sometimes our 
force puts pressure on them to take away any obstacles and smooth the 
way for negotiations (Panya, Interview, Bangkok 28-1-1997). 
For the poor rural villagers and urban slum dwellers in the Assembly participation in such 
collective actions provided a key experience in developing and transforming their 
political consciousness. During the rally protesters were keen to talk with me about why 
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they had joined the demonstration, and about the methods of campaigning and protest 
available to them. Most of the villagers I spoke with emphatically said that they "had no 
choice" but to rally together in large numbers to force the government to listen to them. 
For example, when I asked Kan whether he thinks that the protest rally is the best way to 
campaign, he emphasised that they had tried other approaches: 
We can't see any other way. We think that this is the best way, joining 
together in a rally to petition. We've tried other ways, like sending 
delegates to negotiate with the government, but we didn't get any results, 
so here we are. You could say it is putting pressure on the government in 
an indirect way, but we use nonviolent methods (santiwithi) . I mean we 
don't make the villagers suffer, we place pressure only on the 
government. If it happens that the masses, mass media, the people of 
Bangkok see eye to eye with us no one will criticise us and our chances 
of success will be high .... There are other groups who have experienced 
problems for a long time, some for 10 years or more, but who didn't dare 
rise up and fight. But when they saw our assembly join together they 
came and joined in. Put simply, they depend on the power of joining 
together as one (Interview, Bangkok, 21-2-1997). 
Siang, Chair of the Mun River Villagers' Organisation and veteran of many protest 
rallies, felt that poor, politically marginalised people had very limited strategies available: 
According to my own experience we only have one choice. The struggles 
of villagers - if we fought using the law, we'd lose to them. If we took up 
weapons to fight them we'd lose. The people have only one way out, that 
is rally to present our petition (kanchumnum riakrong ), give notice to the 
government and the public .... in our struggle we hold to the principles of 
nonviolence (Siang, Interview, Bangkok, 13-3-1997). 
During the first few weeks of the rally, when the agency and legitimacy of the protest 
were coming under attack from some sections of the government and the media, such 
sentiments were often expressed by speakers from the stage and were sometimes 
rephrased to me in interviews and discussions with protesters. For example, when I 
interviewed Kitthi about the protest, he exclaimed: "We're poor people. We've got no 
money. No authority (amnat). We only have ourselves and the time to come and rally" 
(Interview, 29-1-1997). This was a common argument during the rally. For example 
Praphat (1997a:27) quotes another village leader: 
We're poor people. Where are the poor to get money from? We have no 
money. We have no power (amnat). We have no weapons, prestige or 
high status. We have no position of authority. We don't speak clearly ... 
We have only our feet. We must join together in large numbers, for long 
periods of time, before they will listen to us. Rallying together is the only 
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power that poor people possess. 
A similar notion is expressed in the Carabao song which begins this chapter. 
Accommodation and Containment by the State 
The extent to which sections of the state accommodated and provided assistance to the 
protest raises the question as to whether the state was prepared to allow symbolic protest 
as long as it did not pose an actual concrete threat to state and elite power. The state had 
developed formalised, institutionalised responses to protest. 4 For example, I soon 
discovered that the Government House employs a public relations officer whose job is to 
liase with protest groups. A large contingent of riot police were stationed at the entrance 
of Government House for the duration of the demonstration. But on most days they 
appeared bored and uninterested, and spent their time languishing in the shade of a row 
of tarpaulins. According to several newspaper reports this was the first time that the· 
government did not direct the police to prevent protesters from marching into the protest 
site (Chitrapom, 1996, Rooney, 1997). 
While the police were deployed as a largely symbolic presence for most of the time, 
government offices organised some basic health and welfare services to the protesters . 
Tents, portable toilets and washing facilities, electric power, water tanks and drinking 
water were organised by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA). The BMA 
arranged for a nearby hospital to provide an ambulance, medical supplies and staff for a 
makeshift "health centre" in a tent next to the barricades. A few days into the protest, the 
politically independent Governor of Bangkok, Bichit Rattakun, visited the protest site. 
Bichit addressed the protesters and promised to provide basic facilities such as water 
tanks , mobile bathrooms, health care workers and tents: 
All the villagers who have travelled a long way from their homes really 
need public facilities like tents, medical care, water supplies and 
bathrooms. We came here to make sure you have enough of these 
facilities to meet your needs (Anchalee Kongrut, 1997). 
4 This, of course, suggests that protests and demonstrations are not as "unconventional" a form of 
political strategy as some writers suggest. While Della Port and Diani (1 999 : 168) write that a defining 
characteristic of protest is its unconventional political nature, they do go on to acknowledge that in 
democratic industrial societies protest actions have increasingly been seen as legitimate methods of 
political participation and campaigning. 
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The Assembly of the Poor later published a summary of the kinds of assistance provided 
by state agencies (Assembly of the Poor, 1997a). The Prime Minister's Office hired 89 
tents for the protesters at a cost of over 800,000 baht. The BMA and city utilities 
provided drinking water, electric power and portable toilets. When the Assembly decided 
to end its protest, the national government paid over one million baht to assist the 
remaining protesters to return to their homes, including hiring 93 buses. No doubt these 
measures by government agencies to provide basic shelter and health and sanitation 
facilities contributed to the ability of the Assembly to maintain their protest for a record 
ninety-nine days. 
Another form of accommodation and containment by the state was the establishment of 
committees as the formal space for articulation of grievances, negotiation and bargaining. 
I explore this process further in later sections of this chapter. 
The Village of the Poor: Space, Place and Protest 
After I sat with the protesters for a few days it became clear that they worked hard at 
creating a peaceful, orderly and healthy community, highly aware of themselves as a 
media and public spectacle, and deliberately trying to present a good "image" (phap-
phot). I began to the see the amount of work and attention to detail that went into the 
creation of a public space of protest. A consideration of the strategic use of space and 
place may extend our understanding of the meaning and symbolic power of the protest. 
Routledge (1993), in a study of environmental protest movements in India, argues that 
we must study the actual spaces and "terrains of resistance" in which social movements 
carry out their struggles and campaigns. Similarly, for the Assembly of the Poor the 
chosen sites of struggle were highly significant. Indeed, the space of the protest rally 
became an important social site (but not the only site) in which the members of the 
Assembly articulated and asserted their grievances, their agency and identity, and their 
demands on the state for social justice. 
The choice of protest site is fairly obvious. The target of their petition was the 
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government. Government House, in the centre of Bangkok, is the practical and symbolic 
headquarters of the state and centre of power. In claiming this space they literally and 
symbolically confronted the centre of power, and were highly visible to the public , but 
also to Members of Parliament (MPs) and government ministers coming and going from 
work. But it is also significant that they claimed the streets and footpaths , which as many 
villagers reminded me, are public property and public spaces which should be accessible 
to everyone in a democracy. Protesters also marched to other important places with 
political significance, notably the Parliament Building (while parliament was in session) 
but also Sanam Luang, the public park near Thammasat University that has been the site 
of mass popular rallies marking famous turning points in Thai history. Not only did the 
protesters occupy and claim space which held symbolic and strategic significance, but 
they also strategically used the space of the rally to create a new, highly visible and 
symbolic place of protest, the "Village of the Poor" (muban khan Jon) (see Photographs 
7 & 8). 
As they had done the year before, the protesters enacted ritual opening ceremonies for 
the Village of the Poor. They actually opened two, corresponding to the two sections of 
Nakhon Prathom Road which they occupied. Maliwan invited me to observe the opening 
ceremony for the second Village directly across the canal from Government House: 
10 am. The protest site is barricaded off from the main road by a fence of 
metal barriers. A gateway in the barriers has been constructed out of 
bamboo poles holding up a banner declaring, "muban khan Jon 2" 
(Village of the Poor 2). There are several journalists and photographers 
waiting nearby. A rowdy procession of several hundred people emerges 
from the other section of the rally site and surges across Phitsanulok 
Road forcing the traffic to stop and wait. The riot police standing nearby 
watch passively and make no move to intervene. About twenty villagers 
at the head of the procession carry stalks of young sugar cane. A monk 
splashes holy water over the gateway and then enters into the site, 
splashing holy water over sitting protesters as he makes his way to the 
stage. The procession follows. Villagers tie the sugar cane stalks to the 
bamboo poles at each comer of the stage and sprinkle more holy water 
on the sugarcane, the stage and the crowd. The ceremony finishes with a 
phuk siaw5 ceremony in this area around the stage (Fieldnotes, Bangkok, 
1-2-1997). 
5 Phuk siaw is a Lao phrase for a ceremony in which participants tie cotton threads around each other 's 
wrists , thus investing each other as siaw, or life-long friends. 
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The Village of the Poor symbolically brought the "rural village" into the heart of the city. 
In doing so the protesters disrupted common representations and stereotypes of the 
"village" and rural life as an enduring source of Thai culture and identify (For an account 
of the "village" as an element of Thai culture and identity, see Hirsch, 1991). This village 
symbolically represented a community in crisis, threatened by the very development and 
economic growth the city both symbolised and depended upon economically. 
The Village of the Poor strikingly combined domestic activities of villagers with the 
signs and symbols of public protest. Everyday, even intimate, activities such as preparing 
and eating food, bathing and sleeping, were enacted against the backdrop of banners, 
stage, broadcast announcements, notice boards and poster displays, barriers and nearby 
riot police. In that public space even seemingly simple, domestic activities became 
symbolic, signifying the protesters' persistence and resistance to the destructive affects of 
development and their intention to endure here in the rally site until the state responded. 
It also signified that this was a peaceful community. 
Tents, provisions, banners, notice boards, shops, amplified announcements and music, 
and people sitting, lying, cooking and circulating, gave the impression of greater numbers 
of protesters than there actually were, and had carved out a new physical and social 
space for the protesters and their supporters to confront the centre of power. This helped 
to create an imposing appearance of presence. The numbers rose and fell during the three 
months but the encampments in the Villages of the Poor always looked populated and 
dense with protesters. In mid-March, after two months had passed, the daily meeting of 
the Assembly's collective leadership (pho khrua yai) discussed a plan to make the 
Villages of the Poor into more permanent structures. The meeting resolved to request 
building materials from members' villages in the provinces, if their negotiations continued 
to make no progress (Fieldnotes, 18-3-1997). This resolution was not followed through, 
but Assembly leaders were well aware of its symbolic potential. 
Once the protest began, multiple spaces were created for the articulation and debate of 
the Assembly's petition. NGOs and academics organised seminars in campuses around 
Bangkok. Assembly representatives and NGO advisers were invited to speak at various 
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venues. Maliwan gave the annual Komol Keemthong Foundation speech at Thammasat 
University which was chaired by prominent social critic, Sulak Srivarak, and attracted 
several hundred people. Maliwan spoke on the topic "Why must we help the poor?" and 
mainly gave an account of her work with Mun River villagers and their fight against the 
dam (Fieldnotes, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 20-2-1997). One villagers' delegate 
leading local opposition to the Kaeng Seua Ten dam in Phrae was invited to speak at the 
inaugural World Conference of Dam-Affected People in Brazil in March (Nation 13 
March 1997:4). In April, after the protest passed two months, the Northern Farmers' 
Network mobilised about 5,000 villagers to rally at Chiang Mai City Hall, a further show 
of numbers in support of the Assembly's demands (Bangkok Post 9 April 1997: 1). 
Organising and Sustaining the Village of the Poor 
One day early in the protest I sat talking with Mae Pla. I asked her what she does each 
day during the protest. "Bo dai het nyang! I don't do anything!" she replied ironically in 
Lao. But she immediately elaborated. "Sometimes I help them sell things in the welfare 
shop (hang sawathikan)," she said, gesturing towards a nearby stall. "I attend meetings 
in the morning and evening, and then pass the meeting discussions on to the group here, 
as I am kaen nam for this group of villagers. Sometimes they call me up on to the stage 
to speak. The [NGO] advisers often send reporters to me for an interview" (Fieldnotes, 
28-1-1997). 
Pla was widely regarded by fellow villagers as an articulate and clever speaker, so she 
was often chosen as a spokesperson for the Mun River villagers. She had a cheeky smile 
and spoke dramatically and passionately about fishing the Mun River and the impact of 
the dam. Often during our discussions and interviews the crowds of protesters sitting 
around us would fall silent and listen, smiling and laughing with her jokes or affirming 
her assertions. 
I asked her about the welfare shop: 
Each group of villagers from the same district has one. If you have 
nothing to eat you can buy something from the welfare shop, because our 
own villagers work it. We all put money into it as a revolving fund. You 
can buy from it, or if you have no money you can still get food. One part 
of it is welfare rice (khao sawathikan). Whoever has no rice, we give 
169 
them credit so that that group of villagers can buy rice (Interview, Pla, 
Bangkok 28-1-1997). 
Villagers and NGO activists explained to me the complex and sophisticated organisation 
and division of labour during the protest rally, and invited me to various activities and 
meetings to actually watch it in practice. This was far from a disorganised "mob" as 
some sections of the media called them (for example, see Thai rat, 27 January 1997: 1; 
Daily News, 29 January 1997:1). Villagers' leaders organised volunteers to look after the 
safety and security, health and well-being, cleanliness and sanitary conditions, as well as 
select their delegates to negotiate with the government. They relied on a system of 
collective leadership through meetings of elected villagers' representatives called pho 
khrua yai (see Chapter 7), and networks of coordination and communication through the 
kaen nam. The NGO advisers joined their meetings, provided technical, secretarial and 
material support as well as coordinating with other allied organisations and the media. 
Over 1000 men volunteered to act as "guards" for the rally, maintaining peace and order, 
ensuring that the rules (kotrabiap) were followed, and watching for outside agitators. 
The collective leadership of the Assembly initiated some basic rules which were designed 
to help maintain peace and a sense of community, but also to create a good image in the 
eyes of the media and the public. Such rules included a ban on drunkenness and the 
consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs in the rally site. Another group of volunteers, 
called or sor mo (an acronym adopted from rural development practice and meaning 
"village health volunteer") and composed mainly of women, worked shifts sweeping the 
protest site and cleaning bathrooms and toilets at the site and at the nearby racetrack. 
Volunteer nurses (phayaban) treated minor ailments and referred sick protesters on to 
the professional nurses and doctors in the health centre. Other protesters painted banners 
and artwork, handed out Assembly leaflets at sites throughout the city, helped manage 
the two stages or performed music to entertain the protesters. 
I have already mentioned the important role of kaen nam in mobilising villagers to join 
the protest. As Pla suggests above, these village-level leaders also played important 
coordinating and communicative roles during the rally. As she explained to me: 
I join the kaen nam discussion meetings every morning and I also attend 
the negotiation meetings [ with the government]. We depend on those of 
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us with a little knowledge to be able to explain to the other villagers 
about the progress of our campaign ... We hold a meeting every day to 
discuss things together. At this stage we might discuss which groups are 
having problems, what sorts of problems, and discuss how we could 
assist them (Interview, Mae Pla, Bangkok, 28-1-1997). 
During the demonstration the pho khrua yai met at least once every day, in public spaces 
near the rally site, usually Wat Benjamabophit or the entrance to the Racecourse (see 
Chapter 7 for more details). They discussed the progress of negotiations and the morale 
and mood of the protesters, planned publicity stunts for the media and reviewed the 
organisation and welfare of the rally site. Pho khrua yai also acted on the negotiating 
team for their local community, preparing and presenting their community's grievance 
and petition in negotiation meetings with the government. 
Of course, different people displayed different degrees of commitment and participation 
in this range of roles and responsibilities. Some literally did nothing but attend the rally to 
make up the numbers and register their family's name on the rolls of petitioners. Others 
acted in multiple roles and responsibilities in the work of protest, particularly villagers 
who acted as kaen nam and pho khrua yai. Panya is one example. He was a veteran of 
several protest rallies, including the Mun River villagers' five month long rally at the dam 
site in 1994/95. He was the kaen nam for his village. He was also a delegate on the 
negotiating team for the Mun River villagers and was highly regarded for his abilities as a 
public speaker and spokesperson for the Mun River fishers. Panya was part of a team of 
six people who managed the stage in Village No. 2. Most days he took the stage to 
explain the progress of negotiations or announce activities planned for Assembly 
members. In this role he also screened prospective speakers, making sure that they would 
not say anything over the Public Address system that would damage the public image of 
the Assembly. On many evenings he entertained the crowd with mo lam folk songs that 
he had composed himself, one of which begins this study. Panya' s experience as a mo 
lam singer showed in his confidence and eloquence as a public speaker and performer. 
Indeed, in N ortheastem village culture, a high value is placed on being able to perform or 
speak charismatically (Lao: wao muan) in public. 
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Protest as Ritual and Spectacle: Protest Street Theatre 
Through the stage announcements and daily meetings the protesters continually talked to 
each other and re-invented discourses and rituals of community and solidarity. They also 
creatively invented and sought new actions and rituals of protest to attract media and 
public attention. Almost every day they organised and staged events for the benefit of the 
media and their own morale and solidarity. Although the Assembly strictly adhered to the 
ideology of nonviolent protest, several times during the rally they took direct action in a 
more provocative manner to try to pressure the government to respond more quickly to 
their petition. These more confrontational forms of protest were more risky, as they 
involved more direct antagonism and inconvenience of MPs and government officials and 
therefore risked intervention and suppression by the police force. 
For example, several times the protesters left the rally site and marched through the 
surrounding streets as a show of strength and to reassert their presence. On the morning 
of 20 February most of the protesters left the site and marched in a huge procession to 
the gates of the National Parliament building two streets away. A small group of police 
stood by just inside the locked gates. Parliament was sitting at the time, on the last day of 
the current session. Protesters congregated around a pickup truck with loudspeakers at 
the front gate, calling on the government to introduce and debate the Assembly's petition 
in parliament (Fieldnotes, 20-2-1997). 
In April after over two months and with rising frustration over the government inertia 
and failure to take tangible actions on the Assembly's petitions, protesters blockaded 
Government House for several hours in the afternoon after they discovered that their 
petition was not discussed in the Cabinet meeting that morning. They blocked all the 
main entrances and exits to the compound, demanding to meet the Prime Minister face to 
face before ending the blockade, and effectively kept the Prime Minister and several 
ministers trapped inside for several hours. They pelted Deputy Prime Minister Samak 
Sundaravej with plastic bottles and mango stones when he tried to leave. Eventually, the 
blockade ended when the Rector of Thammasat University was asked to negotiate on 
behalf of the government with the protesters (Bangkok Post, 9 April 1997:1, Nation , 9 
April 1997: 1). 
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Assembly protesters continually extended the ritual repertoire of protest and invented 
new activities. Recognising the need for newsworthy items for consumption by the media 
they enacted or adopted rituals almost every day for entertainment, symbolic protest and 
media spectacle. For example, to mark two months of rallying on the morning of 25 
March protesters roped off a boxing ring on the stage and performed a symbolic boxing 
match (see Photograph 13). Media reporters and photographers, alerted before hand, 
attended in force. In the final bout a skinny older man, representing the Assembly of the 
Poor, squared off against a fat opponent, representing Prime Minister Chavalit. The 
boxer playing Chavalit acted defensive and evasive, and of course was soundly defeated 
by the Assembly's representative (Fieldnotes 25-3-1997). Not only did the boxing create 
amusing entertainment for the protesters themselves, but also provided highly dramatic 
and colourful images that appeared on the front pages of most of the major newspapers 
the following day (see, for example Khaosot, 26 March 1997:1, Bangkok Post, 26 March 
1997: 1). 
Another example of symbolic drama which the Assembly performed to attract media 
attention was a ceremonial launching of a small raft into the Prem Prachakorn canal one 
month after the rally began. Villagers constructed the small raft from bamboo poles and 
plastic drums. At 2 pm they carried it at the head of a procession to the bank of the canal 
opposite Government House. The protesters carefully lowered the raft to the water and 
held it steady while a middle-aged man and woman boarded. Then they launched the raft 
away from the bank and into the middle of the canal. A declaration painted on the fabric 
roof of the raft made its dramatic and symbolic meaning clear: "If you are going to set us 
adrift and not address our problems, poor people in poverty ... we will leap into the water 
and drown if you don't address the problems of the poor." As the raft floated calmly in 
the middle of the canal, the man took hold of a rope noose suspended from a beam above 
him and pretended to hang himself (Fieldnotes 24-2-1997). The following day dramatic 
photographs of the hanging on the raft appeared in the daily newspapers (for example, 
Naewna, 26 February 1997, Bangkok Post, 25 February 1997:3 and Nation , 25 February 
1997:3). The couple, of course, represented the members of the Assembly, and the raft 
and their performance provided dramatic visual images symbolising the dire straits of the 
poor if ignored and set adrift by the government. 
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Nurturing our Image: Assembly of the Poor and the Media 
These sorts of strategies proved very successful in gaining media coverage on an almost 
daily basis in the newspapers and nightly television news bulletins. The media, of course, 
was a key mediator in the dispute, as the primary source of information and 
interpretations of the Assembly for the wider public. The Assembly's success in 
marshalling media support also stemmed from networks of journalist allies in media 
organisations and NGOs. NGO activists told me that they worked closely with several 
sympathetic media reporters, including newspaper journalists at Khrungthep thurakit 
(Bangkok Business), Daily News, Khaosot (Fresh news), the English language 
newspapers, Nation and Bangkok Post, and television journalists from the program "Face 
the Environment", on iTV. 
The newspaper Khaosot, for example, published a series of three long feature articles 
written by the Assembly's secretariat explaining in detail its membership, grievances, 
petition, policy platform and environmental ideology (1997b; Assembly of the Poor, 
1997m). During the protest three villagers were invited to compete on a TV quiz show 
and their winnings were donated to the Assembly (This was related to me later at a pho 
khrua yai meeting, Fieldnotes, 20-10-1997, Don Chai Village, Phrae). The popular daily 
newspaper Thairat reported on protest activities and the progress of negotiations on an 
almost daily basis for the duration of the rally, frequently on the front page. 
Praphat ( 1997b) found that the evening news on every TV channel regularly carried 
news bulletins about the Assembly during the protest. In addition, he reports that there 
were at least ten "specials" about specific aspects of the Assembly broadcast during that 
time, as well as current affairs panel shows featuring Assembly representatives, 
government representatives and academics. In his survey of the daily newspapers Praphat 
found extensive coverage of the rally, the points of the Assembly's petition and day to 
day progress of negotiations. He also reports that at least 128 feature articles, such as 
editorials and analysis, were published in addition to the daily news stories. He found 
that, over all, the press remained supportive and were very effective in disseminating 
information about the Assembly to a wider public. This aggravated some MPs. Early in 
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the rally the Interior Minister, Sanoh Thienthong, exclaimed, "Don't go and read the 
newspapers. Watch the television, because the newspapers' reporters all side with the 
mob (khao khang mop)" (Sayam Post 27 January 1997, quoted in Praphat, 1997b:33). 
Nevertheless, attacks were made in the media and often aimed at undermining the agency 
and legitimacy of the protesters. The Assembly was criticised for causing a disturbance 
and creating social conflict, accused of disrespecting the law and the principles of 
democracy, and of being a minority unwilling to sacrifice for the development of the 
nation as a whole (Praphat, 1997a:33). Interior Minister Sanoh accused the Assembly in 
the media of being a "paid mob" (mop rap Jang) (Thairat 27-1-1997: 1). The Daily News 
(29-1-1997: 1) accused Assembly leaders of taking 100 baht per person with the promise 
of freeing them from their agricultural debts. 6 Some commentators in the media claimed 
that there was a 'Third Hand" (meu thi sam) behind the scenes manipulating the rally. 
This accusation seemed to strike a chord in the public rumour mill and many "ordinary" 
people that I talked to in Bangkok and Khon Kaen (including taxi drivers, business 
people and university lecturers) suspected that the Assembly was a "paid mob" 
bankrolled by some influential group, such as opposition parties wanting to discredit the 
government. A more sophisticated version of this claimed that the agency behind the 
protest was actually the NGOs, which were financed and hence actually controlled by 
foreigners. For example, as mentioned earlier, the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister, 
Chingchai Mongkhontham, concluded an interview on a current affairs pro gram on 
Channel 9 one night by saying, "We know who the third hand behind the Assembly of the 
Poor protest is. It's the NGOs" (Fieldnotes, Khong Jiam, 15-2-1997). 
Even sympathetic journalists sometimes raised the issue, perhaps to give villagers a 
chance to refute it. On Friday afternoon after the first week of their protest, iTV sent a 
news crew to interview Assembly of the Poor representatives in the midst of the rally. 
The interview was broadcast nationally live on iTV at 2pm. One of the first questions 
asked by the reporter was whether the Assembly of the Poor had been paid to come to 
6 A moratorium on agricultural debts with the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives was 
not part of the Assembly's petition. This campaign was being pursued by the Assembly of Small-Scale 
Farmers of the Northeast at the time. 
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protest. Siang, one of six villager delegates, quickly rejected the idea: 
Siang: No-one was paid to come and protest. We all came because of our 
troubles and problems. Although the government makes prormses we 
have to keep struggling until they make tangible efforts. 
Reporter: I'd like to ask, do the NGOs, private organisations and 
students go and incite you to come by saying that if you don't come your 
problems will never be fixed? Do they or don't they? I ask sincerely. 
Siang: That's just not true at all. Myself, for example, I've been saving 
every baht every satang for a long time to have money to come to 
Bangkok. 
Reporter: Let's go to the dam problems ... (Fieldnotes, Bangkok, 31-1-
1997) 
A few minutes later the reporter asked another villager representing the Land and Forest 
Group if he knew the leaders (phu nam), referring to the twenty-three NGO advisers. He 
replied that because of their previous education and experience advisers such as Khun7 
Bamrung assist them with information and knowledge. 
Reporter: But where do they get the money from to do that? I'm 
suspicious of how they make their living. 
Villager: On this point I'm not suspicious, because they live with the 
villagers. We invite them ... I don't know of anything that they gain. We 
depend on them greatly ... (Fieldnotes, Bangkok, 31-1-1997) 
The reporter then turned to each of the six villagers' delegates to ask about the particular 
problems of their group. The group interview lasted for almost an hour. 
The Sanam Luang Rally: Demonstrating Strength and Support 
After the first month of the protest the Assembly saw little progress in its negotiations 
with the government. As I mentioned above, the Prime Minister established seven 
committees to consider and negotiate the details of the Assembly's petition, but these 
met infrequently and were very slow to reach conclusions. By 11 March, six weeks after 
the rally commenced, 29 grievances out of the total of 122 had reached a conclusion that 
had then been ratified by cabinet. The NGO activists and pho khrua yai became 
7 A title placed before the first name of men or women showing respect. 
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concerned that the protesters' morale was flagging and would not be able to sustain the 
demonstration. Bureaucratic red tape and government inertia might defeat their protest. 
Their answer was to try to mobilise the NGO sector to demonstrate middle class support 
for the Assembly, both as a way of putting more political pressure on the government to 
act and to revive the morale of the rank and file protesters. The result was a joint 
delegation and petition to Prime Minister Chavalit representing 182 NGOs from around 
the country and a mass rally at Sanam Luang in which the Assembly of the Poor was 
joined by representatives from its allies. 
Sawat, a senior NGO activist, described the lead-up to the Sanam Luang rally this way: 
At that time we looked at the situation. It looked hopeless (yae leoi). The 
government was giving us trouble. We could see that the villagers' 
enthusiasm would run out after a month and a half, so we considered 
what strategy to take. We needed the middle class to help us. We had 
been skilful at developing our organisational structure, management, and 
supporting the villagers' leaders - but we were about to lose! Therefore 
we realised that we had to draw in the middle class to help us. We 
realised that we'd forgotten alliance building! The advisers raised this 
with the assembly. So, after that we visited different universities and 
asked them to get · involved. I went to Chiang Mai. I went to talk with 
NGO workers, activist intellectuals. So after that we began contacting 
middle class NGOs, such as the Campaign for Popular Democracy, 
asking for help. And we staged the Sanam Luang rally to try to educate 
the middle class and give a show of support. And after that Chavalit 
agreed to talk with us! (Interview, Bangkok, 29-10-1997) 
The secretarial office of the Assembly began publicising the rally many days before hand, 
notifying the media, arranging the printing of publicity leaflets about the Assembly's 
grievances which invited the people of Bangkok to attend. The NGO activists used their 
contacts and the well-developed NGO network coordinated by NGO-CORD, the Thai 
Development Support Committee and the Thai Volunteer Service to rally organisations 
throughout the country to throw their weight behind the Assembly and petition the 
government. On 11 March delegates from human rights organisations and other NGOs 
met Prime Minister Chavalit to present a petition, undersigned by 182 organisations, 
calling on the government to respond more quickly and efficiently to the Assembly's 
petition (Assembly of the Poor media release 11-3-1997, Chakrit Ritmont1i, 1997b). By 
the day of the rally, Sunday 16 March, 206 organisations had signed their support 
(Fieldnotes, Bangkok, 16-3-1997). 
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Many protesters told me that they felt "very proud" of the public recognition and 
support. Throughout the rally protesters spoke of a renewed sense of enthusiasm 
(kamlang jai) and determination to endure until the government responded to all their 
petitions. Panya said to me, "It is an important point in the history of the Assembly when 
206 organisations have publicly supported us." 
On the day of the rally most of the organisations dispatched representatives to travel to 
Bangkok to join the rally and deliver donations of rice, food and supplies. For example, 
that evening I met up with a group of twelve delegates from the Nam Pong River 
Rehabilitation Project in Khon Kaen Province. Half of them were villagers and half NGO 
workers. They had all driven from Khon Kaen that day in a pickup truck which they 
shared with a load of rice and fresh vegetables to donate to the rally. After attending the 
rally at Sanam Luang for four hours they visited the protest site at Government House to 
deliver the donations and then returned to Khon Kaen. 
The march from Government House and rally at Sanam Luang were well-organised and 
enacted displays of protest street theatre that activists and villagers hoped would gain 
greater support and understanding from members of the Bangkok middle class. The 
villagers left the rally site and began assembling on Sri A yuthaya Road outside Wat 
Benjamabophit at 1 pm. It was a very hot, scorching day, and I heard Mali wan instructing 
the procession marshals, many of whom were student activists, to wait until after 2.30 in 
the hope that the heat would ease. As we waited the "music for life" protest anthem, 
Doen khabuan ("Protest march"), rang out over the assembled marchers (see the 
prologue to this chapter). It boomed out from a powerful PA system mounted on a truck 
which was to lead the procession. 
We marched along Sri Ayuthaya Road, down Ratchadamnoen Nok Road and along 
Ratchadamnoen Klang Road to Sanam Luang park (see Map 3, Photographs 9-12). The 
procession, an impressive show of strength in numbers, stretched for almost two 
kilometres. Leading it, three villagers carried photographs of the King (Photograph 9). 
Behind them walked bearers holding aloft bright yellow flags with the words Assembly 
of the Poor in both Thai and English. Some simple props made the procession colourful 
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and spectacular. Almost every person had been issued with a hand-held "Assembly of the 
Poor" flag in bright red, yellow or green; the procession looked like a field of waving 
colour. 
Behind the flag bearers, protesters carried a series of banners, paintings and models 
symbolically representing the destructive effects of development. For example, one 
painting depicted a double-headed monster with a huge, gaping mouth devouring the 
countryside, and a model of a dam feeding electric power to the city on one side, while 
behind the dam rising water drowned the rural countryside and its inhabitants (see 
Photograph 11). Another painting used concise and striking symbolism; it depicted a dam 
wall labelled "Irrigation Department" and "EGAT" opening up to reveal a sea of skulls 
behind it with blood trickling down from them. Villagers from a community in Khan 
Kaen Province (which has become famous for discoveries of petrified dinosaur bones) 
constructed a large wood and papier-mache dinosaur and carried it to the rally; on its 
side they painted the words "The Thai bureaucratic system". Protesters carried a series 
of banners declaring the different grievances of Assembly members. They donned 
costumes to dramatise their claims. At one point in the procession a group carried a 
banner declaring, "If you build this dam, then ... ". Dozens of women and men followed, 
dressed as prostitutes with bright make-up and adorned in colourful rags. Another 
banner followed, ''Or this ... '', leading a group of older women carrying begging bowls. 
The protesters marched into Sanam Luang and occupied an area in front of a huge stage 
that had been prepared for the event (see Photograph 12). A large and elaborate 
backdrop adorned the stage, depicting the Assembly of the Poor marching through the 
streets of Bangkok, parts of which were barricaded behind high walls and barbed wire, 
and carrying a banner declaring "Poor people join forces together" (ruam phalang khan 
Jon). A large contingent of police (about 300) had come in a fleet of buses and were 
stationed nearby under marquees where they remained, appearing mostly bored and 
disinterested for the whole evening. Assembly of the Poor representatives and newspaper 
reports estimated that 20,000 to 25,000 people attended the rally (see earlier footnote). 
The rally opened with a Buddhist prayer (victory blessing, suat chaya mongkhon) and 
ceremony by a monk. Assembly representatives presented robes and gifts to the monk 
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(that pha pa), who then blessed the stage with holy water (nam mon) and descended to 
walk among the crowd sprinkling the holy water over the heads of sitting protesters. 
The presentations and performances from the stage that evening addressed two 
audiences: Bangkok residents and representatives of allied organisations who had been 
invited to attend, but also the protesters themselves. The program consisted of a series of 
presentations and speeches by Assembly members and NGO activists, interspersed 
between musical and cultural performances by different groups in the Assembly. A young 
NGO activist and consultant to the Assembly acted as master of ceremonies. He began 
by addressing the middle-class residents of Bangkok: 
The Assembly of the Poor consists of one part of the population who are 
suffering from serious problems. We came here because others have 
infringed our civil rights, especially government officials. Our problems 
also stem from the unmanageable and inefficient government bureaucratic 
system. We have come to protest peacefully and nonviolently. We 
request the understanding and support of the urban middle class 
(Fieldnotes, Bangkok, 16-3-1997). 
The speakers introduced the different groups who are represented in the Assembly and 
explained how the protest rally was organised. They read out lists of people who had 
made donations and announced the total amount. Representatives from other 
organisations, such as the Student Federation of Thailand, NGO-CORD and a labour 
union leader, made speeches offering support and encouragement to the Assembly. 
Between these announcements and speeches, a number of groups performed. Several 
professional bands, such as Paradorn, Khitanchalee and Sek Saksit, performed protest 
"music for life". Groups from within the Assembly performed their own traditional 
music, including Karen and other hill tribe groups, Southern Thais and Isan performers. 
Isan women performed a traditional dance. The rally closed at midnight with a song of 
respect to the King. Many protesters had already left by then, exhausted, and made their 
own way back to their encampment outside Government House. Those who stayed to 
the end quickly dispersed and walked back in dribs and drabs. 
At one level the performance of music and dance provided fun and entertainment for the 
evening. But at another level the cultural performances by groups within the Assembly 
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demonstrated the persistence of their local cultures and identities despite the effects and 
depredations of "development" - persistence as resistance. This impressive display of 
cultural resources that the Assembly of the Poor was able to deploy during the protest 
was another way of asserting the voice and agency of the "poor." 
The Assembly of the Poor appealed to and expressed the national identity and ideology 
of Nation, Religion and Kmg in its campaign and during this high-profile march and rally. 
This representation of Thai identity and nationalism has long been a prop of elites in 
power. But most of the rural villagers identify with Buddhism and the monarchy, which 
they see as powerful and inclusive reference points which unite all Thais. Thus, rituals 
marking respect to the Kmg and Buddhist merit-making ceremonies are as much a way 
of constructing and maintaining unity and solidarity within the Assembly, as they are 
deployed to signify shared identity with other sections of Thai society and assert their 
rights as citizens. In other words, the Assembly of the Poor uses the nationalist ideology 
of Nation, Religion, Kmg to seek the moral support and sympathy of the middle classes 
and reject the ideology of difference and otherness that is attached to protesting peasants 
and urban poor. 
Speaking the Language of Power: Negotiation Meetings8 
The petition by allied organisations and Sanam Luang rally did seem to mark a turning 
point in the Assembly's negotiations with the government. The committees met more 
frequently and allocated longer periods of time for discussion. The committee established 
to consider the petitions on dams finally began hearing the Mun River villagers' petition 
two days after the rally on Tuesday 18 March. It convened for two hours that day and 
then for another two hours a week later on Tuesday 25 March. In an effort to speed up 
negotiations the committee chair scheduled two more days later in the same week for 
meetings. Assembly representatives interpreted this a desire on the part of the 
government to move fairly quickly towards an agreement on compensation, but the 
process ended up taking much longer and by the middle of April were bogged down 
once agam. 
8 I have borrowed this phrase from Fetterman (1993). 
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In order to explore and illustrate the negotiation process I will describe in some detail the 
meeting on Thursday 27 March (drawing on Fieldnotes, Bangkok, 26 & 27-3-1997). 
This meeting, like all of the others that I observed, became a struggle over agency and 
knowledge; in other words who had the legitimate right to act and even to speak, and the 
forms of knowledge that would be accepted as legitimate and having authority in the 
debate. Having won the right to negotiate through their demonstration, villagers still 
found their right to petition attacked or undermined by state bureaucrats. Closely related 
to this struggle was a conflict over what constituted "expert knowledge" and valid "data" 
on the affects of the dam on Mun River fisheries. 
Before each negotiation meeting with the government, Assembly delegates held their 
own meetings to review their arguments and practice negotiation skills. On Wednesday 
26 March the Mun River villagers delegates and their NGO advisers met twice, once in 
the morning in a shady area of Dusit Zoo, and again in the evening in the grounds of Wat 
Benjamabophit. The villagers were hopeful that the negotiations would reach a 
conclusion soon. Several times during these meetings they role-played dress rehearsals 
for the upcoming negotiations in which one of the activists would adopt the role of chair 
and address the villagers to force them to express and clarify their arguments. They also 
discussed whether to use Thai or their own local language, Lao, in the negotiations. They 
settled on Lao as none felt skilful enough in Thai. "Besides," they commented to me, 
"the chair and most of the officials are from Isan and so understand perfectly well. " 
When I arrived the next morning (27 March) I found that no one had slept during the 
night as heavy rain fell for several hours. The whole protest site was damp and 
everything was covered with clothes and fabric spread out to dry. Around 1 pm two city 
council buses picked up the negotiating team, several NGO activists and dozens of 
Assembly members going to observe the negotiations. The buses took us to the Ministry 
of Science, Technology and the Environment building a few kilometres away on Yothi 
Road. 
We climbed the stairs to the meeting room on level 4. The room had tables arranged in a 
large U shape. The government representatives and bureaucrats all sat together on the 
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chair person's right hand side, while the Assembly of the Poor representatives all sat on 
the left. Rows of chairs against the two sides of the room accommodated observers. By 
2.10 about 15 government officials, many in uniform, had arrived. They included officials 
from the Department of Fisheries, EGAT, the Government Prosecutor's Department 
(ayakan) and Ubon Provincial officials. On the Assembly side there were about 12 
people, including seven villagers' delegates, Mali wan and other NGO advisers. I 
estimated that there are about 80 people observing, mostly villagers from the protest, but 
I also recognised some journalists, NGO and student activists among them. 
Adisom Plianket arrived forty minutes late to chair the meeting. Adisom was the New 
Aspiration Party MP from Khan Kaen, and Deputy Minister for Science. Adisom was a 
charming and witty speaker, often cracking jokes. He was also a native of Khan Kaen 
and sometimes broke into Lao. Adisom of course controlled and dominated the 
proceedings, sitting at the head of the room with his secretary. He expressed sympathy 
for the plight and hardship of his "brothers and sisters, the people" camped out in the 
heat at Government House. 
Adisom began by emphasising that there was one key issue, "what have been the effects 
of construction of the Pak Mun Dam on the fishing livelihoods of our brothers and 
sisters, the people?". He instructed the two sides of the room not to regard each other as 
enemies. He then asked if the Director of the Fisheries Department had attended as 
requested. The Director had chaired earlier negotiations over compensation for the three 
year dam construction period and Adisom regarded him as a crucial participant in these 
negotiations. Once again he was absent and had delegated a lower official. 
Officials from EGAT and the Fisheries Department made the first submissions to the 
meeting, and while they contradicted each other they also both rejected the basis of the 
villagers' petition. Indeed, it was 15 minutes before any villagers' delegate got a chance 
to speak and by then they were already on the defensive. The EGAT official began by 
rephrasing the issue. "Have fish resources in the river declined or not? If there has been a 
decline, is the dam the direct cause? But, we can't really answer these questions." He 
argued that population growth and increased exploitation of fish also contributed to 
declining numbers of fish in the river, and therefore there were many causes. Finally, he 
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called for a committee of technical experts (nak-wichakan) to be established to find 
"correct information". The Fisheries Department delegate then spoke up and claimed 
that, according to their own expert who oversees the fish ladder and fisheries 
development in the dam, there were now three times the quantity of fish in the river than 
before the dam was built! 
The first Assembly representative to speak was Pen, an activist from the Project for 
Ecological Recovery who has worked with the Mun River villagers for several years. 
Villagers and activists argue strongly that villagers must "speak for themselves" in public 
forums and negotiations, as no one else really has legitimacy to do so. On several 
occasions after some of the early rounds of negotiation meetings during the protest I 
heard villagers complaining that their own delegates said too little and left the NGO 
advisers to speak for them. During the Pak Mun Dam negotiations these issues and 
tensions surrounding who should speak for local people were also played out, both inside 
and outside the official meeting rooms. The education and work experience of NGO 
activists such as Pen and Maliwan gave them language skills and a grasp of technical 
language and argument that most of the villagers had not had a chance to acquire. But at 
an even more basic level, the activists spoke polite Thai fluently, whereas this was a 
second language for the villagers from the Northeast, who chose to speak Lao. 
What emerged during this round of negotiations was a fuzzy division of labour between 
activists and villagers. Villagers' delegates largely spoke in terms of their personal 
experience and gave accounts of the dam's effects on their lives and livelihoods. They 
asserted they knew from first hand experience, as well as anyone, the effects of the dam 
on the river. Activists, on the other hand, tried to present arguments to 'frame ' the 
villagers' testimony and support its legitimacy and validity. 
This can be seen clearly in the way Pen entered the debate that day. First, she called on 
EGAT to table its earlier report about the period of dam construction. She reminded 
them that this report was approved by EGAT and showed clearly that the three year 
construction period had a direct effect on fishing and local fishers' livelihoods. "Surely 
we can relate these findings to the present problems." She then moved to introduce the 
villagers' delegates and their own first hand evidence. "Now, people who are fishers have 
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come to present data (Kho mun) that they have gathered themselves about what has 
happened. About how their own incomes from the river have declined. So they seek 
compensation. I think that we should give this data appropriate importance also ." 
At this, Siang introduced himself and asserted that the "local owners of the river" have 
their own committee to find solutions to the problem and the government should accept 
their information and evidence. He invoked Thailand's international image, a common 
theme in the media, claiming that, "If the government does not accept our petition it will 
damage the image (sia phap-phot) of the government and the nation." Finally, he asked 
what will happen to the people rallying at Government House if they have to wait for a 
committee of experts to present their findings. 
The other villagers' delegates presented their cases as the opportunity arose during the 
following couple of hours. They rejected the government's move to constitute yet 
another committee of experts, which would effectively exclude them from the process 
and delay any compensation agreement. Wari, a young man, stood and addressed the 
meeting about fishing livelihoods before the dam. "I am one person who has suffered the 
effects of the Pak Mun Dam," he began in Thai, but then switched to Lao with Thai 
politeness markers (khrap). "We maintain that there are no fish. We have already proved 
it, Mr Chair. You don't have to take experts there to prove it. We have proved that with 
the dam we are not able to use our fishing equipment. For example, using the thum (net) 
in various places we used to be able to catch enough fish to sell for four to five thousand 
baht." 
Adisom interrupted him, asking "What month was that?" 
"May," Wari replied. "But after the dam fishers are not able to catch large valuable fish 
like they used to." 
Jun, an elder villager, supported his testimony. "Before the dam I could fish the rapids 
and catch five or six kilograms of fish a day, which sold for 120 baht per kilogram. Now, 
when we go fishing, we can't even get one kilogram of small fish." Then an older 
woman, who had been sitting on the floor at the back of the room among the group of 
spectators, stood resolutely and called out a challenge to Adisom. "Why set up a 
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committee of experts?" she declared, "Why don't we go together and see what fish you 
can catch now?" 
In the midst of the negotiations another government member of parliament dropped in 
and proposed a solution that surprised even the government technocrats. Mana 
Khusakul, a New Aspiration Party MP from the Northeast, introduced himself as an 
"ordinary person from the countryside" and spoke about his younger days in his home 
village fishing. He proposed that EGAT study the possibility of shutting down electricity 
production and opening the dam during the season when fish migrate up the river from 
the Mekong to lay their eggs, and only closing the floodgates and generating power for 
the rest of the year. 
EGAT and Fisheries officials continued to reject, or simply ignore, the villagers' claims. 
EGAT showed a promotional video about their fish breeding program and the fish ladder 
that was added to the dam in 1995. The Fisheries Department official reported that , "We 
have data that in 1991 the total fishing income of the population for the three districts of 
Khong Jiam, Phibun and Sirinthom was about 3 million baht in value. At the present 
time, during the period from May 1995 to May 1996 we calculate that the value of fish 
caught was about 5 million baht." 
Then, an Irrigation Department official complained that "every time the state builds 
something people always complain to the government, or EGAT, or us ." He declared, 
"First, we should consider whether this group of people have a right to petition or not. If 
you accept that they do, then second, is their petition plausible?" 
Adisom was not impressed. "Here in Thailand everyone has the right to petition" he 
replied. "It's part of our democratic system. You probably shouldn' t ask such questions. 
People have a right to petition directly to the government, because I'm well aware that 
district officials cover things up, or even EGAT covers things up. " 
Maliwan tried to tum the discussion back to the issue of expert knowledge and gave a 
sophisticated and succinct summary of the NGO ' s perspective. "Large fish provided the 
livelihood for local villagers before dam construction. You have spoken about experts 
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and data. We have expertise and data here. This is research," she said, holding up a slim 
report prepared by the activists and Mun River fishers. "Interviews with villagers about 
their incomes, livelihood and amounts of fish caught in 1995 and 1996 compared with 
before dam construction. Here we have data. But whose information should we believe? 
Before dam construction Thailand never saw the gathering of data or research on the 
amount of livelihoods, catches or incomes of local people who made their livelihood in 
the area from fishing. We must accept this point. The fish ladder has just been built after 
the dam was already constructed. There should be information about what the fisheries 
were like before the dam so we can make comparisons and assess who is right and 
wrong. The people who know well, those who remember, should be the experts. I know 
it's not the technical experts for certain, because they didn't go there then. But the local 
fishers there caught and ate the fish continuously. So who will you believe, the experts 
from which side?" 
Siang followed Maliwan with an passionate appeal. "EGAT must compensate for what 
has been lost and destroyed by the dam. Just as EGAT must compensate for land 
flooded, so it must compensate for the fisheries destroyed!" 
By now it was almost six o'clock. Adisorn wanted to bring the meeting to a close. There 
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had been no progress as the officials had not accepted the villagers ' evidence that the 
dam had destroyed the river's fisheries. The villagers could not move negotiations on to 
bargaining over appropriate compensation before this basic claim was agreed upon. 
Adisom began to sum up: "Personally I think that the dam has certainly had an effect. 
But in terms of what percentage has been caused by the dam, we have to rely on Fishery 
Department experts. You might believe them, you might not believe them. We should get 
the two sides together again." Adisorn proposed, therefore, to establish a committee of 
experts to investigate scientifically the effect of the dam on the fish. He postponed the 
next meeting and insisted that the Fisheries Director must attend the negotiations or give 
a written response to Adisom's questions. 
The villagers and I walked back to the protest site through streets awash with six inches 
of water. It had been raining for several hours. At the rally site protesters had piled up 
their belongings to keep them dry. Many stood as there was nowhere dry to sit or lie. On 
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stage a young man sang "music for life" songs to try to cheer everyone up. 
School of Politics: Transforming Political Consciousness 
The activists who work with the Assembly of the Poor believe that the consciousness of 
villagers who join in collective action and protest is transformed in the very process of 
struggle. In the Mun River Declaration Assembly advisers write about the 
"Consciousness of the Poor" (samneuk khan Jon) in this way: 
Poor people, no matter where they live, tend to be poor because they're 
oppressed and exploited, whether in terms of political economy, society, 
or culture, and this is a truth which may not be denied. For this reason, 
the way out for the poor is to throw off and escape from that oppression 
and exploitation. Therefore it is necessary to depend on their own 
strength to change, and to come together to stand shoulder to shoulder 
all together. To create a situation like this poor people must struggle with 
themselves to win out over their own fear, build confidence and 
determination in themselves. They must bring their strength together 
tightly to build their bargaining power to have their just share of 
resources (Assembly of the Poor, 1995). 
Similarly, a recent book by academics and NGO activists in the Northeast argues that 
protest action "makes villagers' leaders bold and outspoken, and gives them courage to 
negotiate and bargain with officials right up to the level of cabinet ministers and the 
prime minister. It makes its members learn and understand the culture of thought and 
action of people in authority" (Somphan Techa-athik et al. , 1997:77). 
Samran, an NGO activist who works most closely with the Northeast Farmers Assembly 
for Protection of Land Rights explained it to me in terms of his own personal experience. 
In understanding collective protest, he argued, "You have to look at past situations. You 
have to look at the historical background of the villagers. What have Isan villagers been 
like? Very passive." Samran referred to the mass protest by Isan villagers against the Kho 
Jo Ko forest resettlement scheme in 1992 (see Chapter 2). Over 10,000 protesters 
gathered next to the main highway from the Northeast to Bangkok. 
That first day the villagers decided that they wanted to close the road, but 
at first they didn't dare. They said that we should exert pressure first , 
negotiate first. We [NGO advisers] said we must take some action. But 
they didn't dare go out on the road, they were slow to act. We had them 
distribute information (pamphlets) to buses, and go onto the road in dribs 
and drabs. The vehicles had to slow down. Then their leaders called upon 
everyone to sit down and that did it. The second day, everything 
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happened. When they said close the road, they did ... And after that many 
NGO workers believed that this way made the villagers 'smart', made 
them feel confident, capable and determined. They see their own 
'potential.' They feel they are equal to the governor, equal to cabinet 
ministers, because this power of collective protest is very clear ... If you 
give training, some sort of education, I don't know if you will get the 
same results. Maybe you would. But I think, up to now, this method of 
protest has been the best, it's useful. Pho [Siang] can talk with cabinet 
ministers, it's become ordinary (Interview, Samran, Khon Kaen, 21-8-
97). 
Processes of developing or transforming political consciousness are complex and difficult 
to study. Nevertheless, I think that the concept of political consciousness is very useful in 
addressing some of the social processes of the protest rally and the way participants 
changed as a result. Several protesters explained to me that the rally was a learning 
experience for them; they were "learning about politics!". For example, two days before 
the Sanam Luang rally I sat chatting with Kan at his makeshift coffee stall when a young 
man joined us. Thong, in his mid-twenties, came from Sakaew Province in eastern 
Thailand. His wife had remained at their home with their two young children. After I had 
introduced myself and explained that I was a postgraduate student, he said he was also a 
student, "a student of politics!". With an ironic smile he told me he was studying politics 
right here in the rally. His own group had joined the protest to petition for land rights 
documents as they faced eviction from their homes and farms. He told me that each day 
he circulated throughout the rally site talking to different groups of villagers about their 
grievances. He felt that the different problems of each group were very similar, and arose 
because bureaucrats deceive and overpower (khrop ngum) the villagers . Thong spoke of 
government officials and local influential people (jao-pho, suggesting involvement in 
criminal activities) blocking people from petitioning for justice or participating in 
protests. 
A week after the rally began, Assembly advisers announced that they were about to open 
a "School of Politics" (romg-rian kan-muang) and invited all interested members to 
attend. Khun Wiset, from the NGO Friends of the People, managed the schools ' 
curriculum and activities. About 220 protesters attended, meeting several afternoons a 
week in the grounds of Benjamabophit Temple. Wiset and other Assembly advisers 
taught the classes, but at their invitation many university lecturers and prominent activists 
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made contributions and gave guest lectures. These included academics from 
Chulalongkorn and Thammasat universities, labour union leaders and democracy 
activists, and well-known social critic Sulak Srivarak. "Students" of the school also went 
on several "field trips" to participate in seminars at universities and institutes around 
Bangkok. For example, they were invited to participate in a seminar on "The Direction 
of the New Constitution" organised by the Constitution Drafting Committee at 
Thammasat University (Mongkol, 1997). They visited and presented submissions to the 
United Nations at their Bangkok headquarters. 
Phet, a pho khrua yai from the Dong Lan forest community in Khon Kaen province, 
became a student in the school: 
Anyone who wanted could join the political school, as we wanted to have 
our brothers and sisters gain a greater understanding of politics, as we 
had already experienced lessons from politics, and suffered ill effects 
from politics. So we wanted to learn more about politics in order to be a 
basis in addressing our problems, and protection for ourselves. At first 
we used Wat Benjamabophit temple grounds for our lessons and studies 
in the evenings. Often we were invited to join meetings in other places, 
such as Ban Manangkhasila or the Pridi Institute. We studied with 
lawyers. University lecturers would take turns teaching, but mainly we 
studied the basis of politics, learned about the structure of the Thai 
political system. We studied the evolution and rise and fall of Thai 
democracy (Interview, Phet, 8-9-1997, Tambon Dong Lan). 
A central aspect of the political school's activities was the preparation of the Assembly' s 
submission to the national Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA), which was then in the 
process of preparing a new national constitution. As Phet explained, this lead them to 
focus on applied know ledge. 
We studied to develop ideas and know ledge to use in drafting the 
Constitution of the Poor. We went and got information from outside, but 
also from among ourselves, the villagers. Each villager drew on the 
problems of their particular group and assessed this in order to draft laws 
and principles for the constitution that could protect against such 
problems arising again. [In general] we wanted them [CDA] to 
acknowledge poor people (yorm-rap khan Jon). Those words 
'acknowledge poor people ' mean ensure constitutional rights equal with 
every level of society (Interview, Phet, 8-9-1997, Tambon Dong Lan). 
On 26 March the Assembly officially released their constitutional submission which had 
been written by the School of Politics students with the help of activists and academics 
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(Assembly of the Poor, 1997c). In a media relations coup the CDA President, Uthai 
Pimchaichon, and former prime minister and Charter Writing Committee Chair, Anand 
Panyarachun, visited the rally to officially accept their submission on behalf of the CDA 
(Fieldnotes, Bangkok, 26-3-1997).9 The Assembly's submission included proposals for 
the decentralisation of administrative power and the rights of communities to manage 
local resources, legal guarantees of compensation for land and resources destroyed by 
state development projects, freedom of information from state bureaucracies, and the 
establishment of an independent constitutional court. 
Conclusion 
When the marathon rally in the heat and dust of Bangkok concluded, it seemed that the 
Assembly had achieved a great deal for its members. Chavalit's government pledged in 
the strongest terms to consider and address all of the grievances on which the Assembly 
petitioned, some state projects were cancelled, compensation for local people adversely 
affected by big dams and big development projects was guaranteed. Committees with 
government, bureaucratic and Assembly representatives were established to follow up on 
agreements reached during the protest. But when the Chavalit coalition fell apart in 
November 1997 all of these committees dissolved also and the process ground to a halt 
once agam. 
Nevertheless, the protest was an extraordinary event in the history of collective political 
action by rural and urban poor in Thailand. As I examine throughout this thesis, the 
Assembly employs a wide range of strategies and tactics in making its claims against the 
government and particular state actors, but while protest should be seen in the context of 
this broad repertoire of action it remains the fundamental method of conferring power to 
those claims. The demonstration represented one of the most sustained and well-
organised mass protests ever mounted in Bangkok. It won considerable coverage and 
support in the mass media, which was clearly a crucial mediator in the conflict, generally 
9 Anand, in a speech from the stage, said that as a former prime minister he was partly responsible for 
the problems which had brough the protesters to Bangkok. He said that the new consitution would not 
get rid of poverty, but would create better conditions for addressing poverty and problems caused by 
development (Fieldnotes, Bangkok, 26-3-1997). 
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according legitimacy to the Assembly as a political actor and widely disseminating its 
petition in the public sphere. The government and high ranking public officials were 
forced to acknowledge the Assembly's claims and negotiate with some of the poorest 
and most marginalised people in Thai society (see Photograph 14). 
In this chapter I have presented a detailed ethnographic account of the protest grounded 
in first-hand participant observation and the words, actions and experiences of Assembly 
members. This ethnographic approach has lead to a view of protest that differs from the 
more usual studies in the social movements literature that rely heavily on historical 
documentation or media reports. It has opened up new ways of studying the meanings 
and social processes through which protest is constructed. In this concluding section I 
will reiterate three main arguments that have informed my analysis of protest and that 
relate to my overall question about power and social change. 
First, although I have dealt with the 1997 protest rally as a distinct 'event ' in the history 
of the Assembly of the Poor, the protest actually stems from the whole range of social 
and cultural processes explored in earlier chapters of this thesis. It needs to be 
understood in terms of all of the complex problems of organising at the local level, social 
networking and alliance building, identity formation and representation, and mobilisation 
of resources, including cultural resources and information. Thus, early in this account I 
emphasised the links between local communities and the rally at the central, national 
level. The grounding in local grievances motivated individuals to participate, while the 
flow of people and resources between the local and the centre proved crucial in 
sustaining such a long protest. But at the same time, as I discuss in Chapter 2, the 
Assembly had to find ways to unite the diverse local groups and express concrete, 
locally-grounded grievances in terms of a unifying, cohesive identity asserting the 
interests of the 'poor' against national development policy. 
Second, the ethnographic approach underscores a view of protest in broader terms than 
simply its instrumental political goals of influencing government decision-making. The 
Assembly's rally created a new site - a new social context - for the articulation and 
negotiation of the meanings of grievances, as well as the meanings and legitimacy of the 
Assembly's agency and political identity. One dimension of this was the highly 
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expressive and theatrical character of the protest. Assembly members drew on their 
collective cultural resources to continually enact dramatic or spectacular performances 
not only to attract media attention but also to express the Assembly's grievances and 
ideological critiques in the public sphere. These performances and discourses generated 
within the rally represented a powerful critique of contemporary social inequality in Thai 
society and the impacts of "development" on the poor. The representation of the rally 
site as the "Village of the Poor" symbolically brought the rural village into the heart of 
the city and symbolised a community in crisis, the "victims of development". A second 
dimension of the discursive conflict was the struggle to give meaning to their own 
agency that would carry legitimacy in the public sphere. A prime example is the 
Assembly's struggle to counter the representation as a "mob". In describing the 
Assembly as a "mob" whose members were paid by some wealthy and powerful "third 
hand", or manipulated by foreign-funded NGOs, opponents effectively denied the agency 
of the movement and attacked its legitimacy as a political actor with a right to petition 
the state. This was one reason why NGO activists and Assembly leaders emphasised and 
made such a virtue of the highly ordered and non-violent nature of the rally as a 
organised community illustrating the collective agency of the poor. 
Third, in focussing on the meanings that Assembly members ascribe to their own actions 
and experiences within the protest, I have tried to show how it provided a crucial 
experience in developing and transforming their political consciousness. As I wrote in the 
Introduction, political consciousness here refers to William's (1977) concept of practical 
consciousness, to the subjective experience and know ledge of actors, the meanings they 
give to their social position, and the ways in which they undertand their political interests 
and the purposes of collective action. Political consciousness, in this view, is shaped by 
hegemony and determines how people see themselves as political subjects, that is, 
whether they identify themselves with a collective agency. In this regard I have discussed 
the great amount of work that Assembly members actually put into addressing each 
other, engendering a culture of solidarity and community, asserting the agency and 
power of the poor as a collective force, and constructing and negotiating their sense of 
collective identity. While many, if not most, individuals may have been principally 
motivated by the prospect of personal material benefits (financial compensation, 
protecting a home or livelihood) their participation exposed them to these discourses , 
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brought direct experience of the power of collective action and an identification with a 
collective agency with a project for social change. Furthermore, their political identity 
and agency was acknowledged and given legitimacy by sections of the media, sections of 
the state (including the BMA), representative institutions close to the state such as the 
CDA, as well as a number civil organisations. Participants learned through experience 
that "Solidarity is strength" and saw their own political agency in action. If the 
experience expanded the protesters' horizons of struggle and engendered a growing 
confidence in their collective ability to make their own history, this was a step towards 
social change. 
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Photograph 7. The entrance to "Village of the Poor No. 2". Protesters made 
caricature dummies mocking Prime Minister Chavalit Y ongchaiyudh for his 
failure to respond to their demands. 
Photograph 8. Inside the "Village of the Poor" protest site. 
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Photographs 9 & 10. 16 March 1997. The Assembly marches to a rally at Sanam 
Luang park in a display of strength and a demonstration of support from allied 
organisations. At the head of the procession protesters carry Thai national flags 
and pictures of the King. 
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Photograph 11. Preparing for the march outside Benjamabophit Temple. 
Protesters carried flags, banners and models. The banner in the foreground 
depicts dams as monsters devouring the countryside. Behind it is a model of a 
cityscape being sustained by a dam wall - but behind the dam wall a flood drowns 
rural villages. 
Photograph 12. The crowd and stage at the Sanam Luang rally. 
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Photograph 13. The symbolic boxing match between the Assembly and Prime 
Minister Chavalit to mark two months of protest. 25 March 1997. 
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Photograph 14. Outcomes. Assembly delegates meet with Prime Minister Chavalit 
and government representatives in October 1997 to follow up promises made 
during the protest (from Bangkok Post, 3 October 1997). 
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7 Deinocratising Civil Society? 
Grassroots Deinocracy and Power 
within The Asseinbly 
Don Chai Village clings to a hillside overlooking the Y om River valley in the northern 
province of Phrae. Near the village lies a patchwork of young tamarind orchards, and 
beyond those, re-growth teak forests stretch up to the ridges. Below, the Yorn River, 
still just a shallow stream, flows through a narrow flood plain with little room for rice 
fields. I arrived in Ban Don Chai at dusk on a Friday evening in October 1997 after 
travelling all day from Khon Kaen. I had come for the regular meeting of the pho khrua 
yai - the collective leadership of the Assembly of the Poor - which gathered together 
every three months after the Assembly concluded their extended protest in Bangkok. 
This time they were meeting here in Ban Don Chai, the centre of local villagers' 
opposition to the Kaeng Seua Ten Dam. I walked through the village to the temple 
grounds where the meeting would be held over the following two days. In the 'main 
street' villagers houses and shop fronts were adorned with hand-painted signs and 
banners declaring their opposition to the dam. "The forest gives life. Stop and think. 
Stop the destruction." A bright red banner on the house of the kamnan proclaimed, 
"Preserve the golden teak forest. Cancel Kaeng Seua Ten Dam". 
For over two hundred years successive generations of Don Chai villagers have made 
their living from the local teak forests. They worked for the concession companies 
cutting and hauling timber, often illegally and outside of concession areas. Those who 
owned elephants could make a lot of money. In 1981 the national government 
announced its intention to build a large dam on the Kaeng Seua Ten rapids of the Y om 
River downstream from Don Chai. After that logging intensified as companies took out 
timber concessions in the catchment of the proposed dam. By the late 1980s, after 
watching the forests being plundered by outsiders, Don Chai villagers began cutting 
golden teak to use in their own community, "because if we didn't take the timber, others 
would take it all!". They built a large, impressive monks' residence in the temple 
grounds. Most of the village's four hundred families built themselves a new house, hewn 
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out of golden teak from the nearby forests. This meant more than just an investment in a 
new house for each family; the valuable teak could be sold in the future for considerable 
profit. 
Organised, local opposition to the Kaeng Seua Ten Dam began in 1989 when the 
Chatichai government approved the project and Don Chai villagers first learned that their 
homes would be flooded. As they began to understand the connections between the dam 
proposal and the accelerated logging and destruction of their local forests, they realised 
that their best strategy was conservation, not collaboration in the logging. The 
government had declared most of the area a national park in 1986. The villagers have no 
land title documents to use as a basis for opposition or claims for compensation. So, the 
whole village turned to growing sweet tamarind and a range of cash crops such as corn 
and beans, and became advocates for conservation of the remaining stands of teak and 
sustainable "community forestry". In this way the villagers repositioned themselves as 
environmentalists in the struggle to retain their land. Although the villagers have turned 
towards conservation, illegal logging continued, with, according to local people, the 
complicity of local police. 10 
The temple grounds commanded the highest point in the village. Volunteer guards from 
the village hung around the entrance to the fenced compound but said nothing as I 
entered. Just inside to the left stood the temple hall (sala wat). To the right was the large 
monks' residence, which also housed a large kitchen. Women bustled in and out of the 
kitchen, preparing and serving the evening meal on tables set up for the purpose. About a 
hundred or more participants had already arrived. They continued arriving in small 
groups through the whole night, having travelled in NGO vehicles, rented pickups or on 
public transport from all comers of Thailand. Ban Don Chai accommodated them in the 
temple hall and in the classrooms of the village primary school next door. Many of the 
NGO activists, and myself, stayed with families throughout the village. The Mun River 
Villagers' Centre pickup arrived early in the morning before dawn, having driven all 
10 This brief history of Ban Don Chai is based on interviews and discussions with Prasit, a leader of the 
local villagers' organisation opposing the dam, Susithorn, in whose house I stayed, Prakop, a member of 
the local Tambon council, and several other residents of Don Chai who came to observe the Assembly's 
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night from Khong Jiam. It came loaded with villagers' representatives from the different 
villagers' organisations in Ubon and two NGO activists from the Centre. Daeng and 
another woman, Yim, came to represent the Mun River Villagers' Organisation. 
By early Saturday morning about 240 community representatives had arrived to attend 
the pho khrua yai meeting. About eighteen NGO activists attended, assisted by a similar 
number of student activists. Don Chai village women served breakfast: big steaming pots 
of rice, curry and vegetables laid out on tables next to the temple kitchen. Our hosts had 
erected several tarpaulins near the temple hall and arranged extra tables and dozens of 
folding chairs under these. A PA system with two stacks of speakers stood at one end of 
the temple hall. A large contingent of Don Chai villagers (some 60 to 70 people) came to 
listen and observe. The handful of monks then in residence kept to the background, but 
often observed the proceedings quietly from the steps of their quarters. 
While we finished our breakfast downstairs, the NGO advisors met by themselves 
upstairs on the balcony of the monks' quarters. I chatted with a young reporter for the 
television program "Face the Environment" on iTV (Channel 5), who had come to 
prepare a special program on the Assembly of the Poor. While we talked another TV 
crew interviewed Maliwan in the temple hall. 
The meeting got off to a late start as we waited for the arrival of the District Officer, 
whom the host villagers had invited to officially open the proceedings. When he finally 
arrived, forty minutes late, the formalities began with a prayer and offering to the 
Buddha image at the head of the hall. Sawang, an NGO activist, welcomed the District 
Officer and invited him to open the meeting. The District Officer proclaimed that when 
the Assembly of the Poor notified him of their planned meeting here in Don Chai Village 
he was surprised and did not understand why they would choose this location. The 
proposed Kaeng Seua Ten dam was a matter for the government and the people of this 
province. He seemed reluctant to be there at all, but remained polite and performed the 
brief formalities that had been requested. 
meeting, during a four day visit to the village from 17 to 20-10-1997. 
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This was a long way from the excitement and direct action of the mass protest in 
Bangkok, but as I demonstrate here, the collective actions and struggles for social 
change by the Assembly of the Poor must be seen as much broader and more complex 
than just mobilising large numbers of people for high-profile public demonstrations. As 
part of its struggles for participation and democratic reform the Assembly has sought to 
enact new forms of democratic organisation and collective decision-making within the 
movement. These processes of grassroots democracy are seen as part of a broader 
project of democratising and 'strengthening civil society'. 
In this chapter I describe and analyse some of the social spaces and social networks 
through which the Assembly of the Poor is constructing and democratising a grassroots 
"civil society." I focus on the forms and processes of association, organisation and 
"grassroots democracy" which have emerged in the Assembly. The movement has sought 
new ways of building cooperative and collective action. Power and decision-making are 
negotiated and distributed through decentralised networks. But within these complex 
networks, in which villagers, NGO activists and academics occupy different positions, 
there are imbalances of power and conflicts over power and resources. 
In order to explore these issues I present a series of ethnographic accounts of meetings 
and social situations where these processes of participation, negotiation, and collective 
decision-making are enacted. I describe in some detail the pho khrua yai meeting in Ban 
Don Chai, as well as local level meetings and decision-making processes within villagers' 
organisations and individual villages. I try to show how these are linked and interrelated. 
This allows me to go beyond the public rhetoric and official accounts of the Assembly -
which speak of grassroots democracy and collective leadership - to look at actual social 
processes in specific contexts and situations. In this study I do not invoke preset, 
theoretical definitions of "democracy" or "participation". Such concepts are after all 
widely contested and used in a huge variety of ways (Green, 1993). In this chapter I am 
more concerned with describing how the meanings and practices of "democracy" are 
actually socially constructed and collectively negotiated by people in real social contexts. 
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Social Movements as Struggles to Democratise Civil Society and Everyday Life 
As I argued in the introduction, studies of contemporary social movements have 
challenged our conceptions of the social domains and targets of political struggle, and 
the ways in which power and inequality might be contested and transformed. Most social 
movements address the state in some way or another, but also struggle to effect changes 
in a range of social relations and institutions outside the state (that is, civil society). A 
wide range of social relationships, institutions, ideologies and cultural practices, from the 
family and position of women, to economic consumption and ecologically sustainable 
ways of life, have become sites of social conflict and targets of reform for collective 
action. As Cohen and Arato argue, we must "view civil society as the target as well as 
the terrain" of contemporary social movements: 
Contemporary collective actors consciously struggle over the power to 
construct new identities, to create democratic spaces within both civil 
society and the polity for autonomous social action, and to reinterpret 
norms and reshape institutions (Cohen & Arato, 1992:509). 
To put it another way, relations of power, exploitation and inequality penetrate and 
structure virtually all relations and domains of society. Thus the varied forms of 
collective action that have emerged to oppose different forms of power and inequality 
necessarily engage in the struggle in a whole range of social domains in order to bring 
about change in society. Political activity means more than contending with the state or 
engaging in electoral politics. The point is that it is now widely recognised that the social 
impact and ~ransformative potential of contemporary social movements may lie with their 
collective action and struggles on a range of social, cultural and political fronts, in the 
realms of everyday life and civil society, as well as the state. 
Closely linked with the widened view of political activity extending into civil society and 
everyday life, is the assertion that contemporary social movements are characterised by 
grassroots or participatory democracy. Touraine (quoted in Cohen & Arato, 1992:519) 
sees contemporary social movements as engaged in a "struggle to extend the field of 
political activity and to democratize new and existing public spaces at the expense of 
state control and the technocratic model of society". Indeed, appeals to democracy and 
participation have been used to oppose forms of domination and the exercise of power, 
such as bureaucratic power and patriarchy, in all levels of society down to the family 
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(Boggs, 1995; Green, 1993). The argument is that social movements challenge and 
extend the very notion and discourse of democracy while struggling to democratise 
collective life outside of the institutionalised forms of electoral politics; that is , social 
movements endeavour to democratise domains within civil society. Frank and Fuentes 
(1990, quoted in Robert Fisher, 1993: 17) argue that contemporary social movements 
"are the most important agents of social transformation in that their praxis promotes 
participatory democracy in civil society". 
Movements in 'Third World' developing countries as well as industrialised countries 
have been interpreted in this light. Fisher (1998), among others, links grassroots 
democratisation with the process of 'empowerment'. She argues that by democratic self-
management, NGOs enhance their organisational autonomy and their power to influence 
the state. 
The Assembly of the Poor as a Struggle for Participation and Democracy 
The Assembly's democratic and participatory ideology (see Chapter 3) is deeply 
interwoven with the movement's efforts to promote and enact democratic and 
cooperative forms of self-management and collective action inside their organisations and 
networks. In other words, paralleling their critique of centralisation of power and 
administration of development through the hierarchical, inefficient and corrupt 
bureaucracy, the Assembly has tried to establish non-hierarchical and decentralised forms 
of organisation and decision-making which enable 'direct democracy' and collective 
leadership. These links between ideological critique and political reform are most clearly 
expressed by some of the NGO and academic advisers who work closely with the 
Assembly: 
It has been learned particularly from the case of Thailand that 
parliamentary democracy is also much of an illusion at times. Grassroots 
work and networking is the core of counterbalancing forces. The task is 
therefore to get the grassroots strong and build up people-to-people 
relationships at all levels - international, national and local. .. Democracy 
and people's empowerment are still the key to counterbalance wrong-
doings in the current development style (Bantam et.al. , 1994: 122-123) 
Today we cherish the values of participation and strive to replace 
representative democracy with decentralised participatory communities 
and institutions (Bantam et.al., 1994: 145). 
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Similarly, Det Phumkhacha from the Thai Volunteer Service writes that many NGO 
workers "see the networking of people's organisations as the groundwork for grassroots 
democratization. NGOs believe that effective promotion of democracy needs to be done 
at both grassroots and upper levels" (Thai Development Support Committee, 1995:29). 
Clearly the idea of "civil society" as a social domain for the emergence of 
counterbalancing forces for reform is at work here. Civil society is seen as a social 
domain where people come together in associations and organisations that are 
autonomous and independent from the power of the state, often to oppose or challenge 
the power of the state. The idea of civil society has become a key focus of democracy 
and NGO activists in Thailand as a target for democratising society. That is, many NGO 
activists regard working with villagers and urban poor people, encouraging and helping 
them to organise collectively and cooperatively, promoting a political culture and 
practice of participatory and direct democracy at the grassroots level, as effective 
strategies for addressing poverty, economic exploitation, and building political and 
econormc power among grassroots actors. Not all democracy activists and NGO 
organisers label this idea of developing organisational capacities at the "grassroots" "civil 
society", and indeed the meaning of "civil society" is highly contested and interpreted in 
many different ways. But as the quotes above demonstrate, they are clearly aiming to 
develop forms of association, participatory democracy and collective action as social 
domains countervailing the power and domination of an authoritarian, bureaucratic and 
elitist state. 
In this view civil society becomes the domain for transforming the political culture of 
"the people" and "the poor". In other words, putting "grassroots democracy" into 
practice is as much about transforming local people's political culture as it is about 
challenging and contesting domination and the centralisation of power that continues 
under the guise of representative democracy. Cooperative and democratic forms of 
organisation do not necessarily emerge "naturally" or spontaneously from groups of 
villagers or slum dwellers. And the community organisations which constitute the 
Assembly emerged and developed in the face of pervasive state bureaucratic structures 
that extend right down into the village and cultivate and promote a culture of 
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bureaucratic paternalism and deference to government officials. 
Civil society is not just a social domain from which organised opposition to state power 
and struggles to change society are mounted, but is necessarily a domain of struggle and 
conflict itself. Civil society is the target of state hegemony and the site of conflicts over 
ideological control and legitimacy. The attempts by the Assembly of the Poor to enact 
processes of collective leadership and "grassroots democracy" are part of a struggle over 
political culture. Enacting collective leadership and a form of grassroots democracy that 
overtly gives power to local community representatives, no matter how flawed or riven 
with internal power differentials, represents a challenge and opposition to the dominant 
political culture and paternalism promoted by state officials. 
The Assembly' s concept and representation of itself as a "forum" is one way that they 
have tried to conceptualise and create a democratic movement. As I have mentioned 
earlier, the Assembly uses various words to express this, including samatcha, wethi 
(stage), and the English word "forum". All of these terms suggests a process in which 
participants come together as equals in a spirit of mutual cooperation and exchange. As 
they stated in one of their publicity leaflets the Assembly of the Poor "holds the objective 
to be a forum ( wethi) acquiring power through cooperation, sharing experience, and 
coordination of mutual assistance" (Assembly of the Poor, 1997h). The choice of 
"forum" or "assembly" also encompasses the fact that the Assembly of the Poor is not a 
single cohesive organisation but rather a network of villagers' organisations, slum 
community organisations and supporting NGOs, which retain their autonomy and 
independence (see Chapter 3). The challenge for the Assembly has been, then, how to 
coordinate and lead the network while sustaining the principles of equality, participation 
and democracy. 
Collective Leadership and Internal Democracy 
The organizational structure of the Assembly of the Poor has the 
characteristics of a network whose internal relations have a culture of 
equality (watthanatham baeb samoe na). Decision-making power resides 
with representatives from each community who meet together in pho 
khrua yai meetings in a forum enabling collective leadership (Praphat, 
1997b:40). 
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Authority to decide the activities and progress of the Assembly of the Poor rests with 
meetings of community representatives called pho khrua yai. Pho khrua yai can be 
translated as "head chef'. Pho means "father" but both men and women occupy positions 
of pho khrua yai. At the meetings that I attended in 1996 and 1997 approximately one 
third of the pho khrua yai delegates were women. However, the gendering of the term 
reinforces an expectation of masculine qualities of leadership in public affairs. Moreover, 
during the Sanam Luang rally, speakers from the stage referred to mae khrua yai as the 
group who looked after health and sanitation in the rally. This, of course, further 
entrenched the subordination of feminine qualities in service and domestic roles. 
Assembly representatives explained that pho khrua yai are the "principle representatives 
from each problem group" (Fieldnotes, Bangkok, 16-3-1997). Each local community 
chooses one or more representatives to attend the Pho khrua yai meetings, depending on 
the size of their group. As I mentioned in Chapter 3 they number around 260 delegates 
(Fieldnotes 16-3-1997, Assembly of the Poor, 1997j). 
Pho khrua yai meetings represent an attempt to find non-hierarchical ways of leading and 
managing the movement through a process of "collective leadership" . By having each 
local "problem group" represented by at least one person, the leadership is directly linked 
with the local villagers which constitute the rank and file. Moreover, through the pho 
khrua yai meetings the Assembly carries on a self-reflective critical debate within the 
network about its own methods, political strategies and goals. Pho khrua yai are also 
responsible for reporting back to their local group about Assembly decisions. They tend 
to be members of their local communities more experienced in leadership and 
campaigning and lobbying. The establishment of this structure and process of collective 
leadership grew at least partly out of dissatisfaction with the hierarchical and 
bureaucratic structure of the Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers of the Northeast, an 
important precursor to the Assembly of the Poor (Praphat, 1997b: 11 , see also Chapter 2 
on historical background). 
Suthy Prasartset (1997:3) maintains that the pho khrua yai meetings represent "a truly 
democratic system of internal management" . He points out that the Assembly "rejects 
appointing official positions such as chairperson or secretary" and admires the non-
hierarchical and non-bureaucratic principles implicit in this. Similarly, Praphat (1997a:54; 
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1998) argues that the pho khrua yai leadership reveals a "culture of equality" operating 
in the Assembly. 
In the two months prior to the 1997 rally in Bangkok, pho khrua yai assembled twice to 
consider the progress of negotiations with the government and consider protest action, 
once in Khong Jiam on 14-15 December 1996, and again in early January 1997 to 
prepare for their scheduled meeting with the Prime Minister in mid-January. During the 
protest rally pho khrua yai met briefly at least once, often twice, each day. In the 
mornings they often gathered inside the entrance to the nearby Nang Loeng Park racing 
track. In the evenings they would usually meet in the grounds of Benjamaborphit Temple 
at the northern end of the rally site. They discussed the progress of negotiations, the 
morale and day to day problems of the protesters, planned publicity stunts for the media 
------and reviewed the organisation and welfare of the rally site. These meetings were driven 
by the daily demands of maintaining the rally, the slow, halting progress of negotiations 
with the government and the constant need to devise and organise attention-grabbing 
stunts and events for the media. They kept the meetings short, about an hour in the 
morning, from one to two hours in the evening, because of the other demands on their 
time. Most pho khrua yai also acted on the negotiating team for their group, preparing 
and presenting their community's case to the government. The last day of the rally, when 
the Prime Minister met with the pho khrua yai, they invited the media to attend and 
observe the Assembly's collective leadership in action. 
After the mass demonstration concluded, pho khrua yai met every three months or so to 
review outcomes from the rally, progress of negotiations, and decide on continuing 
strategies. The first of these meetings was held at Wat Khiriket, a village an hours' drive 
west of Chiang Mai in Hang Dong District, on 26-27 July 1997 (see Photograph 15). 
The second meeting took place in Ban Don Chai, Tambon Sa-iab at the proposed site of 
the Kaeng Seua Ten Dam in Phrae Province. The descriptions, analysis and discussion of 
the process of collective leadership enacted in the pho khrua yai meetings that I present 
here is based on several meetings that I attended, including the meetings at Khong Jiam, 
Chiang Mai and Phrae, as well as several held during the Bangkok rally. 
The choice of locality and place is, of course, highly significant. The local villagers ' 
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organisations in the Assembly take turns to host pho khrua yai meetings and 
accommodate and feed the participants. The location is, when practicable, chosen 
democratically in a previous pho khrua yai meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting at 
Wat Khiriket in July 1997, for example, several delegates proposed their home 
communities for the next assembly three months later. Prasit, Chair of the villagers' 
organisation opposing the Kaeng Seua Ten Dam, proposed his village, Ban Don Chai in 
Prae Province. He argued that the Kaeng Seua Ten Dam conflict had "reached boiling 
point" and an Assembly of the Poor meeting there would be a timely show of support for 
the anti-dam campaign, as influential people and factions in the current government were 
pushing for the construction project to go ahead. When a ballot was taken by show of 
hands the great majority supported his proposal (Fieldnotes, 27-7-1997, Wat Khiriket, 
Chiang Mai Province). 
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Thus, each meeting introduces representatives from widely dispersed villagers ' 
organisations to the specific conditions and grievances of a member of the network. Time 
is set aside at the beginning of the meeting for the local hosts to explain their specific 
problems and the ongoing history of their campaigns, and "study tours" held at the 
conclusion. For instance, the meeting at Ban Don Chai began with the kamnan and 
Prasit, both of whom live in Don Chai, welcoming delegates and explaining some of the 
history of the proposed Kaeng Seua Ten dam and the reasons for local people's 
opposition to it. Then, on the morning of the third and last day before delegates left to 
return to their home communities, Prasit arranged vehicles to take them into a golden 
teak forest nearby which stands to be flooded if the dam goes ahead. 
Every pho khrua yai meeting that I attended, outside of the occasional gatherings at the 
nearby racetrack during the protest, was held in the grounds of a village temple (wat) . 
The village temple holds both pragmatic convenience and symbolic meaning as a choice 
of meeting place. The temple hall (sala wat) provides a convenient meeting hall large 
enough to accommodate three hundred or so participants ( see Photo graph 16). The 
temples could also provide sleeping quarters (the sala floor) and cooking, washing and 
toilet facilities for the visitors. Moreover, the temple grounds belong to the village 
community and lie outside of the official domains or control of the state in the village, 
while the temple hall commonly provides a venue for community meetings and 
gatherings, not just matters relating to worship. Thus, the temple represents an 
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unrestricted public space for meeting together where anyone could come to listen and 
observe the Assembly's meeting and business. 
The daily meetings during the protest rally had very little structure. Time was too short; 
the meeting agenda was determined by day to day needs and problems, and government 
responses. The "regional" pho khrua yai meetings, on the other hand, offered two whole 
days for meetings, discussions and collective decision-making. These meetings were 
structured and organised. The NGO activists chaired the formal proceedings, set the 
meeting agendas and guided the discussion process. Each of the regional meetings that I 
attended followed a similar, well-worn structure and used the same discussion-generating 
strategies that seemed to derive from the activists' community development background 
and training. The first day consists almost entirely of information sharing and largely 
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red un dan t reviewing of the situation of each of the groups in the Assembly. The second 
day focuses on future directions and collective campaign methods. Discussions about 
new strategies always came on the second day of proceedings and were clearly intended 
to grow out of the previous day's deliberations. And on both days they apply the same 
process of separating into smaller problem groups for discussion before returning to the 
large group. 
At some of the meetings an invited government representative officially opened the 
meeting. At Wat Khiriket, the Deputy Minister for Agriculture (in the then cabinet of 
Prime Minister Chavalit) paid a brief visit from Chiang Mai city to officially open the 
proceedings. He accepted petition letters from Assembly delegates, made some brief 
comments, promising that the Chavalit government was doing its best to address the 
Assembly's grievances, held a quick press conference for the media reporters present, 
and left with his entourage. At Ban Don Chai the Assembly invited the local District 
Officer. 
So, how do the representatives of local villagers' organisations claim a voice and 
negotiate their particular interests within the collective forums of pho khrua yai? What 
happens when one group tries to claim priority or gain the backing of the whole of the 
Assembly network for its singular campaign? The answer seems to be that the large 
number of local groups represented - 122 community groups - make decisive leadership 
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by the pho khrua yai almost impossible, except when the whole network moves together 
in mass demonstrations for which the collective social contract promises that every 
group stands to benefit. In other words, the pho khrua yai process works well at giving 
every community a voice, recognition and influence within the movement, but it cannot 
be the sole location of authority and decision-making for the Assembly, perhaps not even 
the major location. The pho khrua yai meetings are only the hubs in a network of 
communication, negotiation and compromise between the community organisations and 
the network as a whole. Even the NGO activists, who occupy positions of great power 
and influence, must negotiate and compromise. But do they represent forums of 
"grassroots democracy" where power and authority are vested in the villagers 
representatives? I will explore these questions by describing in greater detail one segment 
of a Pho khrua yai meeting and the processes of discussion, debate, negotiation and 
decision-making through which collective leadership was enacted. 
Collective Leadership in Practice: The Pho Khrua Yai Meeting 
I will focus on the second day of the pho khrua yai meeting in Ban Don Chai. The first 
day consisted almost entirely of information sharing. On this second day, however, the 
activists endeavoured to set a specific issue for the Assembly representatives to resolve 
collectively. The issue, as always, involved the future directions and strategies of the 
Assembly, in the context of a government that looked to be on the verge of collapse. 
Sawang, who works with slum organisations in Bangkok, chaired the session and set the 
agenda for discussion. He began by arguing that it would not be long before the current 
government dissolved and in light of this the Assembly needed to reconsider its short 
term priorities and strategies. 
Sawang: First, Brothers and sisters (phi nong) we have to work out our 
priorities. We know that some group's grievances may take a long time 
to fix. Others are close to being finalised. So we want you to consider 
how to sort your grievances into priorities. Which are the "hot" issues at 
the moment? Which are the "cold"? Each problem group should rank 
their priorities. Which issues can wait? Which issues are close to 
completion? Second, brothers and sisters, please consider short term 
methods to emphasise the priority issues and have them fixed. In the next 
six months what can we do quickly to ensure that they're fixed? This 
government, the government of General Chavalit Yongchaiyut, hasn ' t got 
long to go. It will probably dissolve by the end of March. It will pass new 
election laws [called for by the new constitution] and probably call an 
election for sometime in May. This means they only have five or six 
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months to go. This government has made the most effort of any 
government to address our problems, if we compare them, and has 
several ministers and MPs like Adisom, who understand our grievances 
and have tried to address our petitions. If they only have a few months to 
go, we need to think about what we can do, because we don't know who 
will be the government after that. To summarise, the economic problems 
and the political problems of this government will result in it only lasting 
another five or six months. 
Finally, he introduced a third issue for consideration. Allied organisations had been 
requesting their support, usually in terms of symbolic public announcements of Assembly 
of the Poor support to the media. He asked that the pho khrua yai meeting consider how 
the Assembly should respond to these requests. Sawang summed up the agenda for their 
small group discussions: "One, work out a list of priority issues. Two, what methods 
should we use to make the government hurry up? Three, the role of Assembly of the 
~
Poor in assisting allied organisations?" 
In setting an agenda that required the villagers' delegates to set priorities brought to the 
fore a tension between the "social contract" to be faithful to every group's petition, and 
Sawang' s politically pragmatic argument that the movement, as a whole, should throw 
its weight behind a few groups' issues in the short term. This proved to be a difficult 
issue for the meeting to resolve. Some delegates immediately opposed the idea, arguing 
that "we should work together to see that every group's grievance is fixed, just like we 
did during the protest rally". 
After 10am we broke for morning tea, then reconvened in the small "problem groups." I 
joined the Dams Group which gathered in the Tambon Administration Office. Somchai, 
from the Mun River Project, chaired. With tousled hair, and eyes squinting from lack of 
sleep, he wore a stained, white cotton shirt with a jagged hole in the back, baggy 
chequered pants and a natural dyed phakhaoma tossed around his neck. Nuat, a young 
Wildlife Fund activist, and Maliwan joined in frequently. We all sat on the lino covered 
floor, about fifty people completely filling the room. 
Somchai reiterated the agenda set by Sawang. "We have three dams that we 're waiting 
on, and four proposed dams. So we need to look at which is close to a conclusion." 
Prasit suggested that they should focus on proposed dams like Kaeng Seua Ten as the 
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appointed committee was currently reviewing this dam. "We need to make them see that 
the dam should not be approved before the government dissolves". Another Kaeng Seua 
Ten delegate backed him up and talked about the need for the government to make a 
public announcement that the dam has been cancelled and not just postponed. Maliwan 
listened intently to each speaker, sitting cross-legged like everyone else, often taking 
notes. She wore a white T-shirt featuring an image of Che Guevara, black slacks, and her 
trademark large glasses. 
Maliwan: The Assembly of the Poor has the power to bargain with the 
state, but we can't win over proposed dams as politicians will just 
postpone the decision. Thailand has never had a policy to cancel dam 
construction, because dam construction is a fundamental and important 
way of national development. What we can do is stop the dam while we 
try to educate the public and encourage society to reconsider this means 
of development and find another way. 
No one challenged this and the discussion turned back to existing dams, dominated by 
Nuat and Somchai. One of the Sirinthorn delegates brought up the government promise 
to establish a 1,200 million baht fund from which families affected by the dam would be 
paid compensation. He argued that one priority should be pressing the government to 
accelerate the compensation process from the fund. This led to an explanation by 
Somchai about how the process of examining the claimants and approving payments will 
proceed, with a series of questions about the details from some of the delegates. 
Eventually, Somchai and Maliwan proposed to the group that they put the Sirinthorn 
Dam at the top of their list of priorities, followed by Pak Mun. Somchai called for a 
show of hands for those delegates supporting this proposal. Everyone raised their hand. 
The discussion then returned to proposed dams. Somchai and Nuat continued to 
dominate the debate. The delegates discussed a proposal to pressure the government to 
institute "public hearings" (pracha-phijan) to enable local people to participate in 
assessing dam proposals. Again the local Kaeng Seua Ten delegates argued that all four 
proposed dams were "hot" but that Kaeng Seua Ten was "boiling" and most urgent. 
Somchai gave a brief summary of the discussion and once again called for a show of 
hands to ratify the group's resolution. "We should give priority to Kaeng Seua Ten in 
order to improve the decision-making process for this and other dams. And we propose 
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that the committee visits the locality to investigate the villagers' security." 
Finally Somchai asked the meeting to suggest how they could act on these priorities and 
pressure the government to work faster. Several delegates complained that one of the 
greatest problems was getting provincial level officials to actually attend committee 
meetings and comply with the directives of the central government for initiating 
processes of evaluation and compensation. They agreed to try to set deadlines for each 
stage in the process and try to force government officials at various levels to keep to 
them. No one raised the issue, however, of what action to take if government officials 
failed to comply with their deadlines. We broke for lunch, having run out of time to 
discuss the final issue of how to assist allied organisations, and reformed again with the 
whole group in the temple hall at one o'clock. 
Maliwan chaired this final session, calling up one delegate from each problem group at a 
time to take the microphone and report on their discussions to the meeting as a whole. 
Each small group had prepared lists of priorities, but whether or how these five separate 
lists should be prioritised by the pho khrua yai as a whole remained undiscussed. The 
NGO activists seemed satisfied that the villagers' delegates had started thinking about 
collective priorities and the process could continue at future meetings. Each 
spokesperson for the small groups also reported their ideas for strategies and opinions on 
how to give support to organisational allies. Although the Dams Group had not had time 
to consider this issue, their nominated spokesperson gave his personal opinion: "We have 
struggled with poverty and to address our own problems. From my own perspective and 
vision it is not appropriate to take the Assembly of the Poor' s name and let other 
organisations use it in the media." 
The meeting was presented with a range of proposed strategies and responses from each 
of the small group discussions. The State Projects group proposed holding a pho khrua 
yai meeting right at Government House in Bangkok to put pressure on the government. 
The Forest and Land group proposed a similar idea of arranging a face to face meeting 
with the Prime Minister. The Alternative Agriculture group argued that delegates should 
identify and "lobby" (using the English word) key people in the government and 
bureaucracy. With regard to requests by allied organisations, most groups proposed that 
214 
the pho khrua yai as a whole must consider each organisation's campaign on its merits 
before deciding. Maliwan gave a quick summary and asked if anyone had any further 
comments on these issues. Perhaps acknowledging the fact that the issue of collective 
priorities remained ambiguous and unresolved, Maliwan announced that "each local 
community will follow up the progress of its specific petition". No further discussion on 
the proposed new collective strategies, or when and how they might be enacted, took 
place, however. 
Maliwan went on to talk about how they should respond to requests from new groups to 
join the Assembly. This was interesting as it highlighted the position and influence of 
NGOs within the Assembly of the Poor. Maliwan explained her own position first: 
We need conditions on groups who want to join us. They must have phi 
liang11 people who are able to look at all the details, who know the 
problems, the possible solutions, people who work in the locality. If we 
don't have conditions like this we could take on more problems than we 
could solve. How should we decide whether to accept such groups, what 
conditions should we impose? Does anyone want to propose something 
on this issue? 
In the discussion that followed, most delegates agreed with Maliwan that any prospective 
new group must have an NGO working with them and supporting them. Prasit argued 
that they "must be very careful to make sure that such groups have not trespassed into 
forest or destroyed natural resources in any way". A Sirinthorn delegate agreed that 
there should be "limits and conditions. The Assembly needs to assess how any new group 
will affect our campaigns, and look carefully at their reasons and grievances for joining 
the network." 
Other delegates argued that the Assembly had a responsibility to refuse no group with 
legitimate grievances. "Not all groups have access to local NGO supporters and 
therefore this shouldn't be a restriction." One Isan delegate declared, "We have a 
responsibility to assist groups with real problems. We have to investigate in their local 
11 The phrase phi liang usually means older carer, benefactor or nursemaid. Phi is a fictive kin term 
meaning elder brother or elder sister. Liang means to look after or nourish (Wit, 1996). Villagers and 
activists in the Assembly often use the term in referring to NGO advisers, implying a superior person 
entrusted with looking after the group. I discuss the implications of this for power relations within the 
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area. We hold to justice, that must be our aim always, as far as helping other groups, we 
should give them an opportunity to join with us". 
The activists continued arguing for the need for phi liang. Phijit, another young NGO 
activist and Somchai' s brother, took the microphone: 
We've talked about this several times. Then we thought that groups who 
want to join us should: one, be a group that we assess as having true 
problems, real hardships; two, have already organised as a group; three, 
have phi liang responsible. Why do we need conditions like this? 
Because any new group without phi liang would stretch the ability of the 
phi liang we have already. 
Daeng from the Mun River villagers' organisation disagreed about the importance of 
NGO advisers. "We have experienced problems before with regard to phi liang. Really, 
regarding our problems there has been a lot of conflict [among NGOs]. The advisers (thi 
phreuksa) have limitations. We have to ask the advisers, are they prepared and ready to 
fight also?" Maliwan brought the debate to a conclusion: "To summarise, we have to 
consider the conditions in each local community and the appropriateness of having them 
join our network." 
The meeting concluded with a discussion about when and where to hold the next pho 
khrua yai meeting. J aroen, who works for the NGO Friends of the People in the 
Assembly's secretarial office, proposed a special meeting to mark the second anniversary 
of the birth of the Assembly on 10 December. Jaroen proposed, therefore, that the pho 
khrua yai meet at Thammasat University and use the occasion for generating publicity. 
The meeting rejected this. A delegate from Isan took the microphone and argued that 10 
December was less than two months away and right in the middle of rice harvesting. This 
would not be a convenient time or place to meet again so soon. Many others agreed. 
Another delegate proposed that, instead of meeting together in Thammasat, each group 
organise local celebrations which would be more convenient and less demanding on 
members' time. This was carried by a show of hands. 
The pho khrua yai meeting closed with a bai si su khwan ceremony, a ritual which 
Assembly in the next section. 
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involves calling the khwan, each person's souls, and binding them to his or her body with 
a cotton thread tied around one wrist. The ritual was presided over by a local mo tham, 
an expert in reciting Buddhist sacred texts, in this case an elderly grandfather from the 
village who had spent many years as a monk. Each regional pho khrua yai meeting that I 
attended concluded with this ceremony. Everyone present in the sala participated by 
taking a bundle of prepared cotton threads and tying them around each other's wrists 
while wishing the recipient prosperity and a good life. It is a ritual which serves not only 
to look after the spiritual health of celebrants, but also emphasises a sense of community 
and belonging (see Tambiah, 1984:223-244,322). By this time - late-afternoon -
however, the delegates were tired and sleepy, and the afternoon's muggy heat had driven 
most people out of the hall. Many groups immediately packed up to leave, and would 
travel all night to return home. 
NGO Activists and Power 
Focusing on collective leadership by villagers also raises the question of the power and 
influence of the NGO activists who attend every meeting. Despite their small numbers 
this group of middle-class activists exert a great deal of influence and power over the 
pho khrua yai process. Furthermore, a consideration of the position of NGO activists 
leads beyond the Assembly rhetoric that authority resides in the pho khrua yai meetings 
to find other locations of power in the network, for example, the Secretarial Office in 
Bangkok. 
As seen in the previous section, Assembly members use various terms to describe the 
NGO activists' position and role within the movement. The Assembly's magazine states 
that they occupy the "position of advisers only. Currently the Assembly of the Poor has 
over 20 advisors who all have more than 10 years experience of struggle" (Assembly of 
the Poor, 1997d). An Assembly video gives a slightly more detailed picture: 
Our advisers comprise NGO workers and villagers' leaders with 
campaign experience. They act as phi liang, coordinating negotiations 
with the state, communicating with the media and allied organisations in 
the city, administering the preparation of negotiation documents and 
summarising our issues to explain to the public (Assembly of the Poor, 
1997j). 
As we saw in the account of the pho khrua yai meeting above, the words phi liang are 
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often used to refer to the NGO workers. Unlike the words thi preuksa, which I have 
translated above as "adviser", the phrase phi liang connotes an unequal relation between 
NGO activists and villagers. To refer to the activists as phi liang, therefore, suggests that 
they occupy a superior position with a responsibility to care for and guide the villagers. 
The power and influence of the NGO activists within the Assembly can be seen in a 
range of ways in the ethnographic accounts presented in this chapter. The activists chair 
the pho khrua yai meetings and set the agendas. While they encourage every pho khrua 
yai representative to participate and have a voice, and promote democratic processes 
such as ballots, being highly articulate and experienced campaigners they often dominate 
discussions and present their own views persuasively. NGO activists possess the 
education, training and experience - in other words the cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1973) 
- needed for the production of documents and other media in the Assembly's campaigns. 
They often speak on behalf of Assembly members in negotiations, media interviews and 
public relations campaigns, and in the Assembly's dealings with allied organisations. 
The Assembly secretarial office employs a small team of media specialists who produce 
media such as videos, publicity leaflets and the Assembly's magazine, called Siang 
prachachon (Voice of the People, see Figure 3 on following page). The activists and 
media specialists who write most of the Assembly documents and produce virtually all 
its media for publication occupy a very influential position in constructing and 
representing the public image and voice of the Assembly, and do this virtually 
independently from the "collective leadership". For instance, at the pho khrua yai 
meeting at Ban Don Chai we were shown a video produced by the "Media Section" of 
the Assembly. Entitled Samatcha khon Jon: phalang haeng prachachon (The Assembly 
of the Poor: Power of the People), the video was mainly a record and commentary on the 
1997 protest rally in Bangkok, which the commentator described as "the longest lasting 
mass people's rally ever". It was filmed, written and produced by activists from the 
secretarial office in Bangkok, and with its high quality images and editing, professional 
commentary and background music, it had been produced to provide ready made, 
prepackaged professional audio-visual material to television producers, as well as 
distribute to NGO and academic allies. The video ran for thirty minutes. Almost 
everyone watched with intense interest and everyone that I spoke with afterwards 
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Figure 3 The first issue, October 1997, of the Assembly of the Poor's magazine, 
Siang prachachon (Voice of the People), produced by a team of NGO workers. 
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approved, saying that they were very pleased with the video. They are all well aware of 
the importance of the media in reporting and representing their campaigns. 
Democracy and Decision-Making in the Local Villagers' Organisation 
Examining the process of collective leadership and decision-making at the pho khrua yai 
level provides only half the picture. We need to examine and assess processes of 
"grassroots democracy" at the level of the villagers' organisation and the village, and 
understand the links and relationships between these processes at different levels. In the 
rest of this chapter I describe democracy in action in the Mun River Villagers ' 
Committee. It is easy to see the processes of collective decision-making in action in the 
general meetings at the Mun River Villagers' Centre, but if these processes are to have 
an impact at village level then they rely on the active networks of kaen nam and their 
ability to communicate with and organise village level meetings which allow democratic 
decision-making at that level. 
In late September 1997 the Mun River villagers' organisation called a general meeting to 
discuss the progress of its compensation campaign and, in their expectation of impending 
success, future directions of the organisation. 12 A number of significant proposals were 
raised at the meeting, and the ways these were debated and resolved reveals a great deal, 
not just about the democratic processes operating, but about ongoing efforts by NGO 
and villager activists to develop political consciousness and a culture of solidarity. 
Over 200 villagers attended, representing members in 55 villages. Siang chaired, 
Somchai spoke in his position as advisor and Wari, a local man and Cooperative 
employee, acted as secretary. Everyone spoke in Lao except for Somchai, who spoke in 
Central Thai with an occasional Lao phrase. Somchai began by explaining the progress of 
the government agreement to pay appropriate compensation to Mun River families 
whose fishing livelihoods had been destroyed by the dam and current problems holding 
up the process. 
12 This account draws on detailed fieldnotes and tape recordings of the meetings on 27-9-1997, Mun 
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Then Somchai explained why the Rasi Salai Dam group had returned to Bangkok to 
protest. "Do you remember that during the protest rally we all agreed to help each 
other?" he asked. "Then what do you think you should do to help the Rasi Salai group 
now?" Siang immediately argued that their success was tied in with the Rasi Salai 
villagers, and asked again how they thought they should help. This sparked a great deal 
of chatter and discussion among the people assembled, but no one spoke up to address 
the meeting as a whole. 
"Suppose you were them, what would you want?" Somchai prompted. 
Pla emphatically responded, "Encouragement, the power of people and resources 
(kamlang jai, kamlang khan, kamlang sap)." There was general agreement to help in 
some way. Someone proposed that they collect a set amount of money from each family 
to send. Amounts of five baht and ten baht per family were put forward. Another villager 
suggested that they to dispatch a contingent of people to join the Rasi Salai villagers' 
rally. 
Siang reiterated Somchai' s question, "If we here were in their situation what sort of 
assistance would we want?" He called on them to demonstrate solidarity and unity with 
the Rasi Salai villagers' struggle. Then he put the amount of money to be collected to a 
vote, asking for a show of hands to vote for either five or ten baht. The majority voted 
for ten baht. Somchai asked how many people they would send. The meeting became 
rowdy as people earnestly debated the issue among themselves. Someone proposed 
twenty delegates; someone else one delegate for each village, making 5 5 people. 
Somchai tried to hurry the decision-making process up. He called out, "Who votes for 
one per village, hands up! Twenty people, hands up!" The result was still unclear, so he 
asked Wari to make a careful count of hands. A small majority of 117 votes to 97 
favoured sending twenty delegates. Somchai explained that they would travel to 
Bangkok together in three days time and join the Rasi Salai villagers ' rally for three to 
River Villagers' Centre, Khong Jiam and 28-9-1997 at Kho Tai Village, Phibun Mangsahan. 
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five days. He asked them to think about who would like to volunteer. 
As a preamble to the next item on the agenda Somchai went on to talk about the 
impending compensation payment. He suggested that even if they win the 525,000 baht 
or 15 rai13 of land compensation they may not be able to rehabilitate their livelihoods and 
may be no better off, so they should continue to work together and face future problems 
together as a organisation. Then he handed over to Siang, who had written on the 
blackboard "Future directions of the Mun River Villagers' Committee". Siang proposed 
that when they receive their compensation payments, each family donate 15,000 baht to 
"establish a fund for activism and study of long term problems" which Siang referred to 
as a "foundation" (munlanithi) and also as a memorial (anusom) to their struggles. 
This provoked a great deal of talk and debate. The meeting became louder and rowdier 
as participants discussed the issue of donating some of their expected and hard-earned 
compensation money. Some quickly did their sums and realised that Siang's proposal 
would bring in over 45 million baht, and so suggested that 5,000 would be plenty. Siang 
and Daeng raised the possibility of the parasite schistosomiasis becoming a problem in 
the future as it had in other large dams, and the need for funds to engage experts to 
research the subject. Another male kaen nam spoke out in support of establishing a 
foundation but argued that 15,000 baht was too much and proposed 10,000. 
Somchai asked if everyone understood what the purpose of a "foundation" was. "For 
people who live here it is necessary to make plans about what they will do with the 
money once it is paid out." Siang explained again his idea for a foundation. Daeng 
emphasised that if they do establish a fund then a committee of villagers will administer 
it, not the NGO advisers. 
Somchai tried to bring the meeting to make a decision. "The issue is, do you agree with 
the proposal to mobilise funds to campaign for economic improvements - it might be to 
demonstrate and bargain for long term solutions. Please raise you hand if you agree to 
13 Arai is a unit of measurement equal to 1,600 square metres. 
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set up such a fund." Almost everyone showed their support. "If you don't agree please 
raise you hand. You agree. We have a resolution!" Then he suggested that they return to 
their villages and consult with the remaining members about how much they think they 
should set aside, and what form the foundation should take. 
The next agenda item was the progress of government appointed committees in making 
the final assessment of who was eligible to receive compensation. The process required 
the preparation of lists of eligible villagers by Village Heads and kamnan , which were 
then submitted to district level committees for ratification. Siang and Somchai explained 
that some Village Heads had bribed the villagers by refusing to register them unless they 
handed over a percentage of the payment. Some official lists differed from the Mun River 
villagers' organisation lists of members. Thus, it was a controversial and emotive issue 
affecting everyone and sparked a lot of comment and discussion. Most were excited by 
what appeared to be the imminent success of their campaigns and protests, while also 
anxious and frustrated with the slow and sometimes corrupt bureaucratic processes 
required by the government. The conversation noise level grew and Siang tried to 
reassert order and his control as chairperson. Many people ignored him and continued 
speaking amid the general hubbub. Others, thinking that all the agenda items had been 
covered, began to leave. 
When the meeting fell quiet again Siang castigated the assembled villagers for not 
demonstrating "unity" (ekkaphap). Somchai also admonished them to maintain an 
orderly meeting. "Brothers and sisters, a strong organisation relies on members that 
cooperate, who know sacrifice, who have order and discipline, invest importance in the 
organisation's activities. Only a strong organisation is capable of bargaining with the 
government to have its problems solved. If we call a meeting and people come and just 
sit and chat together, or sit outside, what will you tell your fellow villagers back home? 
Or if you pay no attention to the proceedings, and don't know the meeting's decisions 
and don't pass them on to your fellow villagers, this will surely cause conflict within our 
organisation. Because the heart of an organisation is in its meetings. Please give 
importance to everything we discuss here." 
Siang continued the lecture, appealing to the importance of solidarity, unity, order 
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(khwam rabiap) and discipline (winai) in meetings in order to achieve their goals. After a 
final announcement about the Pak Mun Agricultural Cooperative, Siang finally brought 
the meeting to a close. It had lasted almost three hours. Most of the assembled crowd 
quickly dispersed, while a few remained behind to discuss who would join the twenty 
delegates to the Rasi Salai villagers. 
Reaching into the Village 
Over 214 people attended the Mun River Villagers' Organisation committee meeting, 
representing over three thousand members in fifty-five villages. The NGO activists tried 
to ensure that each village was represented by at least two kaen nam, but in many cases 
more came because of the keen interest in the progress of the compensation process. 
Somchai had reminded them during the meeting: "Brothers and sisters, you must 
remember that in your capacity as leaders, as representatives, one of your number 
represents many people. Each time you raise your hand, you must consider what each 
person back in the village will think." 
Their job now as kaen nam, as the "axis" of a network reaching into the village, was to 
communicate the meeting's proposals and resolutions to the other members in their 
village and reach some sort of agreement or consensus at the village level that they 
would then report back to the next committee meeting as a basis for negotiating a 
collective resolution. I was able to observe this process only a few times during the 
course of the year, but the process was very similar in each case and accorded with 
villagers' descriptions of the role of kaen nam in many interviews as well. 
That evening, after the meeting at the Mun River Villagers' Centre, I travelled with 
Panya back to his village and his house on the banks of the Mun River near Phibun 
township. He and a woman, Duangjai, had attended the committee meeting as the kaen 
nam for their village, where sixty-seven families, almost every household, had joined the 
campaigns of the Mun River Villagers' Committee, the Assembly of the Poor protest 
rallies, and registered for compensation. After 6pm Panya drove his old, rickety 
motorcycle to the house of the Village Head and used the village public address system 
to announce a meeting of the Mun River Villagers' Committee members the following 
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morning at 6 am. 
The next morning we walked together to the Village Head's house, arnvmg a few 
minutes after 6am. Panya carried a battered notebook with him to the meeting, in which 
he had scribbled notes during yesterday's meeting. At first there was no sign of anyone. 
After waiting for ten minutes, once again Panya used the PA system to call the members 
to the meeting. We watched as a handful of monks from the village temple filed slowly 
through the dusty lanes, receiving the morning's offerings. After the monks made their 
rounds villagers began to trickle in. Panya waited another fifteen minutes until just over 
thirty villagers gathered around the house. That meant that only about half of the 
membership in this village bothered to send a representative to this meeting. 
First he announced the latest news about the Agricultural Cooperative. Then he related 
the problems of the Rasi Salai group. "If they don't get their compensation payment, 
then Sirinthom won't get paid and neither will we." He explained the meeting resolution 
that the Mun River Villagers' Committee would send 20 representatives and the request 
for 10 baht from each family. Pan ya gave his own elaboration on the use of the donated 
money. "Every village will collect the money and send it to the Centre on 29th. Anyone 
can take it. This portion of money is for travel expenses for the delegates who go to join 
the protest. And for rice and food for them all collectively. We will take money for the 
protesters to help them. Every local group is going to help them! 121 problem groups." 
This sparked some discussion at the edges of the gathered villagers, so Panya argued for 
its importance. "This 10 baht per person is a necessity! We help them. If we were in that 
situation, they would help us just the same. Brothers and sisters, what do you think? Can 
we help them? Soi dai bo ?" 
Many villagers called out "Yes, we can help them. Soi dai!" 
"If we don't help them, they won't help us," someone else asserted. There were no 
dissenting voices. Panya took this as agreement and quickly moved on to the next issue. 
"If you receive the compensation money that we petitioned for, 525,000 baht, do you 
think you could put a portion of that into a foundation to assist our group? Are you 
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ready to do this? Yesterday, a proposal was made that 10,000 baht, or 1000 baht, or 
5,000 baht per family should be donated. Brothers and sisters, you have to decide and I 
will report back to the general meeting." 
This stimulated a burst of vigorous discussion among the group. One older woman joked 
that she would "give a little bit at a time!" Everyone laughed. Fanya emphasised that it 
was only if and when they received their compensation, to which she replied, "If we get 
500,000 take the 10,000. Take it!" 
A male villager exclaimed, "You're asking for money from people who haven't got any!" 
Someone else called out, "10,000 is too much!" Everyone talked and called out at the 
same time. Someone called out, "One thousand!" and a competing voice immediately 
replied, "One thousand is not enough!" Another man cried out, "They want too much 
money! Too much!" 
Fanya became more defensive, raising his voice above the other competing voices. He 
tried to restore order by calling for a vote on each of the proposed amounts by a show of 
hands, but many villagers ignored this and continued debating the issue heatedly among 
themselves. A growing number of voices began calling out "Five thousand!" 
Fanya argued that they had often contributed small amounts during their campaigns to 
assist him and other representatives; this was part of their collective struggle. "This 
money won't go to any person! It will be put into a collective fund. We will look after it 
collectively. When problems arise in the future, we'll use this money. Every village is 
considering this. Five thousand?" The meeting became quiet again. Villagers nodded and 
no one opposed this proposal. 
Once again Fanya moved quickly onto his next item. He explained the timetable for 
assessment of the lists of compensation claimants over the following few weeks. He was 
one of the villagers' delegates for the Fhibun district-level committee. There were few 
questions on this issue. This group of villagers knew that their names were all on the list 
for their village. The Village Head here quietly but openly supported the Assembly and 
was highly regarded. Villagers began to stand up and leave as Fanya made a few remarks 
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closing the meeting. It had lasted for forty minutes. 
Managing Conflict at the Local Level 
To write of democratising processes and transformations in political culture and political 
consciousness among local people, however, is not to suggest a romanticised and 
unrealistic picture of villagers' organisations expressing only democratic and cooperative 
principles. I have already described the power and influence of NGO activists in the 
Assembly of the Poor. There is also conflict at the local level within villagers' 
organisations, and between villagers and NGO activists. In this section I describe how 
one deep-rooted conflict has been played out among factions of the Mun River Villagers' 
Committee and their NGO advisors. Importantly, I will show how principles and 
practices of democracy were used by the NGO activists to manage and attempt to 
resolve the conflict. 
The Pak Mun Agricultural Cooperative has been riven with conflict and factionalism 
since its inception. The Cooperative, a separate legal organisation to the Mun River 
Villagers' Committee but with much the same membership and leadership, was 
established in 1995 after the villagers won some financial compensation for the three year 
dam construction period (see Chapter 4). The government imposed a condition on the 
compensation agreement that two-thirds of the 90,000 baht payment for each family 
would be used to establish an agricultural cooperative to be administered by the villagers 
themselves and be used to rehabilitate the livelihoods of its members. 
The conflict first emerged in 1996 as the villagers set up the organisational structure 
required under Thai law for the administration of agricultural cooperatives. The villagers 
elected 15 people from among their ranks to form the administrative committee. Almost 
all of these committee members came from among the ranks of the kaen nam and leaders 
of the Mun River Villagers' Committee. Siang, the current Chair of the Mun River 
Villagers' Committee, became the Chair of the Cooperative's management committee, 
while Samart, a previous chair, became the Treasurer. Around the same time they 
employed a full-time manager with experience in managing and administering agricultural 
cooperatives. Once the administrative structure was in place and the newborn 
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cooperative registered with the government, they received the promised compensation 
payment, over 100 million baht (Interview, Wanphen, Cooperative manager, 23-9-1997). 
A conflict among the administrative committee members emerged almost immediately, as 
debate began on how to use and invest the funds. The conflict centred on a proposal by a 
faction in the committee, lead by Samart, to invest a substantial proportion of the 
Cooperative' s funds in a petrol station on the Phibun-Khong Jiam Road. They argued 
that this would return a good profit to the co-op and hence benefit all its members. As 
Om, a young woman who works for the Cooperative, explained: 
Another faction thought that whatever they did with the money, they had 
to be careful, because the funds didn't just belong to the steering 
committee, but to all members. So they thought the funds should be used 
to rehabilitate members' livelihoods. For instance, they proposed small 
revolving loans for members, but which might not make any interest. The 
government gave it for this purpose, to reconstruct livelihoods destroyed 
by the dam. So the different voices clashed. They argued about it 
continuously, every meeting (Interview, Khong Jiam, 26-9-1996). 
For a year the conflict virtually paralysed the activities of the Cooperative. The first 
manager resigned and went to work elsewhere. The internal squabbling in the 
Cooperative made it difficult to find qualified people to replace him and it took many 
months before they finally found Wanphen, a young woman and trained accountant, to 
fill the position. The management committee was unable to make effective decisions or 
agree on the future direction of the organisation. They argued over where to purchase 
land for construction of the Cooperative' s new office and storehouse. 
Maliwan and the other NGO activists tried to use democratic means to resolve the 
conflict. To bring the debate about where to buy land for the Cooperative's headquarters 
to a conclusion they called a general meeting in which all members of the Cooperative 
were invited. A vote was taken and a site chosen. The divisive and acrimonious debate 
over the petrol station continued however, and concern grew as rumours and accusations 
circulated that the pro-business faction was dominating decisions about builders and 
contractors, and was getting corrupt kickbacks in the process. 
The NGO activists decided to call another general meeting. But first they spent two 
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months visiting villages and talking to the kaen nam, explaining the positions of the two 
opposing factions and promoting the idea that the ordinary members should set the 
overall policies of the Cooperative. In mid-1997 they called the general meeting and in an 
effort to deepen participation and representation of villagers' views they asked that each 
village send at least four delegates, making a total of more than two hundred and twenty 
people. The meeting was presented with a choice between two general directions for the 
Cooperative: invest in business, or rehabilitate members livelihoods as the basic strategy. 
Predictably, after the groundwork of the NGO workers the meeting voted for the second 
policy direction, which would see the development of small-scale revolving loans and a 
range of small scale strategies aimed at individual member families rather than collective 
capital investments. 
At this general meeting the NGO advisers also successfully advocated a reform of the 
steering committee, arguing that it should be expanded from the original fifteen to 
include one delegate from each village, making a total of fifty-five committee members. 
Their intention was to broaden the representative base of the steering committee in order 
to overcome the stalemate between the two opposed factions and weaken the power of 
the pro-business faction. In each of the fifty-five villages Cooperative members voted to 
select their delegate to the reformed steering committee. In many villages the factions 
lobbied for their own candidates. Moreover, most of the original committee members 
won positions on the new committee. Although this democratic strategy defused the 
factional squabbling and got the steering committee going again, the pro-business faction 
still held positions and continued exerting their influence. This even extended to attacks 
on Cooperative staff members who opposed them, a move which created tensions 
between some villagers and the NGO activists. W ari, for example, was criticised as being 
under-educated for his position and put under pressure to resign. The other Cooperative 
and NGO staff based in the Centre immediately closed ranks in support of W ari and 
opposed any staff changes (Fieldnotes, Mun River Villagers' Centre, June - September 
1997). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described the ways in which democracy and collective decision-
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making are actually put into practice in a range of levels and social contexts within the 
Assembly of the Poor. In doing so I have drawn upon the concept of civil society as a 
way of theorising the social conditions in which these examples of 'grassroots 
democracy' take place. One influential view of civil society that I discussed above sees it 
as the political space, free from domination by state institutions, in which people exercise 
the freedom to organise autonomously and develop their collective capacities to 
influence the state. This theoretical perspective sees civil society as a social domain in 
which to develop participatory and democratic associations and thus challenge existing 
practices and social institutions that support domination and inequality. A different 
perspective, originating in the work of Gramsci, conceptualises civil society as the social 
domain where ideological and cultural processes operate to organise social life and 
promote consent to the dominant elite and existing social order. Thus, this perspective 
does not regard civil society as a privileged domain of freedom and democratisation. 
Rather, civil society encompasses the whole range of non-state institutions and 
organisations which structure social life and may either reproduce or challenge 
hegemony. Such a Gramscian analysis has suggested an approach to social 
transformation involving a cultural and ideological struggle to democratise institutions 
within civil society and challenge state hegemony, rather than mount direct assaults on 
the state (see Introduction). 
Two key issues arise from these discussions of civil society and democratisation. First, 
does the ethnographic study support the oft-made argument that social movements are 
acting to expand the boundaries of civil society (that is , conditions of liberty and free 
association) at the expense of state domination? Second, just how democratic are 
emerging organisations within such a civil society? Does the Assembly of the Poor 
represent a forum of grassroots democracy where power, authority and decision-making 
are vested in the villagers themselves? Certainly, the writings of Suthy (1997) and 
Praphat (1997a, 1998) on the Assembly of the Poor point to affirmative answers to these 
questions. Suthy (1997) , for example, argues that the Assembly of the Poor is a leader in 
the struggle to strengthen civil society in Thailand and manages itself according to real 
grassroots democracy. 
How we answer the first question depends, to a certain extent, on our definition of civil 
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society. The word 'space' in the often-used shorthand definition 'political space' is 
clearly meant metaphorically for the particular socio-political conditions in which people 
are able to associate free of coercion. But where are we to find those conditions in 
practice, except by close study of the real spaces and places where people join together 
to organise and collectively pursue political purposes? In this chapter I have described in 
detail a range of spaces and places where members of the Assembly meet to negotiate 
and make collective decisions. The pho khrua yai meeting in Don Chai Village, the 
meetings at the Mun River Villagers' Centre, and the village-level meetings organised by 
kaen nam, all testify to the endeavours of the movement to create and sustain new spaces 
for participation and collective action. Taken together with the previous chapter on 
protest, these spaces can be seen to be interconnected by thriving social networks and 
extend from village meetings to street rallies and offices in Bangkok. My argument is 
that these new contexts of participation and interaction certainly have expanded the 
social domains available for political association and contesting the power of the state. 
Turning to the second issue, how democratic are these organisations and decision-
making processes that have emerged within the Assembly of the Poor? Cooperative and 
democratic forms of organisation do not necessarily emerge naturally or spontaneously 
from groups of villagers or slum dwellers. As I have shown, the movement enacts forms 
of collective decision-making and participatory democracy in the internal management of 
the Assembly as a whole and at the level of its member Villagers' Organisations. The pho 
khrua yai meetings are only hubs in a network of communication and negotiation 
throughout the movement, and through which power and decision-making is negotiated 
and carried out. In such a complex network, the NGO activists, pho khrua yai and kaen 
nam who play such key roles in creating and sustaining these networks stand to exert 
greater power and influence than the rank and file villagers who they represent. 
Furthermore, as I have illustrated, ostensibly democratic practices can be used to 
manage conflict within the movement and direct the decision-making process. NGO 
activists, who, although possessing no voting rights in meetings, usually set the agendas, 
guide discussions and very often elicit grassroots ratification of their proposals. The case 
of the internal conflict within the Pak Mun Agricultural Cooperative illustrates how the 
NGO activists effectively used participatory and democratic processes to manage conflict 
and also to produce an outcome that they desired. 
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Clearly, however, Assembly leaders promote a 'culture' of grassroots democracy and 
collective decision-making, or a "culture of equality" as Praphat calls it (1997b:40). They 
encourage participation in debates and discussions, and the use of voting to reach 
collective resolutions. I see this as part of a struggle over grassroots 'political culture' in 
the face of pervasive state bureaucratic structures that extend right down into the village 
and cultivate and promote a culture of bureaucratic paternalism and deference to 
government officials. Enacting collective leadership and a form of grassroots democracy 
that overtly gives power to local community representatives ( and not those sanctioned by 
the state) no matter how flawed or riven with internal power differentials, represents a 
challenge to the dominant political culture and paternalism in by state officials. 
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Photograph 15. Pho khrua yai meetings were always held in village temples, a 
convenient but also highly symbolic site belonging to the whole community. This 
temple, Wat Khiriket in the hills just outside Chiang Mai, hosted the July 1997 
meeting. The temple and village are threatened by a private quarrying operation 
on the hill above. 
Photograph 16. A pho khrua yai meeting in progress inside the sala wat (temple 
hall). 
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8 Conclusion: Sources of Power and 
Social Transforniation 
This study has presented an ethnographic account of the Assembly of the Poor, informed 
by debates within the fields of political ecology and social movements theory. A 
limitation of political ecology that I identified and discussed in the Introduction has been 
a lack of attention to explaining how people move from a situation of environmental 
degradation or crisis to purposeful collective action. To a large extent I would argue that 
this stems from political ecology's focus on a Marxist analysis of social structure (rather 
than agency) in its analysis of the causes and consequences of environmental conflict. 
Social movements in Marxism stem from the structural position of particular groups in 
the economic organisation of society, for example working class union movements. 
Explaining the structural and economic causes of participants' grievances, however, falls 
far short of explaining the complex processes underpinning protest actions. While the 
destructive effects of large-scale development may create ecological crises and threats to 
local livelihoods, which should weaken people's capacities for organised collective 
responses, much depends on how people give meaning to their grievances, define their 
position in society and thus their potential for collective opposition, and are able to 
organise effectively and create links with other social sectors and organisations 
Therefore, I also drew on theoretical approaches that have been developed in the social 
movements literature, as social movements have long posed the problem of how to 
analyse agency and collective action as they contribute to social change (but still with the 
context of social structure). This thesis, however, is not an attempt to present a new 
theory of Third World environmental movements. Social movements are, after all, 
complex social phenomena whose salient characteristics are determined by the particular 
theoretical and analytical point of view we adopt (see Scott 1990:5; Melucci 1998:423). 
Rather, my intention has been to bring certain theoretical insights to bear on the 
empirical, ethnographic data in order to better understand and explain the nature of the 
Assembly of the Poor in the context of Thai society. Ethnography is always grounded in 
specific historical and social contexts. 
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The central concern of this study, then, has been to bring analytical approaches from 
political ecology and social movements theory to bear on analysing and interpreting the 
Assembly of the Poor in the context of Thai society. I explored the historical origins of 
the movement, the social networks embracing NGOs, grassroots organisations and 
underlying mobilisation, and the constitution of cultures of solidarity and political 
identity. In the final two substantive chapters (6 and 7) I focussed on two crucial modes 
of action of the Assembly - protest and attempts to democratise the internal workings of 
the movement within the domains of civil society. 
An ongoing debate in the political ecology and social movements literature centres on the 
potential of grassroots movements to effectively transform social structures of inequality 
and exploitation in Third World societies. Here in the final chapter I return to this 
overarching issue and address the question: what conclusions can we draw from this 
study about the potential of grassroots environmental movements for social and political 
transformation? 
The study as a whole has tried to explore and analyse the social processes which brought 
individuals and groups together into the Assembly of the Poor, the sources of solidarity, 
ways in which they have organised and sustained the movement, and the political 
strategies they have chosen to struggle with the state and represent themselves in the 
public sphere. Each chapter revealed ways in which sometimes small - sometimes more 
substantial - gains were made in finding common ground on which to build autonomous 
organisations and networks, pushing back the power of the state or winning battles for 
compensation. But, as Bryant and Bailey (1997: 185) write, "Growing activity by 
grassroots organizations thus does not in itself signal a shift in power relations between 
the weak and the strong in many Third World countries". In Thailand, events since the 
economic crash of mid-1997 and the change of government a few months later in 
November of that year indicate that the movement's political gains have been eroded by 
an aggressive state and changed economic climate. The Assembly is on the defensive, 
and any claim that it is transforming social structures or democratising Thai society in 
any far-reaching way would be overly optimistic. After all, the Assembly represents not 
more than two hundred thousand people, from the poorest sections of Thai society. 
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Therefore, in returning to questions of power and social transformation in this final 
chapter, I will argue that we can draw four main conclusions from this study of the 
Assembly of the Poor. First, in terms of the material outcomes of the Assembly's 
protests and petitions the movement has had some significant, but limited successes. 
Therefore I will briefly sum up the material and political outcomes since the 1997 rally, 
and the erosion of government promises and political opportunities in the light of 
changing economic and political circumstances. 
Second, I argue that the dynamic social networks underlying the Assembly, which extend 
from local groups and NGOs to national and international organisations, represent 
relatively new and powerful forms of organisation and activism that are changing the 
nature of rural politics. 
Third, I argue that new forms of identity and oppositional consciousness are emerging 
through the campaigns of the Assembly. Throughout the study I have tried to show how 
the constitution of collective identity and the deployment of culture are important 
dimensions to understanding the collective action and political struggles of the 
movement. The point I emphasise here is that they are also transformed through the 
experience of participation and mobilisation. 
Fourth, I reiterate the Assembly's ideological and discursive challenge to dominant 
discourses of development in order to emphasise that struggles to change unequal 
relations of power must necessarily involve conflicts over know ledge, discourses and 
meanings as they shape practice. 
Material and Political Outcomes 
In addressing issues of power and social transformation it is appropriate to consider the 
material and political outcomes of the Assembly's protests and petitions. I paid 
considerable attention to the 1997 protest rally in Chapter 6, arguing that mass 
demonstrations constitute the movement's main political strategy. The mediation and 
support of the mass media appeared to be important at that time. The protest won wide 
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coverage m the media, much of it sympathetic and supportive, especially in daily 
newspapers and weekly magazines, but also on the independent TV channel iTV. The 
protest forced government representatives and bureaucrats to come to the bargaining 
table and negotiate face to face with Assembly representatives over the demands in its 
petition. But what have been the results? To what extent has the Assembly been able to 
compel the state to respond to its demands, provide compensation for livelihoods 
destroyed by development, and guarantee local community rights within the development 
process? Piven and Cloward, writing about popular protest in the United States, have 
argued that protesters only "win, if they win at all, what historical circumstances [have] 
already made ready to be conceded" (1977, quoted in Della Porta & Diani, 1999:250). In 
1997 did the Thai state concede only what it was already predisposed to give? 
When the rally dispersed on 2 May 1997 it seemed that the Assembly had achieved a 
great deal. Chavalit' s government had given a guarantee to consider and address all of 
the grievances of the petition. In the months that followed the government implemented 
some of its promises to the Assembly and set up joint committees to follow through with 
others. Cabinet cancelled the proposed Saiyaburi Dam and initiated reviews of the four 
other proposed dams on the petition, including Kaeng Seua Ten and Lam Dorm Y ai. 
Cabinet approved compensation for 2,526 families affected by the Sirinthom Dam and 
3,084 families affected by the Pak Mun Dam, announced the establishment of a multi-
billion baht fund to cover it and began registering villager claimants. 
By November 1997 thirteen grievances out of a total of 122 listed in its petition had 
reached a tangible conclusion satisfactory to the Assembly. The government paid 
compensation to 272 families affected by small dams (210 million baht), and to 1,154 
families whose land was flooded by the Rasi Salai Dam ( over 363 million baht). Four 
petitions on state construction projects were successful, including compensation for 73 
families who lost land to a construction project at the Chong Mek border checkpoint ( 47 
million baht). Altogether, the Assembly had won over 652 million baht compensation for 
people affected by development (Assembly of the Poor, 1997k; Praphat, 1998:207). This 
was unprecedented. 
In mid-1997 the Thai "bubble economy" fmally burst. After the Chavalit government 
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deregulated the exchange value of the baht on the international currency market, 
Thailand rapidly entered a period of economic and financial crisis. In the face of its 
inability to deal decisively with the economic downturn the Chavalit government 
collapsed in November after a no-confidence vote in parliament. A coalition, led by the 
Chaun Leekpai and the Democrat Party, took over the government without elections. 
The new government ignored all previously established Assembly-related committees, 
and set out on an aggressive campaign to reverse the previous government ' s concessions 
to the movement (Baker, 1999). Bureaucratic officials and regional levels of government 
now refused to follow through any unfinished promises by the previous government. For 
example, the Irrigation Department and provincial officials restarted plans to construct 
the Phong Khun Petch Dam in Chaiyaphum (Pasuk, 1999). As the effects of economic 
crisis reverberated throughout the city-based middle class, many sections of the 
previously supportive media seemed to reflect a growing lack of sympathy for rural 
demands for compensation and safeguards to their livelihoods. 
The Assembly initiated a fresh round of demonstrations during 1999, this time dispersed 
throughout the country at strategic localities and sites of conflict, including another rally 
at the Pak Mun dam site (Assembly of the Poor, 1999, Bangkok Post, Internet Edition, 8 
June 1999; Baker, 1999). These protests have won relatively little coverage or support in 
the media and in some cases have been dispersed with force by local authorities . I 
suggest that while the urban, middle class, whose interests are reflected in the media, was 
prospering during the economic boom time of Thailand's bubble economy, an influential 
section supported the environmental and democratic campaigns of the rural and urban 
poor in the Assembly. But with the onset of economic crisis and recession, this 
progressive section of the middle class and the media seems to have lost sympathy with 
the demands for economic compensation by the poor. 
Networking and Activism within Civil Society 
Social movements in the developing world, as in the West , have expanded the social 
domains for challenging existing institutional arrangements for the exercise and 
mediation of power, and the ideologies on which they are based. As I mentioned in the 
Introduction, the concept of "civil society" is increasingly being applied to analyse the 
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social and political contexts of organisation and the manifold ways in which social 
movements challenge relations of power in complex societies. One approach, influential 
in political science perspectives on Third World NGOs, conceptualises civil society as the 
autonomous political space in which previously marginalised groups are able to form 
independent organisations and networks to mediate with the state and pursue their 
political goals. From this perspective NGOs and grassroots' organisations provide 
opportunities for uncoerced association, articulation of collective interests and political 
advocacy that may not be available through other conventional political channels (Clarke, 
1998; Fisher, 1998). They emerge in and enlarge social spaces free from state power and 
enable participation and democratic decision-making, thus democratising society from 
the "bottom-up". 
This study certainly supports this argument about the importance of local villagers' 
organisations for enabling the participation and representation of dissenting voices, and 
mobilisation of people in collective action. I have focused on their emergence and 
activities in several chapters, but especially in Chapter 4 on the Mun River Villagers ' 
Committee. But what I want to challenge here is the idea that the "political space" in 
which they emerge and operate is somehow distinct and autonomous from the "political 
space" of the state at local levels. Writing about civil society in Southeast Asia and 
Thailand, Rodan (1996), and Hewison and Rodan (1996), do argue that we need to 
break down the conceptual dichotomy between state and civil society. For instance, they 
point out that the state determines the legal and political framework in which civil 
organisations must act, arguing that 
it is not the emergence of organisations that is the measure of an 
expanded civil society. Rather state actors must effectively legitimate the 
rights of such bodies to engage in political activity and even to challenge 
the exercise of state power before civil society can be said to be 
established (Hewison and Rodan 1996:41). 
Thus, their work explores the complex relationships and interdependence between the 
two domains, but they also constantly fall back on the ambiguous description of civil 
society as "independent political space". Indeed, the spatial metaphor of civil society, 
usually implying separate and distinct domains of action, pervades much of the writing 
about civil society: it is described as a "realm", a "sphere", a "space for action" "outside" 
of the domains controlled by the state (Van Rooy 1998:19-21). As I argue in the 
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Conclusion to the previous chapter, where are we to find these conditions of uncoerced 
association except in real spaces and places where people meet and organise for political 
purposes. As this study shows, however, these spaces are not necessarily distinct or 
separate from state-controlled spaces. 
At a general theoretical level, considering the degree to which the Thai state has been 
able to "penetrate" to the local level with bureaucratic, ideological and administrative 
institutions (Hirsch, 1989; Missingham, 1997; Turton, 1989), it is difficult to imagine the 
village as providing "autonomous political space" for organised dissent. As I showed in 
Chapter 4, for example, a majority of Village Heads and kamnan, who are employed by 
the state, actively attempt to suppress opposition to state development projects and offer 
few effective means for participation. This, of course, is why the emergence of villagers' 
organisations independent from such state agents is so important for opening up new 
avenues for participation and opposition. But this is not to say that there are no 
supportive groups or individuals occupying positions within the state; where they exist 
they appear to be crucial allies assisting Assembly activities. A salient example is the 
support of the kamnan in Don Chai village ( see Chapter 7). He works actively with the 
villagers' organisation opposing the Kaeng Seua Ten dam and his support was crucial in 
having Don Chai host the Assembly's pho khrua yai meeting in October 1997. 
Moreover, during the meeting he opened up the Tambon Administrative Office and its 
resources for Assembly activists to use. Other examples include a handful of Village 
Heads in communities along the Mun River who support the Assembly, encourage 
people to participate and use the resources ( and prestige) of their official position to 
assist the movement (such as use of the Head's house for meetings, public address 
systems etc). At least three of these Village Heads had been elected because of their anti-
dam activism. In these sorts of cases, how do we conceptually distinguish between the 
"political space" of the state and "civil society"? Clearly they intersect to a certain extent, 
and I would argue that in Thailand, where state institutions are so pervasive at the local 
level, these sorts of links with progressive or dissident state officials play an important 
part in building opposition within civil society. 
The growing impact and power of the social and organisational networks which 
constitute the Assembly also carry implications for understanding notions of civil society. 
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The local organisations of the Assembly's rank and file are part of thriving horizontal and 
vertical social networks which interconnect villagers with NGOs, academics, students 
and other political activists who all act and speak in various contexts to construct what 
we call the "Assembly of the Poor". Moreover, these complex networks link Assembly 
members to other organisations both within the country and outside; to journalists and 
media corporations; to individuals within the state bureaucracy; and to ideas, information 
and resources flowing through increasingly global networks. 
These networks mean that the boundaries of the Assembly are actually difficult to define. 
Moreover, they further challenge any clear-cut distinction between civil society and the 
state. This is because the networks extend to supportive and sympathetic state officials 
and government representatives at many levels. I have already mentioned examples of 
these interconnections at the local level. Prior to a merit-making and fund raising festival 
staged by the Mun River Villagers' Committee at a local temple in early January 1997 
the Assembly announced the names of three national Members of Parliament, one 
member of the Ubon Provincial Assembly and two local kamnan symbolically supporting 
or sponsoring the event (Fieldnotes, 15-12-1996, Khong Jiam). At other levels, some 
NGOs such as the Thai Volunteer Service, include high level state bureaucrats on their 
boards. In Chapter 6 I mentioned the key role played by MP Adisom Plianket in 
representing the government in negotiations with the Assembly during and after the 1997 
protest rally. Activists believed that Adisom' s background as a member of the 
communist insurgency in the 1970s and his friendship with an activist academic who 
works closely with the Assembly contributed to his positive attitude. 
Such networks represent powerful forms of organisation and activism that are changing 
the nature of rural politics (Pasuk, 1999). They are what Castells refers to as "networks 
of social change". They "do more than organising activity and sharing information. They 
are the actual producers, and distributors, of cultural codes" (Castells, 1997:362). The 
potential of these networks to generate knowledge, mobilise resources, people, 
information and representations in the public sphere is clearer when we consider that 
they link the Assembly of the Poor with many powerful institutions in Thai society and 
beyond (for example, the Declaration of 182 Allied Organisations during the protest). 
They connect student organisations and university academics, newspaper, radio, TV and 
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magazine journalists, and NGOs from local community development projects in rural 
areas to international environmental and activist organisations, and other government 's 
aid and development agencies, civil service bureaucrats at all levels from rural teachers to 
semor administrators, village heads, national MPs and provincial assembly 
representatives. 
Such networks bring groups of local people together to support each other's campaigns 
and protests, but also enable local people to speak and poor villagers' voices to be heard 
and broadcast in many social contexts and public spaces. They enable local people to 
access and interpret useful information about state policy, legal regulations and 
resources, human rights and official avenues for petition and representation. They 
translate local claims into technical language for petitions to the state and publicity 
campaigns, academic, scientific and legal arguments. They produce media including 
video and TV productions, newspaper reports, books, magazines, music, art and other 
performances. They organise academic and expert debates and public forums , attended 
by university academics and rural villagers sitting side by side. They mobilise allies and 
supporters to at least symbolic expressions of support. These networks are creating a 
two-way flow of people, resources and information between local contexts and global 
contexts. 
Not all members of the Assembly have equal access to, or move through these networks 
in the same way, of course. All of the NGO activists I interviewed travel constantly and 
extensively throughout the country, and many of them travel overseas on occasions. A 
handful of villagers from each local organisation ( and in many cases not the village elite) 
move from village, to national NGO forums or meetings with government ministers and 
senior bureaucrats, to international conferences of Third World peoples' organisations or 
delegations to the United Nations and the World Bank. For these few villagers the 
experience increases their status, and gives them new confidence and skills. 
The importance of NGOs in building and sustaining these networks is crucial, of course, 
and this brings us back to the issue of their importance in the movement. I have 
discussed their power and influence in the movement, and the contradictions with the 
professed democratic ideologies and practice of collective leadership in the Assembly in 
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Chapter 7. However, to argue that Third World grassroots organisations' dependence on 
the support of NGOs is a weakness, as some do (Bryant & Bailey, 1997: 186; Jelin, 
1998:411-412; Rigg, 1991), is to miss the point. My study of the Assembly leads me to 
believe that the movement would not exist in the form it does without the historical 
activities of NGOs. Professional activists are crucial to the success of broad-based 
movements for social change (Goodwin & Skocpol, 1994:261-2). NGOs work at 
building up a constituency among the poor but, as many villagers told me, if the NGOs 
were not starting from villagers' own perceived needs and goals, the villagers would not 
go with them. As Siang says, villagers' organisations and NGOs are "two things that go 
together". 
New Forms of Identity and Consciousness 
In the Introduction I argued for an approach that pays close attention to identity, culture 
and the symbolic dimensions of collective action and political struggle. This is important, 
as many writers have argued (for example Castells, 1997; Fraser, 1997: 153; Jordan & 
Weedon, 1995), because the formation and representation of collective identity is always 
involved when subordinated groups attempt to redefine their position in society and 
change the social order. Thus, I have described how the movement deploys culture 
strategically, and socially constructs identity and solidarity as a basis for mobilisation and 
protests. I considered the ways in which political identity is constituted in ideological and 
symbolic terms that addresses both outsiders (ie the state) and members of the Assembly, 
seeking to have them recognise shared problems and a shared, meaningful purpose in the 
movement. Through the articulation of collective identity, individuals not only recognise 
their own interests within the collective, but also acquire new consciousness of collective 
agency and their potential to make their own history. Thus, I argue that the culture and 
consciousness of poor, marginalised people constitutes a fundamental terrain of social 
change for the Assembly. 
This argument brings us back to the work of Gramsci and the theoretical concept of 
hegemony. For Gramsci, and many recent Marxist and post-Marxist theorists who draw 
on his work, hegemony refers to the ideological and cultural dimensions of the exercise 
of power throughout civil society. Hegemony suggests ways in which the day to day 
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lives, knowledge, and consciousness of subordinated groups are shaped by pervasive 
ideological meanings, cultural practices and values stemming from dominant groups. 
Writers such as Raymond Williams (1977: 110), as I mentioned in the introduction, 
interpret hegemony as a lived process involving everyday cultural practices, which he 
calls "practical consciousness", embedded in relations of domination. Such an approach 
is consistent with Bourdieu's rejection of a division between the material and cognitive 
worlds through his notion of "habitus" and his theory of practice (see also Pieke, 
1996:49-51 ). Habitus involves the acquisition of particular dispositions, "constituted by 
practice and constantly aimed at practical - as opposed to cognitive - functions" 
(Bourdieu, in Wacquant, 1992:42). As I have shown throughout this study, it is through 
the practice of meetings, networking and protesting that villagers come to embody 
activism and "cultures of solidarity" (Fantasia, 1988). In their words, actions, even body 
language, villagers come to be in the world in different ways to their former dispositions 
- not merely change their consciousness. 
For these reasons, this study is grounded in the lives, experiences and practices of the 
actual members of the Assembly of the Poor, rather than an approach solely concerned 
with ideology. Thus, it is important to look at the practices, processes and experiences 
through which villagers come to have new dispositions, new ways of acting, embodying 
and responding to relations of power. Social movements emerge out of the day to day 
lives, and activities of the people who participate in them. In fact , I have argued 
throughout that this grounding in the material local grievances and problems of 
livelihood of members provides the principle motivating force for large numbers of 
people to mobilise and participate in the Assembly's activities and protests. Their own 
day to day lives, locality, sense of "community" and relationship to place are the most 
immediate sources of identity for most of the ordinary villagers in the Assembly (see 
Castells, 1997). For many groups the assertion of a locally-based collective identity 
became a rallying point and a strategy of resistance to the projects and processes of 
"national development". 
For the Assembly, the starting point for a political consciousness is in people ' s local, 
material problems, particularly the destructive effects of large development projects 
implemented by state agencies. These provide the concrete experiences from which to 
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develop a political consciousness of the causes of poverty and inequality, and challenge 
the hegemony of development as an ideology. A group of NGO activists who advise the 
Assembly of the Poor put it this way: 
Social movements begin from the issues pertammg to the immediate 
impacts of development on the livelihood of the people. In recent years, 
people have learned to connect their immediate problems with political 
issues such as the state and power structure. The development of this 
trend shows higher political consciousness of the lower income group. 
People are quite often underestimated in their political awareness and 
commitment to the movements (Bantam et.al., 1994: 121). 
These "immediate problems" of livelihood also provide the motivations to participate in 
meetings, forums, villagers' organisations and networks. Thus, such "grassroots 
organisations" become the vehicles for better organising and mounting cooperative, 
collective efforts but also for representation, delegation and petitioning of local and 
outside authorities and agencies. They also become the domains for transforming 
political consciousness. A common strategy of the NGO activists who work with the 
Assembly is to arrange meetings and forums in which villagers are encouraged to speak 
from their everyday, local experiences but in contexts that encourage them to find 
common ground and linkages with other groups with similar problems. 
As I described in Chapter 6, participation in campaigns, rallies and protests provide 
experiences that dialectically transform identity, solidarity and political consciousness. 
Participants literally learn through experience that "Solidarity is strength" and see their 
own political agency in action. "We have to join together in great numbers . Join together 
for a long time before they will listen to us. The strength (phalang) of poor people is 
only in the protest rally" . The protests asserted and demonstrated the agency of the poor 
and their collective power in numbers, coupled with their right to have a voice in a 
democracy and, at the very least, express their petition and have their grievances 
recognised by the state and the public sphere. That is why the representation of the 
history of protest events provide significant touchstones in Assembly documents and 
discourses. It is also why Assembly activists and leaders regarded a measure of "tangible 
success" so important to the conclusion of the protest rally in 1997. What my 
ethnographic account of protest in chapter 6 shows is the great amount of work that 
Assembly members put into addressing each other, engendering a culture of solidarity 
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and community, developing political consciousness asserting the agency and power of 
the poor as a collective force, and constructing and negotiating their sense of collective 
identity. 
Ideological and Discursive Challenges to Development 
For many writers theoretical conceptions of "hegemony" have increasingly converged 
with discourse analysis deriving from the work of Foucault (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; 
Smart, 1983). Much of the recent work of Escobar is concerned with "development" as a 
"hegemonic discourse" shaping representations of the "underdevelopment" and 
determining the dominant policies and practices of social and economic change in Third 
World societies (1995a; 1995b). Peet and Watts (1996b) argue that this hegemony of 
modernisation and development is being contested and subverted by various forms of 
environmental discourse. The importance of environmental movements in the Third 
World, from their perspective, is their opposition and challenge to dominant discourses 
of development which shape people's relationships with the economy and environment: 
... as well as being practical struggles over livelihood and survival, 
[ environmental movements] contest the 'truths,' imaginations, and 
discourses through which people think, speak about and experience 
systems of livelihood (Peet & Watts, 1996b:37). 
I have explained the Assembly's ideological and discursive challenges to development at 
various points in this study. In attacking discourses of development which promote 
industrialisation, entrench the political and economic power of the elite and social 
relations of inequality and exploitation, the Assembly contests a central hegemonic 
discourse on which legitimacy of the dominant elite is based. There are at least two 
dimensions to the ideological strategies of the movement. First, the Assembly has had to 
find ways to challenge the powerful discourses of "national development", modernisation 
and economic growth which the state and other social forces deploy to legitimate large 
scale projects. Second, the Assembly constantly struggles to give meaning to its actions, 
and to frame its petitions and demands in terms that carry legitimacy and symbolic power 
in public debates. 
At the heart of the Assembly's challenge to state power is an argument about the effects 
of development on local communities. Its critique of development is expressed in terms 
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of communities' rights to participate in development decisions about their own local 
resources, articulated in terms of community rights, sustainable development and 
democratisation. Environmentalism has proven powerful as it has provided ways of 
giving specific local environments meaning and value in terms of the national interest. In 
other words, environmental protection and sustainable development have provided 
powerful discourses for overcoming the representation of "national interests" over and 
above "local interests". In these terms villagers have been quick to reformulate 
themselves as the legitimate managers and conservationists of their local environments. 
For example, we saw this in Mun River villagers claims about their sustainable use of the 
fisheries before the dam (Chapter 4), and in the move by villagers threatened by the 
Kaeng Seua Ten Dam to reposition themselves as local conservationists (Chapter 7). 
Thus, the Assembly draws upon global discourses of environmentalism, while at the 
same time reinterpreting and re-articulating it in terms of the defence of their rights to 
land and livelihood. 
Thus, claims about relationships with local environments provide one of the grounds 
from which the Assembly challenges the ideological underpinnings and practice of 
development by the state. These claims are linked with appeals for community rights, 
participation and democratic reform (Chapter 3). All of these terms are ambiguous and 
carry multiple and contested meanings, but are used in Assembly discourse as political 
symbols in a struggle over power relations and political decision-making in Thai society. 
We cannot judge the political effectiveness of the Assembly of the Poor simply on the 
material outcomes of its protest campaigns. As I show throughout the thesis, members of 
the Assembly of the Poor mobilise, campaign and struggle against domination in a 
number of social situations and material contexts, and enact through a range of media a 
cultural, ideological and discursive struggle over the exercise of power. It is an ongoing 
struggle. 
* * * 
On 23 March 1999 the Mun River villagers once again began a prolonged protest and 
occupation of the Pak Mun Dam wall, calling on the government of Chuan Leekpai to 
follow through with compensation agreements reached in 1996 and 1997. They were 
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joined by other Assembly groups from the Northeast, including Sirinthorn Dam villagers 
and two other dam groups (Pennapa, 1999). According to NGO activists at the Mun 
River Villagers' Centre about 5000 people have joined the rally. After six months they 
were still there, as there has been little response from the government (N oi, personal 
communication, 28-9-1999). I can imagine them, sheltering in the makeshift 
encampment, conducting their ordinary lives as an extraordinary protest. No doubt, 
Panya Tongyu is performing again at the protest site, adding a new verse to his song. 
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